Disruptive philosophies: Eco-rational education and the epistemology of place\ua0​​​​​​​ by Thornton, Simone Gralton
  
 
 
Disruptive Philosophies: Eco-rational 
education and the epistemology of place  
 
 
Simone Gralton Thornton  
BFA (GRIFFITH), BA (HONS) (UQ), DIPARTS (UQ) 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at 
The University of Queensland in 2018 
School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry 
 
ii 
 
Abstract 
Climate change and colonisation share many similarities. Both are the result of complex 
interactions between epistemology and ontology. Both are the indirect result of 
individualism and industrialisation. Both can be said to fail to recognise limits, and both 
have had many theses written on them already. Instead of focusing on one or the other, I 
join Val Plumwood in looking for a shared logic that underpins the two. Plumwood’s 
work centres on trying to bring together multiple critiques of domination: feminism, 
critical race theory, indigenous philosophy and environmental philosophy, to explicate 
what they have in common: the logic of domination. The careful way in which she 
combines these fields allows her to argue that our current (Western) form of rationality, 
marked by an emphasis on the liberal individual’s stark separation of the human from the 
earth and earth Others, is irrational. Further, it is a potentially suicidal rationality, in that 
it is not only divorced from, but unable to recognise, environmental limits, the observation 
of which is essential to human survival. To better explicate how the logic of domination 
operates in social, cultural, institutional and political habitats, I incorporate Albert 
Camus’ search for moral limits into Plumwood’s framework.   
 
If climate change and colonisation are underpinned by an ecologically irrational 
epistemology, then education as an instrument of liberal-democracy is implicated in the 
reproduction of ecological irrationality and is, therefore, a site of possible disruption of 
dominant logic. To this end, I discuss philosophical suicide, heavenism, epistemic 
violence, anthropocentricism, anthropomorphism, and the myth of reversal to illustrate 
the historical influences of Western philosophical thought that has dominated liberal-
democratic institutions. I follow dominant logic’s legal and ontological instantiation 
through the doctrine of discovery, Terra Nullius, liberal-democracy, the Stolen 
Generations, the apology, the Northern Territory intervention, and the slaughterhouse. I 
show that how we remember the past, exercise our imagination, and conceive of truth and 
morality, can either perpetuate or mitigate dominant logic.  
 
The overarching two-part question of this thesis, then, is: (1) why are societies structured 
as they are? and (2) how does education reinforce or disrupt existing structures? 
Consequently, the thesis is in two parts. The first looks at the ways in which Australian 
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society is structured. I focus on Australia as it is the country in which I am situated; 
however, as a white colonial identity, I seek to unsettle my own natal identity, to become 
traitorous to those aspects of myself that have become habituated to a dominant colonial 
logic, while admitting that my perspective is likely to be limited in ways that escape my 
own inspection. As Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2015), speaking of an indigenous ‘we’, 
said: ‘We experience and tolerate racism on a daily basis, and its perpetration is usually 
invisible to those who practice it, particularly when it is exercised with a reliable self-
calibrated moral compass’ (p. 173). I chose Australia also as it is, on the global stage, a 
relatively clear-cut case of an invading peoples claiming sovereignty over existing 
peoples who have never ceded their pre-existing sovereignty. To justify colonisation, 
colonisers dehumanised/dehumanise Ingenious peoples, resulting in ethnocide. I explore 
the ways in which colonisation has worked in this country to obscure the conditions of 
settler ‘acquisition’ of land and, therefore, its violent history.  
 
In the second part, I turn to the disrupting potential of philosophy and develop what I call 
eco-rational education. I introduce Philosophy for Children as an existing approach to 
inquiry-based, child-centred learning that has pedagogical emphasis on self-correcting 
communities of inquiry, which proponents of philosophy in schools claim to be exemplar 
of democracy in action, not as a political system, but as an associated form of life. I then 
ask how the existing Australian literature responds to dominant logic writ large. I 
conclude by arguing that Australian identity formation is marked by an ongoing denial of 
history that is epistemically violent to the ‘self’ in formation and to the Other it interacts 
with. Ethnocide is perpetuated in the classroom through colonial identity formation, 
which dominates other ways of knowing and being. To agree to a ‘self’ defined by force 
is to lose the ability to define one’s self, which I argue educationally amounts to losing 
the ability to learn. To guard against epistemic violence in the classroom teachers need to 
turn traitorous to dominant logic. As the task of education, implicitly or explicitly, is 
identity formation and nation building through curriculum, hidden or otherwise, being 
traitorous means mitigating against dominant logic’s control over the narrative of being 
human.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Defining the problem 
 
My task is to develop a theoretical framework that can provide guidelines for an eco-
rational education. Why? A common response to adverse daily news, both in Australia 
and abroad, is: ‘Education is the answer’, as if education alone will solve the world’s ills. 
Education has been touted as an antidote for a range of apparent ills on both sides of the 
political divide: ‘fake news’, climate denial, climate change, environmental degradation, 
economic growth, economic stagnation, the controversy over the date of Australia 
Day/Invasion Day, reclaiming Aboriginal sovereignty and the call for a treaty, hate 
speech, political correctness, domestic and family violence, to name but a few. 
Compulsory primary and secondary schooling, senior secondary school, higher 
education, citizenship education for immigrants, and public education are but a few ways 
that education is said to provide a stable society, social change, a new economy, economic 
stability, female empowerment, male rights, traditional values, progressive values, and so 
on. 
 
According to John Dewey (1916), ‘Education is not preparation for life; education is life 
itself’ (p. 239). Dewey (2012b) claimed that the ‘heart of the sociality’ of a person is 
education and rallied against the ‘idea of education as preparation and of adulthood as a 
fixed limit of growth’, reasoning that ‘[i]f the moral business of the adult as well as the 
young is a growing1 and developing experience, then the instruction that comes from 
social dependencies and interdependencies are as important for the adult as for the child’ 
(p. 185). Dewey knew that education, politics and morality could never be separated in 
anything save language. He touted the need for philosophy to underlie education, giving 
                                                 
1 Dewey’s notion of growth contrasts starkly with notions of economic growth, the growth of nations, and 
the accumulation of wealth; that is, growth toward an end goal. Instead he viewed growth as an end in itself 
and the goal of education. One can be said to have an educational experience if one grows as a person, not 
as an individual in the liberal sense of the word, but as an embodied human in relational to other humans 
and the environment.  
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something so important for so many diverse reasons, a theoretical structure. However, 
according to Matthew Lipman (2004), Dewey  
 
left behind him no samples of philosophical curricula, no specific 
examples of how philosophy could serve as an essential subject area in the 
elementary schools, he did bequeath to us something perhaps just as 
valuable: a set of criteria by means of which we might be able to tell 
whether our efforts to follow his grand design were on target or misguided. 
In other words, implicit in his writings are pedagogical guidelines which 
would be applicable to any curriculum, even to those that had not yet been 
invented. (p. 6) 
 
My purpose here is to follow in Dewey’s footsteps, so to speak, in creating not a practical 
curriculum, but, rather, a theoretical framework to inform curriculum. The framework I 
develop is for social change and cultural reproduction that avoids the epistemic harms of 
the past. Education is a powerful vehicle for both social change and cultural reproduction. 
Were it not the case, successive governments, conservative or progressive, would not 
closely guard it as an institution for their own reform agendas, inculcation of values, 
identity formation for future generations and nation building. Indeed, this thesis 
somewhat relies on it being so. However, more than not, what is left out of appeals to 
education as a solution is the form and purpose of education needed and how it might 
improve the dearth of whatever it is that is being claimed requires improvement. What 
culture is reproduced is also little commented on. What do people mean, then, when they 
propose education as a solution, and why is it assumed that education is a public good? 
Surely education programs can create social disbenefits?  
 
History abounds with examples of the education of children that we would today look 
upon as anything but desirable. Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012) argues that Western 
education has been and continues to be a site of violence toward Indigenous peoples: 
‘Numerous accounts across nations now attest to the critical role played by schools in 
assimilating colonised peoples, and in the systematic, frequently brutal, forms of denial 
of indigenous languages, knowledges and cultures’ (p. 67). The Stolen Generations in 
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Australia are a prime example of the damage wrought by education based on a policy of 
assimilation, the growing recognition of which led former Australian Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd to deliver a formal apology in parliament on 13 February 2008. However, 
the gaps between Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, highlighted by the Australian 
Justice Report 2005 in the areas of employment outcomes, Year 12 attainment rates, early 
childhood education, infant mortality, and life expectancy have not yet been closed. Of 
the seven areas, only three are reported to be on track to meeting the closure targets set 
(See: Closing the Gap Prime Minister’s Report 2018). Further, closing the education gap, 
Janet Mooney and Rhonda Craven (2015) argue, ‘can only be achieved by building 
cultural competence in Aboriginal history and cultures for all students and Departmental 
staff’ (p. 321).  
 
The Australian Curriculum as it stands includes ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Histories and Cultures’ as a cross-curriculum priority; however, the way in which it is 
incorporated and taught in the classroom has the potential to perpetuate prejudices that 
contribute to the very existence of the gap. Mooney and Craven reason that for a teacher 
to effectively teach Aboriginal perspectives, they themselves need to first learn them at 
the level of pre-service teacher training. However, not all teacher training courses in 
Australia have a core Aboriginal Studies unit, and as a result, some school students ‘may 
not be being taught adequately about Australia’s Aboriginal history. This implies that 
mandatory Aboriginal perspectives are not being incorporated into the curriculum’ (pp. 
327‒328).  
 
As it stands, not enough is being done to ensure the teaching of ‘Aboriginal history and 
culture’ as per the cross-curriculum priority, but there is another issue which arguably 
subsumes cross-curriculum priorities effectiveness and questions its framework. Irene 
Watson (2014) states that ‘First Nations peoples must also negotiate the dominant 
colonial paradigm within which the colonial state either denies Indigenous knowledge or, 
if it acknowledges it at all, treats it within Western social sciences as culture or history’ 
(p. 510, italics added). Teaching Aboriginal knowledge as confined to ‘culture’ or 
‘history’ treats it as a singular dead object of study, rather than as plural diverse living 
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knowledge. In a powerful statement, Watson calls for a decentring of Western knowledge 
that has for so long kept other ways of knowing at the periphery:  
 
To make up for the historic and ongoing erasures of Aboriginal knowledge 
and possibly to begin to remedy the desolation which they have wrought, 
one solution would be to recentre Aboriginal worldviews as the norm and 
to liberate Indigenous places from colonising and assimilationist 
processes. However, for this to occur we need to take aim at normativity 
itself; and certainly to take aim at the proposition that the state is the centre 
into which First Nations peoples are to be absorbed and assimilated. In 
centring Aboriginal knowledges, we need to go beyond neo-liberal 
interpretations of human rights and include, for example, the relationality 
of Indigenous knowledges to all things in the environment, to land and kin. 
(p. 513) 
 
Education is no silver bullet, whether it be lifelong education, citizenship education, 
institutional schooling, adult education, or any form of formal or informal education from 
parenting to public awareness campaigns, such as the Australian ‘Slip, Slop Slap’ 
campaigns to create awareness of skin cancer or drug and alcohol media campaigns aimed 
at youth. What and how we teach is of important ethical, political and social concern. I 
follow Watson in calling for a more central place for Indigenous ways of knowing, being 
and doing in education, particularly the relationality of Indigenous knowledges to all 
things in the environment, to land and kin.  
 
In this thesis, I look at the ways in which education can be used to mitigate both physical 
and epistemic violence to self, the Other and the environment. I argue for a 
philosophically in-depth understanding of education, one that itself creates a limit to 
violence, not only physical but also epistemic. Why? Because education is a vehicle for 
the transmission of ideas, and ideas are dangerous, especially when we fail to question 
their legitimacy. To demonstrate the interaction between ideas and the social structures 
they help to create, I would like to recount an excerpt from a fictional story, written 
nonetheless from the memories, during World War II, of the German author, Hermann 
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Hesse (1978). The passage highlights the ability of the Outsider to question structurally 
embedded ideas and values that those immersed in the structure accept and habituate to 
without reflection, without understanding. It also demonstrates how the failure of the 
insider to question supports the dominant social order: 
 
‘May I ask you a question? You must realize how little I know about 
what’s been going on.’ 
‘Go right ahead.’ 
‘Well, here’s what I’d like to know: how can life go on under these 
conditions? How can people stand it?’ 
‘Oh, they’re not so badly off. Your situation is exceptional: a civilian – 
and without papers! There are very few civilians left. Practically everyone 
who isn’t a soldier is a civil servant. That makes life bearable for most 
people, a good many are genuinely happy. Little by little one gets used to 
the shortages. When the potatoes gave out, we had to put up with sawdust 
gruel – they season it with tar now, it’s surprisingly tasty – we all thought 
it would be unbearable. But then we got used to it. And the same with 
everything else.’ 
‘I see,’ I said. ‘It’s really not so surprising. But there’s one thing I still 
don’t understand. Tell me: why is the whole world making these enormous 
efforts? Putting up with such hardships, with all these laws, these 
thousands of bureaus and bureaucrats – what is all this meant to preserve 
and safeguard?’ 
The gentleman looked at me in amazement.  
‘What a question!’ he cried, shaking his head. ‘You know we’re at war: 
the whole world is at war. That’s what we are preserving, what we make 
laws and endure hardships for. The war! Without these enormous 
exertions and achievements our armies wouldn’t be able to fight for a 
week. They’d starve – we can’t allow that!’ 
‘Yes,’ I said slowly, ‘you’ve got something there! The war, in other words, 
is a treasure that must be preserved at all cost. Yes, but – I know it’s an 
odd question – why do you value the war so highly? Is it worth so much? 
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Is war really a treasure?’ 
The official shrugged his shoulders and gave me a pitying look. He saw 
that I just didn’t understand. (p. 27) 
 
The backstory, that for the sake of brevity is missing from the excerpt, is that the man 
asking the questions has been, so the fictional story goes, off in the ether, wandering in 
the cosmos for some years, a feat he accomplishes by reciting a ‘short astral spell’ (p. 28), 
and, upon his return, had found that many things had changed in his absence. The societal 
organisation he once knew is now gone; the human world to him is now unrecognisable, 
and for that reason, unnavigable. I find this story compelling for several reasons. The first 
is the emphasis on habituation; ‘we got used to it’ as Hesse writes. His description of the 
consumption of sawdust gruel flavoured with tar gives the reader a visceral understanding 
of the lengths to which people will go to adapt to a system of organisation, in this case, a 
system organised to support the ‘war’: ‘If there is still any law, order, or thought in the 
world, we have the war to thank for it’ (p. 28), notes the bureaucrat. The second reason, 
the outsider’s questioning of the value of adapting to such a system of violence, is equally 
important: ‘Is the war really a treasure?’ Asking such a question is to go to the heart of 
social organisation and to question the very structures of which we are a part. The 
official’s reaction is telling, it is he who does not understand that things could be other 
than they are, and yet his look reverses the situation: the ‘bureaucrat’ thinks it is the 
questioner who does not understand. The bureaucrat has never thought to question the 
law and order brought about by the war, he has never thought to ask: ‘What is all this 
meant to preserve and safeguard?’ This is a significant question, for as we all know, the 
ultimate cost of war is life. How is it that such an obvious cost had escaped his attention, 
or at the very least, not weighed in his calculations of war as a treasure? Albert Camus, 
ever the outsider, finding himself caught in the same war that Hesse was critiquing in his 
story, namely, World War II, asked, although not in so many words, why is war thought 
to be more important than life? How could it possibly be more important than ‘preserving 
and safeguarding’ life? In many ways, it is absurd that such a question needs to be asked, 
and I read Camus’ work as an attempt to demonstrate this absurdity.  
 
Born in November 1913, less than a year before World War I began, Camus was a young 
man during World War II. He lived in a period very much marked by death. His two 
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philosophical essays, The Myth of Sisyphus (Le Mythe de Sisyphe, 1942) and The Rebel 
(L’Homme révolté, 1951), were both attempts to address the culture of death he 
witnessed.2 Received religion had set moral limits to life, the most important being ‘Thou 
shalt not kill’, however, Friedrich Nietzsche’s infamous declaration ‘God is dead’, in 
addition to the chaos of the war and the rise of Communism, had widely placed the 
validity of moral limits in question.3 The advent of nihilism, from the point of view of 
philosophy and the mountain of bodies accumulated through the course of the war, 
seemed to have done away with morality; for if ‘one believes in nothing, if nothing makes 
sense, if we can assert no value whatsoever, everything is permissible and nothing is 
important’ (p. 13). Following this line of thought, a strange and terrible freedom is 
obtained; a freedom from moral limits that greatly troubled Camus. This is not to say, 
however, that Camus advocated a return to dogma, as he thought dogma itself guilty of 
murder.4 For Camus, writing was a way of life. In his words, it is ‘an attempt to understand 
the time I live in’ (p. 11).  If the time happened to be one marked by death, particularly, 
murder and suicide, then it was to these grim topics that he would turn his pen. Amidst 
the horror of war, it was to the logic that proposed the death of moral limits that he turned 
his critique.  
 
The world wars are in the past, but the killing continues; the places, names, faces change 
but Camus’ critique, sadly, remains relevant. History remembers the world wars as 
declared and recognised wars between specific countries, and yet, according to Camus, 
the justifications leading up to and following many of the specific acts of murder and 
violence, those which make up the statistics, were less than clear, and poorly, if at all, 
understood. These justifications, he thought, must be understood, as they ‘cripple 
judgement’ and halt action to prevent violence.  
 
As a pied noir, a French citizen of Algerian birth, Camus was a relative outsider in French 
society. As an outsider, he thought it an absurd justification that we as living creatures 
could structure our society in such a way that the taking of life is normalised to the point 
                                                 
2 See Chapter Four.  
3 For Camus (1977) ‘suffering exhausts hope and faith and then is left alone and unexplained. The toiling 
masses, worn out with suffering and death, are masses without God. Our place is henceforth at their side, 
far from teachers, old and new’ (p. 267). 
4 See Chapter Four.  
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of unquestioned habituation, and achieved through the stroke of a pen, as in Hesse’s 
example and as Camus witnessed during World War II. Whatever else it may be, the 
perspective of the outsider is the value I find in Camus’ work, and the perspective I seek 
to advance in this thesis. In doing so, I also seek to respond to a request made by Mary 
Graham (2014) in her paper, ‘Aboriginal notions of relationality and positionalism: a 
reply to Weber’, wherein she writes: ‘I would like to conclude this brief paper by 
requesting an inquiry into the following question – Will there ever be a use-by date for 
Empire? Or will Empire simply dominate behind another face?’ (p. 22). Colonisation, I 
argue, is an ongoing war against the Other hidden ‘behind another face’, structured into 
our institutions and perpetuated through systems of administration. I trace this war 
through Val Plumwood’s logic of domination, and the epistemic violence it leaves in its 
wake.  
 
The overarching two-part question of this thesis, then, is: (1) why are societies structured 
as they are, and (2) how does education reinforce or disrupt existing structures? 
Consequently, the thesis is in two parts; the first looks to the ways in which Australian 
society is structured. I chose Australia as it is the place in which I am situated, however, 
as a white colonial identity,5 I am aware of my perspective, ever mindful of the potential 
for me to slip into the role of Hesse’s bureaucrat. Hence, I seek to unsettle my own natal 
identity, to become traitorous to those aspects of myself that have become habituated to 
a dominant colonial logic. I also chose Australia as it is, on the global stage, a relatively 
clear-cut case of an invading peoples claiming sovereignty over existing peoples who 
have never ceded their pre-existing sovereignty.6 To deny Indigenous sovereignty, the 
colonialists did not recognise Indigenous peoples as fully human. I explore the ways in 
which colonisation has worked in this country to obscure the conditions of its 
                                                 
5 I will use the term coloniser or colonial identity in place of the usual ‘settler’ nomenclature. I do this to 
create consistency with the past, as Australia was not settled but, rather, colonised by an invading culture 
(see Chapter Three). 
6 Watson (2011) writes: ‘As a young law student, I was amused by my discovery of the law’s naming of 
the Aboriginal person as being a British subject – that is, without acknowledging that there had never been 
a dialogue between us and the British on the question of our legal and political status, and that at no stage 
had Aboriginal peoples been informed of our coming into being as “British subjects”, let alone having 
obtained our consent to this subject positioning as the included native. It had all occurred even though 
Aboriginal peoples had remained in fact excluded from recognition as British subjects – that is, excluded 
from having rights to “property” and any rights to a self-determined community life’ (p. 624). 
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‘acquisition’ of land and, therefore, its violent history. Particularly, my concern is how 
this history has shaped education in Australia.  
 
I wish to acknowledge throughout this thesis, the traditional owners of the land on which 
I live, the Kabi Kabi peoples locally, and the many Aboriginal peoples throughout 
Australia. Following Alieen Morton-Robinson, Gayatri Spivak, Patrick Wolfe and others, 
I argue that the logic of colonisation is a structural force without an end date; one that 
needs to be addressed at every level of human organisation—individual, familial, social, 
cultural, institutional, political—to develop the self in continuous formation as an 
environmentally embedded active moral agent, fallible and aware of its potential to 
collectively perpetuate colonial dominance. I primarily refer to the logic of domination 
as Plumwood has done much of the work in her two books, Feminism and the Mastery of 
Nature (1993) and Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason (2002), to 
establish the links between epistemology and oppression—however, she does not use the 
term ‘epistemic violence’ specifically, so, for this, I turn to Spivak. 
 
Plumwood (1993) contends that ‘a common, integrated framework for the critique of both 
human domination and the domination of nature’ is a ‘vital contribution to a more 
complete understanding of domination and colonisation’ (pp. 1‒2). I follow her lead and 
examine the history of colonisation of the land; land in a robust sense including plants, 
animals, ecosystems, rock formations and human beings. I reject the separation of humans 
from land, from earth, from nature, and seek to reinstate our consciousness within the 
natural; to take our head out of Plato’s clouds so to speak. I examine the history of appeals 
to ‘heavenism’ and its ongoing contributions to the notion of humans as separate and apart 
from nature and those closest to it. Heavenism is used by Plumwood as an explanation of 
myths at the core of the logic that drives ongoing colonisation; the logic of domination. I 
also follow Karin Murris (2016a) in seeking to extend the critique of colonisation to 
children and childhood.  
 
Although much academic critique focuses on the social and cultural 
normativity of knowledge claims when deconstructing Cartesian dualist 
oppositions, their focus is almost exclusively on race, class and gender 
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[…]. Children are still invisible in mainstream academic philosophy as 
well as other fields of academic enquiry. (p. 132) 
 
I contend that the current Australian curriculum does little to address either colonisation 
or environmental degradation and when it does so, both are treated as fixed topics for 
study, rather than areas open to reconstruction and action. The presentation of knowledge 
as fixed and final is a feature of traditional forms of education, which Paulo Freire 
famously called the banking conception of education. Traditional forms of knowledge 
transmission mirror cultural norms of knowledge transmission; to move away from both 
requires the reconstruction of education towards the reconstruction of society. 
Philosophy, I will argue, can aid in accomplishing the educational task of identity 
formation and community, rather than nation building, through the reconstruction of 
education toward socio-cultural reconstruction of the greater community (Dewey, 2012; 
Bleazby, 2013; Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1980), but with an emphasis on onto-
epistemological reconstruction (Murris, 2016a; Plumwood, 1993) and decolonisation of 
dominant logics (Plumwood, 2002; Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Spivak, 2003; Wolfe, 
2006) with a view to create eco-rational identities. In other words, my task is to argue for 
an educational methodology that provides students with the capacity for correctiveness. 
 
Maughn Gregory, Joanna Haynes and Karin Murris (2017) remind us that the presence 
of philosophy in schools is centuries old, and that the history of philosophy as a vehicle 
for social change is even older. Indeed, Socrates was arguably killed for philosophy’s 
ability to disrupt established social and moral practices.  
 
Unlike others experimenting with ‘pre-college philosophy’ at the time, 
who saw schools as a place to do philosophy with young people, Lipman 
and Sharp saw doing philosophy as an ideal of the educational experience, 
even capable of transforming education more broadly. Toward that agenda 
they each wrote a number of philosophical novels for children and 
teenagers … (p. xxvi) 
 
Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, founders of Philosophy for Children (P4C), 
recognised both philosophy’s danger and its potential. Developed in the 1970s, theirs is 
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an inquiry-based pedagogy which focuses on the social reconstruction potential of 
philosophy. It is a viable learning-centred approach to education that uses an inquiry-
based pedagogy known as the community of inquiry (COI). However, its environmental 
engagement has, to date, been limited. Whilst their approach to practising philosophy 
with children in an educational setting is not the only one, it is unique in its emphasis on 
philosophy’s ability to reconstruct education, and hence, society. However, although it 
has been adapted to a plethora of ends since its first creation in the 1960s, I will argue 
that its adaption to indigenous philosophy and environmental philosophy is still in its 
infancy. It is to these areas that this thesis mostly contributes to the literature on 
educational philosophy, or as Lipman put it, philosophy functioning educationally, 
particularly Philosophy for Children, but more widely, the philosophy in schools 
‘movement’.  
 
The addition of Plumwood to the literature on Philosophy for Children is not novel. 
Others, such as Jennifer Bleazby (2013), in her book Social Reconstruction Learning: 
Dualism, Dewey and philosophy in schools, have done this successfully. So, I build on 
Bleazby’s, argument regarding the role of dualisms in shaping education and focus on 
Plumwood’s work on developing ecological rationality and decolonisation. My attempt 
to fit Philosophy for Children with environmental philosophy is also not without 
precedent. Evidence I uncovered during research for a co-edited book on the history of 
philosophy in schools in Australia (see Burgh & Thornton, 2019) suggests that an early 
project included Plumwood. Plumwood’s brush with Philosophy for Children lends 
further weight to the claim of the potential fit between Philosophy for Children and 
ecofeminism.  
 
Plumwood (1993, 2002) argues that the (Western, First) world has been and continues to 
be shaped by an ecologically suicidal rationality that poses a threat to the existence of our 
species and other species. Granting that we live in such a world, my concern is how to 
educate present and future generations to act in an ethically responsible, ecologically 
rational way. Plumwood used examples of environmental degradation to make a case for 
Western society’s eco-irrationality, whereas I use climate change specifically as an 
example of a global threat to life. As stated in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
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Change (IPCC): ‘Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and 
even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very 
high risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence)’ 
(IPCC, 2014, p. 18). Whilst there is contention within the climate change community as 
to how severe the effects of climate change will be, the very possibility of ‘severe, 
widespread and irreversible impacts globally’ demands a response from all areas of 
human collective effort and knowledge production.  
 
The history of what we now recognise as climate change spans centuries, beginning at 
least in the field of science with the study of thermodynamics in the 1800s. As a global 
phenomenon attributable to human activities, climate change is becoming an ever larger, 
ever looming spectre affecting or caused by every level of human organisation. Since the 
early 2000s, scientists have been calling for greater engagement from the humanities in 
academic research on the problem and possible solutions. This has led to what Mike 
Hulme (2017) has observed is a ‘new wave of “environmental humanities” which has 
erupted around the intellectual world’ (p. 115):  
 
‘Climate change’ is seen much less as an environmental ‘problem’ to be 
solved through technology or the deployment of economic instruments, as 
was an earlier wave of twentieth-century environmental challenges such 
as river pollution or stratospheric ozone depletion. Mere science and 
engineering knowledge seems, on its own, deficient to the task in hand. 
Rather, the scale of the transformations occurring to the atmosphere, 
oceans and cryosphere, and the deep implication of the human in these 
transformations, reframes what sort of phenomenon climate change is. 
And therefore reframes how it needs studying, debating and acting upon. 
The humanities, and the ways they approach the world and the meanings 
humans impute to the world, are central to these tasks. (p. 115) 
 
Environmental philosophy was an early entrant into this intellectual reframing. However, 
the applications of the theories developed to other areas of research has been limited. This 
is unfortunate because, as Freya Mathews (2014) points out, environmental philosophy  
 
13 
 
examines our relation, as human beings, to nature or our natural 
environment: it reviews our philosophical understandings of nature and 
our conception of nature’s value and entitlements; it explores how we are 
to live with and in nature and to what degree nature is or is not implicated 
in our own human identity. The question whether nature and environment 
are useful concepts at all, or merely contribute to attitudes that pathologise 
our relations with our world, is also considered. (p. 534) 
 
Philosophy is a site of reframing, and when coupled with education is a possible site of 
influencing societal reframing. If environmental degradation is, as Plumwood (2012) 
argues, a problem that has its epistemic source in a dominant rationality, then, to unravel 
the threat of ecological irrationality, I argue that educators must look for, what she calls, 
‘experiences that do not fit the dominant story’ (pp. 11–12). This thesis, then, is also a 
rallying call to educators to not continue to do business as usual, but to disrupt an 
important link in the chain of climate change by developing ‘traitorous identities’, their 
own and their students’. A traitorous identity7 is a critically engaged and 
phenomenologically aware ‘self’; a self that is traitorous to the logic of domination. This 
means a self that is positioned not only against the erasure of nature, but against the 
othering of those deemed close to or part of nature.  
 
Locke’s recipe for property formation allows the colonist to appropriate 
that into which he has mixed his own labour, as part of the self, transferring 
his ownership of self to what is laboured on, on condition that it falls under 
the category of ‘nature’, not under prior ownership. But since the colonist 
was either not able or not disposed to recognise either the prior ownership 
of indigenous others nor their different expression of labour and agency, 
the formula aided large-scale appropriation of indigenous lands by those 
who could visit upon them highly transforming and destructive European-
style agricultural labour. (p. 214) 
 
                                                 
7 The term ‘traitorous identities’ I take from Plumwood and use according to her definition, not to be 
confused with the term ‘race traitor’.  
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Colonisation is the story of the nullification of Indigenous peoples’ ways of knowing, 
being and doing, and nature. Plumwood’s (2002) traitorous identity contrasts with what 
she calls the ‘incorporative identity’; ‘the incorporative self of the colonising mind is 
insensitive to the other’s independence and boundaries, denying the other’s right to 
define their own reality, name their own history, and establish their own identity’ (p. 
203). If Plumwood is right in arguing that it is the chains of the liberal individual, the 
Lockean self, that tie our governments to ecological devastation, then it is past time that 
we move away from an individual self toward a related embedded self.  
 
In education, we must strive beyond the construction of the liberal individual, toward 
the creation of ecologically rational people; it is time to put John Locke in the cupboard 
and turn our theory to those with the benefit of hindsight: Albert Camus, Jennifer 
Bleazby, John Dewey, Miranda Fricker, Lisa Guenther, Matthew Lipman, Alieen 
Moreton-Robinson, Karin Murris, Val Plumwood, Ann Sharp, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, 
Gayatri Spivak, Eve Tuck, Wayne Yang, Irene Watson and Patrick Wolfe. Using this 
diverse array of thinkers, I will explore the intertwined paths of domination, first through 
the work of Camus and in particular his notion of philosophical suicide, then through 
Plumwood’s theory of the logic of domination and the role it plays in liberal democracy, 
before turning to the invasion of Australia as a prime example of the epistemically 
violent nature of the logic of domination. I conclude the first section of this thesis by 
tying the first three chapters together and extending the critique to education, while also 
pointing to ways in which education could be otherwise. These ways, mere suggestions 
in Chapter Four, become the focus of the remaindered of the thesis. I envision education 
as a possible site for correctiveness for the reconstruction of society toward the redress 
of epistemic violence. If it is, as I will argue, the colonial episteme in all its guises that 
created and continues the practices of colonisation, then it is to the reworking of the 
episteme that we must turn.  
 
The argument 
 
David E. Denton (1964) notes that ‘it is true that the moral philosophy of Albert Camus 
has had considerable influence on literary and political thought. The question now 
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becomes, does the moral philosophy of Camus have relevance for education?’ (p. 99). I 
answer in the affirmative and connect Camus’ notion of philosophical suicide with 
Plumwood’s logic of domination toward a greater understanding of the logic that 
underpins colonisation, which, through historical factors, continues to inhabit liberal-
democratic discourse, founded on classic liberal principles that have failed both 
democracy as a deliberative form of associated living and ecology. Following Plumwood, 
I also name Plato as a source of historical significance for the development of such logic. 
In Plato, what is real or what is human is defined in opposition to nature. Accordingly, to 
be human is to overcome, to dominate, to control nature, including human nature. I take 
climate change to be a by-product of human domination; a problem that requires a 
reconstruction of self as an integral part of redressing such issues. Climate change is, in 
many ways, a spectre too vast to be seen or fully experienced. As a result, our awareness 
of it is abstract, although we may experience certain symptoms.  
 
Following the chains of domination, I further ask: ‘Is it possible ‘we’ are involved in a 
war ‘we’ do not even recognise, in which ‘we’ are the aggressors and ‘we’ are both the 
inciters and benefactors of an ongoing violence done to a marginalised Other, imagined 
as less than human?’ Answering this question, leads me to draw together Camus’ notion 
of philosophical suicide, history and truth, and Plumwood’s notions of the logic of 
domination and heavenism, to show the structuring abilities of epistemic violence. I locate 
history as a major site of justification of violence and show that controlling the narrative 
past shapes the meaning of the present and paves the path of domination into the future. 
Relegating wrongs to history denies their present-day realities, in a sense fictionalising 
them while at the same time creating a fictitious future. I then turn to a possible site for 
reimagining the future through relearning the past ‒ education. I introduce the community 
of inquiry pedagogy that underpins Philosophy for Children, considered by many to be 
an exemplar of educational philosophy, that is, philosophy functioning educationally. 
Addressing the problems with philosophy identified throughout the thesis, I argue for its 
potential to reinvent itself as a pedagogy for the development of traitorous identities; that 
is, identities that reject a colonial self, defined through force. To agree to a ‘self’ defined 
through force, is to lose the ability to define one’s self educationally. I argue that this 
definition amounts to losing the ability to learn. Conversely, I conclude that open dialogic 
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inquiry requires a shared understanding of the epistemic and ontological landscapes in 
which we are embedded and argue that this can be achieved through what I call lucid 
inquiry. 
 
Although Camus infamously championed the importance of a philosophical exploration 
of suicide, in the Chapter One, I argue, along with David Denton and Hank Weddington, 
for the importance of adapting Camus’ philosophy to education. Contra Weddington, 
however, I hold that Camus’ notion of lucidity is particularly instructive. I lay out his 
meaning of the term and argue against Weddington’s adaptation of lucidity, before 
aligning with and extending on Denton’s adaptation. By positing the absurd, both as an 
explanation and a feeling ‒ to capture the unreasonable fit between epistemology and 
ontology, between what we think and how our thinking maps onto the world ‒ Camus 
was in a sense going to the heart of what it means to be human, and what it means to be 
human, taken as a question, speaks to the heart of educational philosophy. Camus 
maintained that denial of the absurd lies at the root of domination. Such denial, I argue, 
is a form of violence which stems from a transgression of the limits of the absurd, or as 
he calls it, philosophical suicide. Both the recognition of limits, and the acknowledgment 
of the transgression of limits, is necessary for the prevention of Camusian violence. 
Sustained awareness of the absurd, or lucidity, requires a limit to action; it requires a new 
type of reasoning: reasoning from the breath.  
 
Plumwood, too, thought reasoning needed an overhaul. She points out that if we consider 
the damage done to the environment, to our life support system, what we think of as 
rational, in the past and the present, is, to a large extent, irrational. In Chapter Two I argue 
that our current (Western) systems of human organisation are not capable of responding 
to the environmental crisis as they are implicated in creating it. Environmental 
degradation, resulting from human domination over environment, from the felling of trees 
to climate change, stems from our failure to acknowledge our human ‘being’ as a part of 
‘nature’. The tendency to view ourselves as above and separate from ‘nature’, Plumwood 
tells us, can be traced back to before the time of Plato, but was well instantiated in Western 
thought by his work. The term heavenism is introduced to describe this split. I emphasise 
the animal in human animal to reinstate humans as part of ‘nature’ before giving a 
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historical overview of the development of the climate change literature which 
demonstrates both a growing awareness of the damage we are inflicting on our 
environment and the need to change. I argue that the ways in which we must change 
require greater philosophical attention. I cover a range of proposed solutions to the 
problem of climate change and argue, extending on the work of John Houghton, that they 
all have underlying attitudes which are problematic in one way or another. In addition, 
liberal-democracy is implicated in contributing to our inability to respond to the 
environmental crises.  
 
Chapter Three traces the logic that creates the domination of nature as it extends to the 
domination of the Other using the colonisation of Australia as an example. I do this to not 
only understand the history of the land on which I sit and write, both figuratively and 
literally, but also to practice what I later argue for: the need for historical and political 
positioning within education. Linking to earlier chapters I argue that the damage of 
colonisation can be understood in many ways, and without creating a hierarchy I follow 
Spivak’s use of the term epistemic violence to bring attention to colonisation as an 
ongoing logic of domination, a structuring logic as Wolfe calls it, or a possessive logic as 
Moreton-Robinson calls it. I argue epistemic violence is transmitted through myths of 
reversal which act as justifications for such violence. A myth of reversal is a story that 
uses the suffering of Others as a weapon against them. It is marked by a failure to 
recognise prior presences exemplified by the case of Terra Nullius. The failure to 
recognise prior presences is a systematic failure of shared socio-political epistemic 
frameworks; a failure to see the world without first committing philosophical suicide.  
 
In Chapter Four I sew together themes of the previous three chapters: philosophical 
suicide, the logic of domination, epistemic violence, heavenism and the myth of reversal. 
Throughout this chapter, I find commonalities between Plumwood’s heavenism and 
Camus’ notions of history and heaven. I detail how the conception of an afterlife 
reinforces the stark separation Plato created, and how doing away with such stark 
separation opens a space for the notion of an embedded self, something I talk more about 
in Chapter Six. The separation of self from Others is furthered through modern day 
institutional practices, not the least of which are slaughterhouses, which Marc Trabsky 
argues have fundamentally altered human relations with animals. The alteration of 
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relationships in a different way is taken up again in the section entitled ‘History’s 
Amphitheatre’, where I argue Camus’ and Michel Foucault’s use of the plague is 
analogous to Plumwood’s use of dominant logic. ‘Plague power’ as Camus called it, and 
‘disciplinary power’ as Foucault named it, are, like dominant logic, unseen forces that 
result in the ordering of a society in a way that seeks to remove the Other from moral 
consideration and control their behaviour. The rejection of heavenism also opens the way 
toward a rejection of transcendental or absolute Truth. I argue that Camus’ concept of 
truth as plural is a rejection of an absolute Truth which I link to anthropocentrism. As 
Plumwood (2002) says, it is ‘important to demonstrate the imprudence of 
anthropocentrism, for example by showing the extent of uncertainty and the limits of our 
knowledge’ (p. 113). I further look at the role history plays in creating myths of reversal 
and, following on, an anthropomorphised landscape. I conclude with broad implications 
for education, to be elaborated upon in the final two chapters.  
 
In Chapter Five I follow on from Camus’ critique of history discussed in the last chapter, 
with Deborah Bird Rose’s critique of time as a colonising force, explaining how it links 
to the concept of utopia and eventually how it is tied to childhood. I detail how the 
progression of linear accounts of personhood are marked through exclusions, or put 
another way, are premised on what they are not, creating dualisms, such as child/adult, 
savage/civilised, and are accordingly part of the logic of domination. In the first section, 
I offer a brief account of the ways violence has traditionally been thought of and dealt 
with in the classroom, before expanding the concept to include epistemic violence. The 
ability for the teacher to effectively teach is hampered by epistemic violence and, as such, 
the onus for preventing such violence falls on the teacher, who must be equipped to first 
recognise it, but this, at the very least, requires teacher preparation programs and 
professional development to equip teachers with requisite skills and knowledge, or 
ideally, a reconstruction of education. To demonstrate the scope of the problem, I then 
draw on a speech James Baldwin gave to educators in which he argued that racism is 
structural. Following Baldwin, I concur that it is not the Other who must change, but the 
system that Others. Finally, I look at the notion of development through the lens of the 
absurd, showing it to be a dehumanising fiction.  
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If it is admitted that philosophy can help in our understanding of the world’s diversity, 
‘speaking not just of a diversity of people, but of a diversity of ideas’, then ‘philosophy 
has value to those learning about the world, especially those that are new to the world, 
i.e., children’ (Thornton & Burgh, 2019, p. 235). It follows that philosophy cannot be 
ignored as an educational methodology. Indeed, around the world many ways of doing 
philosophy with children and adolescents have been established. Divergent approaches 
have emerged from different educational needs and social, cultural and political contexts. 
Thus, in Chapter Six, I turn to a pedagogy I argue can be adapted to both elucidate and 
respond to structural epistemic violence. I argue that Philosophy for Children, particularly 
the community of inquiry pedagogy, holds potential as a child-centred pragmatic 
approach to education which focusses on dialogic pedagogy as a method for developing 
inter-subjective communities of inquiry that recognise fallibilism, not certitude, as vital 
to knowledge construction and informed citizenship. However, it is not beyond critique, 
and, so, I point to issues in need of further attention in education.  
 
Various scholars have criticised aspects of Philosophy for Children, including its 
curriculum and pedagogy, on grounds of perpetuating epistemic bias or ignoring 
philosophy as itself being part of the dominant discourse (Murris, 2015a, 2015b; Chetty, 
2014; Kohan, 2014). In Chapter Seven I concentrate specifically on Hell Rainville who 
argues for the importance of relatedness and self in education. From the standpoint of 
the embedded self, an attack on a human’s relationship with other humans, with their 
history or with the non-human world, is an attack on the human, on the self, and not 
just on an individual but on a communal self. Resistance to such attacks, to such 
forms of violence, becomes of upmost importance to the survival and flourishing of 
both notions of self. To the ongoing violence against indigenous peoples, that is, the 
denial of history perpetrated by colonisers in multiple countries, Smith (2012) argues 
that to ‘acquiesce is to lose ourselves entirely and implicitly agree with all that has been 
said about us’ (p. 4). To agree to a ‘self’ defined by force, is to lose the ability to define 
one’s self. Educationally, I argue that this amounts to losing the ability to learn. Lucidity, 
to Camus (1977b), carries not only a responsibility to maintain awareness of injustice, but 
also the responsibility to rebel against it: ‘I rebel, therefore we exist’ (p. 28). I, therefore, 
highlight the need to value the knowledge of the outsider, those society has deemed unfit 
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for inclusion, both ontologically and epistemologically, and show that their voice is 
essential for the development of a critically engaged and aware ‘self’, a self that is 
traitorous to the dominant culture. I argue that our propensity to insist on educating the 
outsider is symptomatic of our eco-irrationality and should instead be flipped, with 
emphasis on educating the insider. I propose the community of inquiry, re-enriched with 
pragmatist theory and augmented with Camus’ notion of the absurd adapted to education, 
as a viable approach capable of facilitating such education. I begin with an overview of 
the ways in which pragmatism and absurdism complement each other, before highlighting 
the role habits play in perpetuating harmful prejudice. To conclude, I argue for the need 
for traitorous teachers to model traitorous identities in the classroom.  
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Chapter One 
Reasoning from the Breath: A method for lucid 
moral education 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
David E. Denton (1964) notes that ‘it is true that the moral philosophy of Camus has had 
considerable influence on literary and political thought. The question now becomes, does 
the moral philosophy of Camus have relevance for education?’ (p. 99). In this chapter I 
will argue that it does, which will provide a starting point for a pedagogy of lucidity which 
will underpin the educational philosophy I develop in the chapters that follow. By positing 
the absurd, both as an explanation and feeling to capture the conflict or ‘divorce’ between 
meaning-seeking humans and a meaningless world ‒ as the unreasonable fit between 
epistemology and ontology, between what we think and how our thinking maps onto the 
world ‒ Camus was in a sense going to the heart of what it means to be human, and what 
it means to be human, taken as a question, speaks to the heart of educational philosophy. 
Like Plumwood,8 he argued against the reduction of humanity to reason. Whereas 
Plumwood (2002), fighting against a colonial war against nature, traced this reduction 
back to Plato and forward ‘through the narrative which maps the supremacy of reason 
onto human supremacy’ (p. 4), Camus (1977b), embedded in the conflict of World War 
II, saw it in the suffering that surrounded him. He spoke of the need to counter the 
mechanistic certainty of rule-based systems of politics and ethics with human emotion. 
For ‘who can weigh the greatest conquests of reason or of force against the sufferings 
they represent, if his heart is blind to the simplest form of sympathy and his mind averse 
to all justice!’ (p. 13). As we shall see, to stand with those who suffer, against any form 
of reasoning that would seek to justify and increase suffering, was Camus’ idea of justice. 
To resist any logic that would sacrifice human well-being for an imagined future was his 
ethic and his politic. As Matthew Sharpe (2015) put it, the absurd as ‘epistemic humility 
                                                 
8 For more on Plumwood see Chapter Two. 
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makes imperative in the political realm a principled opposition to […] all ideologies 
which claim the right to silence, enslave, systematically deceive or kill’ (p. 26).  
 
Drawing on Camus’ philosophy, Denton (1963) sought to expand the task of education 
from the development of humans to the development of moral humans, defined as lucid 
individuals who live the ‘philosophy of limits’.  
 
The one major objective of education will no longer be to produce 
primarily a rational man or social animal; it will no longer be, as the 
Educational Policies Commission would have it, to discover the values 
inherent in rationality; rather, if we take our cue from Camus, education 
will have a new primary objective: to produce the moral individual—
moral because, in the face of the absurd, he lucidly lives the philosophy of 
limits. (p. 127) 
 
Denton argued that, to ‘produce the moral individual’, we need to turn to the method 
found in Camus’ adaptation of Cartesian doubt9 ‘which demonstrates the necessary 
relationship between feeling and cognition’ (p. 127). In this chapter, I build on Denton’s 
contribution to illustrate what I take to be Camus’ method; that of lucidity (see Thornton, 
2018).10  
 
Prior to Denton’s (1963, 1964, 1967) research, there was a dearth of scholarship on the 
educational aspects of Camus’ philosophy, moral or otherwise. Since then, there has been 
a spate of publications,11 including a special issue of Educational Philosophy and 
Theory.12 While the articles in this special issue13 do not ‘pretend to present a unified 
                                                 
9 More on this in Chapter Five. 
10 This chapter was initially written prior to modifications for publication in Thornton (2018), in which 
some sections, or part thereof, of this chapter appear. However, since then, it has undergone further 
revisions. To avoid confusion, I have not further cited the published article in this chapter, but it should be 
noted that some passages may be identical to the published version. 
11 See Oliver (1973), Greene (1973), Götz (1987), Marshall (2007, 2008), Roberts (2008a, 2008b), Curzon-
Hobson (2003, 2013, 2014, 2017). 
12 Educational Philosophy and Theory, 45(11). Special Issue: Education, Ethics and Existence: Camus and 
the Human Condition. 
13 Gibbons (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d); Heraud (2013), Roberts (2013a, 2013b); Roberts, Gibbons & 
Heraud (2013). 
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picture of Camus and his significance for education’ (Roberts, Gibbons & Heraud, 2013, 
p. 1087) they do offer a range of educational perspectives on aspects of Camus’ individual 
works. All of the articles ‘address, either directly or indirectly, the problem of 
“existence”: the question of how we understand ourselves, give meaning to life and make 
our way in a seemingly absurd world’ (p. 1087).14  In contrast, Denton (1964) was the 
first to consider the educational implications of Camus’ philosophy to draw conclusions 
that directly ‘bear on the nature and purpose of education’ (p. 99). His ideas first, and 
more extensively, appear in his PhD thesis (1963), then later in his article ‘Camus: 
Philosopher of moral concern’ (1964), and finally in his book The Philosophy of Albert 
Camus (1967).15 Since then, one of the only attempts to follow Denton’s lead of adapting 
the tenets of Camus’ philosophy specifically to pedagogy, insofar as the conclusions can 
offer guidelines for practice, is Hank S. Weddington’s (2007) article, ‘The Education of 
Sisyphus: Absurdity, Educative Transformation, and Suicide’. Weddington links Camus’ 
philosophy with transformative education to offer a practicable adaption that can be used 
in the classroom.  
 
In a recent article, ‘The Experience of Strangeness in Education’ (Curzon-Hobson, 2017), 
and book, Albert Camus and Education (Hobson, 2017a), Aidan (Curzon) Hobson draws 
attention to an article I co-authored that offers ‘guidelines for teachers to facilitate the 
education of lucid individuals’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2016a, p. 3)16; an article he links to 
the ideas in Weddington’s article. He sums up our position as follows: 
 
Their position is that strangeness, managed in a certain way and balanced 
within existing pedagogical frameworks, has a new potential to empower 
the learning space. An idea they cite from Weddington (2007) who talks 
of an education characterised by ‘perpetual suicide’. (Curzon-Hobson, 
2017, p. 125)  
                                                 
14 For a detailed description of the recent use of Camus philosophy in education literature see Hobson 
(2017) and Curzon-Hobson (2017).  
15 ‘No studies, however, have been written, prior to this one, on either the education of Camus or the 
bearings of his thought upon education’ (Denton, 1963, p. v).  
16 Throughout this thesis passages from my joint publication (see Burgh & Thornton, 2016a) appear both 
cited and uncited. All passages attributable to Burgh or Burgh and Thornton jointly have been cited. Other 
passages appeared here first and were slightly modified for publication.  
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Hobson correctly identifies an overarching idea of our article; however, while we do 
acknowledge Weddington in the same way I have above, we do not draw on his ideas.  
As I draw heavily on Camus’s conceptions of lucidity and philosophical suicide 
throughout the thesis, in this chapter I clarify my position, in part, by distinguishing it 
from Weddington’s idea of perpetual suicide as a form of educational transformation, an 
adaptation, which I argue, is inherently problematic. Thereafter, I will return to Denton’s 
thoughts on Camus to establish what I consider to be a more fruitful starting point for an 
educational adaptation of his philosophy, one that will inform the remainder of my thesis. 
Camus’ lucidity, which I identify as both an awareness of the absurd and a method for 
the prevention of philosophical suicide, stands in opposition to both faith and blind 
reason, stripped of emotion and held up as ideal. The religious connotations in 
Weddington’s work negate lucidity’s opposition to faith, and in doing so, negate Camus’ 
original meaning of lucidity. 
 
Denton (1967), in contrast, utilised Camus’ philosophy of the absurd to ‘claim that the 
central purpose of education is to develop lucid individuals’ (p. 99). For Camus, lucidity 
is the understanding of the world as divided between our desire to find certainty in the 
world and the indifference to our desire we find there. Put simply, it is the elucidation of 
the absurd. Weddington (2007) also draws heavily on the idea of lucidity. However, 
unlike Denton, he argues against the human capacity for sustained lucidity as Camus 
envisioned it, instead opting for a ‘rhythmic churning of tension and release, concern and 
complicity, suspension and resolution, lucidity and suicide as constituting a self-
perpetuating form of education’ (p. 122). Weddington admits that his interpretation of 
Camus’ philosophy is in direct contradiction to it and justifies it on the basis that he does 
‘not think any of us, including Camus, are brave enough to live without reprieve from the 
absurd’ (p. 122). I contend that his claim, and the line of reasoning that follows, is 
problematic and unnecessary for an effective adaptation of Camus’ philosophy to 
education.  
 
As Weddington draws his understanding of Camus primarily from The Myth of Sisyphus, 
I will begin my discussion by suggesting why Camus famously started his exploration of 
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the absurd with suicide. Next, I explore in greater detail notions of the absurd, the feeling 
of absurdity and lucidity, before giving an example of how one can fail to translate the 
feeling of absurdity into lucidity. I follow with a critical analysis of Weddington’s article, 
before going on to explore what I take to be Camus’ main points of interest for education, 
in the section entitled ‘Philosophical Suicide and the Death Penalty’. I finish with a brief 
explanation of the direction that Denton took Camus in. I will further develop the notion 
of a Camusian education based on lucidity in Chapter Seven to draw attention to the issue 
of epistemic violence that is located in what Plumwood (1993a, 2002) calls 
‘inferiorization’, which is brought about by a particular rationality of domination that 
dehumanises individuals or groups of humans and the environment. Camus maintained 
that denial of the absurd lies at the root of domination. Such denial, I argue is a form of 
violence which stems from a transgression of the limits of the absurd, or as he calls it, 
philosophical suicide. Both the recognition of limits, and the acknowledgment of the 
transgression of limits, is necessary for the prevention of Camusian violence. Sustained 
awareness of the absurd, or lucidity, requires a limit to action; it requires reasoning from 
the breath.  
 
The Myth of Sisyphus: Camus on suicide, the absurd and lucidity 
 
In his book, The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus (1977a) illustrates absurdity in the plight of 
Sisyphus, a being condemned by the gods to push a boulder up a mountain, only to watch 
it roll back down again, descending after it, to begin again, in an endless cycle of struggle 
and release. As the Greek myth goes, Sisyphus’ meaningless labour was his punishment 
for displeasing the gods. What he did to displease them depends on which version of the 
story you read, as Camus gleefully notes. ‘If one believes Homer, Sisyphus was the wisest 
and most prudent of mortals. According to another tradition, however, he was disposed 
to practice the profession of highwayman. I see no contradiction in this’ (p. 107). What 
is clear is that Camus has his own reasons for believing Sisyphus condemned: ‘His scorn 
of the gods, his hatred of death, and his passion for life won him that unspeakable 
penalty in which the whole being is exerted toward accomplishing nothing’ (p. 108). 
 
According to Camus, the cycle of Sisyphus’ struggle parallels the human struggle to find 
meaning or understanding of life's purpose; a struggle that is inevitably met with the 
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disappointment of universal silence. Sisyphus knows his fate, he knows the why of his 
existence, an eternity of the same action is his punishment, and he can name his punisher. 
In these ways, his situation differs from ours; we cannot know the why in the same way 
he could, we do not know our fate, and we have many reasons to doubt that fate exists. 
Humans can, however, with some certainty, expect to die sooner or later, but before that 
happens, most of us would also expect to be happy at times and suffer at other times, and 
this is a fate of a kind. To come close to truth on a topic such as the meaning of life, we 
must generalise, although what makes a life are the particulars that fill in the time between 
birth and death. Many people just get on with life; they focus on the particulars, leaving 
the grander scheme of things to itself. Others search for meaning in direct contradiction 
to the knowns of existence, in the unknowable; following a desire to know the 
unknowable, to make finite sense of an infinite universe, they impose meaning on it. They 
have faith, or as Camus (1977a) calls it, unfounded ‘hope’, that the universe will unfold 
along the lines of their kind of reason. Speaking of all existential philosophers, but 
mentioning by name philosophers such as Søren Kierkegaard, Karl Jaspers and Lev 
Shestov, he writes:  
 
in a closed universe limited to the human, they deify what crushes them 
[the absurd] and find reason to hope in what impoverishes them. That 
forced hope is religious in all of them … Nothing logically prepares this 
reasoning. I can call it a leap. (p. 36) 
 
Camus resists such hope to demonstrate to us the absurdity of our attempts to make the 
world reasonable. He demonstrates this through books, plays and philosophy. In The Myth 
of Sisyphus he writes: ‘For me the sole datum is the absurd’ (p. 34); the sole truth in a 
universe of constructed fictions. Camus writes,  
 
I am thus justified in saying that the feeling of absurdity does not spring 
from the mere scrutiny of a fact or an impression, but that it bursts from 
the comparison between a bare fact and a certain reality, between an action 
and the world that transcends it. The absurd is essentially a divorce. It lies 
in neither of the elements compared; it is born of their confrontation. (p. 
33) 
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It is the gap between our desire to know the world ‒ to find comfort, reason and certitude 
in it ‒ and the indifference to our desires we find in the world when we look with lucid 
clarity upon existence. We come to recognise the absurd experientially in the lack of fit 
between our expectations of our actions and their outcomes. We see it in our inability to 
reliably navigate the world and to negate chance interference in our plans.  
 
Committed to the consequences of his method of extrapolating from the axiom of the 
absurd, Camus in a sense staked his life on the pursuit of an answer to what he thought 
was the only truly serious philosophical question, a question he deemed most urgent due 
to the severity of its consequences, that of ‘whether life is or is not worth living’ (p. 11).17 
Matthew Lamb (2011) and Matthew Sharpe (2015) argue that Camus embodies the idea 
of ‘philosophy as a way of life’ (p. 561) and that his philosophy should be read in a way 
commensurate with an understanding of this conviction (p. 562). As Camus (1977a) put 
it: 
 
If I hold to be true that absurdity that determines my relationship with life, 
if I become thoroughly imbued with that sentiment that seizes me in face 
of the world’s scenes, with that lucidity imposed on me by the pursuit of 
a science, I must sacrifice everything to these certainties and I must see 
them squarely to be able to maintain them. Above all, I must adapt my 
behavior to them and pursue them in all their consequences. (p. 26)  
 
I say Camus ‘staked his life’ for if the result of his exploration was that life had no 
meaning, suicide would be a logical option, assuming one could not live without meaning. 
Of the absurd, Camus (1977a) stated that it ‘is essential to know whether one can live 
with it or whether, on the other hand, logic commands one to die of it’ (p. 50). Must we 
assume that life cannot be lived without meaning? Camus’ response is that although 
people have ‘pretended to believe that refusing to grant a meaning to life necessarily leads 
to declaring that it is not worth living […] there is no necessary common measure between 
these two judgments’ (p. 15). When we ask for a meaning for life, what we are usually 
                                                 
17 ‘There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide’ (Camus, 1977a, p. 11). 
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asking for is a singular reply, an all-encompassing meaning, something to explain our 
existence, a key to make the infinite, finite. Camus thinks this cannot be found. But this 
is not enough to negate the value of life; death alone can do this, and while there may not 
be one meaning, this does not necessarily exhaust all options, not one can also mean 
many. Death alone can extinguish both value and meaning (in the pluralist sense), because 
both are dependent on there being someone to find meaning and to give value, hence the 
common leap to an all-knowing God as a continual source of meaning.18 In a universe 
free from such notions of all-knowing beings, life must be preserved for meaning to be 
preserved; the destruction of life then becomes tragic not only for the loss of life, but for 
the loss of meaning.  
 
The reasons both meaning and life are destroyed are Camus’ starting points for inquiry. 
To further understand why he choose these, I turn, briefly, to Miranda Fricker (2013). In 
her search for what she calls ‘epistemic justice’, Fricker begins with an exploration of the 
concept of epistemic injustice. I will explore epistemic injustice in greater detail in 
Chapter Seven, but for the moment the reasoning she uses will suffice, as I believe it 
overlaps with and helps illuminate Camus: 
 
The requirements of what we might call epistemic justice are surely many 
and various. But we can begin to get the measure of it by looking first to 
basic kinds of epistemic injustice, whose negative imprint reveals the form 
of the positive value. As a general point of philosophical method, I believe 
that taking failures as one’s starting point is a good strategy. If one wants 
to discover the conditions of a given positive social value (justice, 
freedom, independence, equality …), it tends to be instructive to look first 
at the various ways in which it is likely to fail. This method as applied to 
any kind of justice simply reflects the fact that just social systems, even in 
their most historically stable forms, are sustained under pressures toward 
collapse into injustice. (p. 1318) 
                                                 
18 Bertrand Russell (1997) stated that ‘Religion is based, I think, primarily and mainly upon fear’ (p. 48). 
Terror Management Theory (TMT) has been the focus of much research, it ‘posits that the fear of death 
motivates individuals to sustain faith in a cultural belief system or worldview that makes life seem 
meaningful and sustain the belief that they are significant and capable of enduring beyond their own death’ 
(Greenberg, 2007, p. 593). 
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When considering topics as all-encompassing as the meaning of life, starting from the 
negation, or ‘negative imprint’ as Fricker calls it, of the concept is instructive. Life, too, 
is sustained under pressure to collapse into death.19 Keeping oneself alive is a Sisyphusian 
task, but unlike Sisyphus, we have the option to stop. There is, as Camus (1977a) says, 
something to be learnt about living by asking why some people choose to take that ‘subtle 
step when the mind opt[s] for death?’ (p. 13). Rather than viewing suicide as a defect in 
the human psyche or as a crime that one ‘commits’,20 Camus takes the view that the 
possibility of opting out of life confers a value on choosing not to; it confers a value on 
living, one that is reaffirmed with each breath, and denied by those who choose to stop 
breathing. Absurdly living is a value that can be undermined by other values. Camus 
explains: 
  
Living, naturally, is never easy. You continue making the gestures 
commanded by existence for many reasons, the first of which is habit. 
Dying voluntarily implies that you have recognized, even instinctively, the 
ridiculous character of that habit, the absence of profound reason for 
living, the insane character of that daily agitation and the uselessness of 
suffering. What then is that incalculable feeling that deprives the mind of 
the sleep necessary to life? A world that can be explained even with bad 
reasons is a familiar world. But, on the other hand, in a universe suddenly 
divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is 
without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or hope 
of a promised land. This divorce between man and his life, the actor and 
his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity. All healthy men having 
thought of their own suicide, it can be seen, without further explanation, 
                                                 
19 In later chapters I explore our relationship to death and our illusions of heavenism through the work of 
Plumwood. Her conception of humans as prey is particularly relevant here; being the dominant predator in 
most cases, we often forget that in some cases we are also prey, as she herself found out when faced with a 
crocodile’s intention to consume her. This experience, for her, shattered the narrative of human 
exceptionalism, a narrative she argues, as detailed in Chapter Two, is prevalent in the West.  
20 The expression ‘commits suicide’ is tied to suicide’s historical illegality. In Australia, suicide has been 
decriminalised, and in all jurisdictions, except the Northern Territory, attempted suicide is no longer a 
crime, although, it is still an offence for a person to assist another person to commit suicide or to attempt 
to commit suicide. However, in many other countries suicide is still a crime.   
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that there is a direct connection between this feeling and the longing for 
death. (p. 13, italics added)  
 
The value we place on life, divorced from any outside omniscient valuer, is of an 
individual nature and linked to our sense of meaning, which is shaken by the feeling of 
absurdity. When Camus talks of the sleep necessary to life, he speaks not just of the 
inability to sleep due to worry that most of us experience from time to time, but primarily 
of the illusions of meaning that keep our awareness of our impending end drowsy. When 
we stop to think about it, a simple morning ritual of making coffee comes replete with 
explanations, values and meanings, and these give the world a sense of familiarity. Our 
habits taught and acquired from birth through to death, in many ways, orient us within 
our worlds; they guide us through life without the need to think too deeply as to why we 
perform them, without the need to question why we live the way we do. When the need 
arises, we are thrown into disequilibrium. The feeling of absurdity describes the 
restlessness and frustration of a person grasping for meaning, searching for old narratives 
and yet finding none.21 The part of us that is aware of our existence cries out for 
acknowledgment, for approval, for certainty, for some reason for our existence. The world 
beyond the human, however, is indifferent to our calls.  
 
The lack of a stable conception of meaning, Camus thinks can lead to the taking of one’s 
own life, but equally he thinks it does not and should not do so, for ‘even if one does not 
believe in God [ultimate meaning], suicide is not legitimate’ (p. 7). Rather, the logic of 
the absurd can lead us to lucidity; sustained awareness of the absurd. It can lead to a 
fallibilistic understanding of knowledge as ultimately uncertain, and further, of life as 
unstable, finite, temporal and no less individually worth living for being so. Camus 
teaches us to question and confront uncomfortable answers rather than hide them from 
view, for doing so decreases our awareness of the world’s limitations, which in turn 
decreases our ability to respond to situations that do not adhere to our illusions, thereby 
limiting our potential for creating and recreating meaning.22 Further, the insistence of 
holding onto meaning in the face of conflicting meaning, and conflicting ontology, is a 
                                                 
21 The importance of narratives in the construction of identity will be explored in Chapter Seven. 
22 This ability, I will argue in Chapter Five, is vital to the construction of an ecologically aware and 
functional society, which, in turn, is vital to our own and other species’ survival. 
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major source of violence. Lucidity conversely leads to an increased ability to construct 
and reconstruct meaning; an increased ability to adapt.  
 
The individual and societal importance of meaning construction and its relation to 
violence is a topic to which I will return, but first, I will take a closer look at Camus’ 
method of lucidity, before giving an example, drawn from The Stranger, of how it is 
possible to fail to translate the feeling of absurdity into lucidity. This becomes important 
in later sections when we turn to Camus’ notions of the lion and the martyr, the two main 
ways of escaping the absurd, of committing philosophical suicide (ideas to which I return 
in Chapter Four).  
 
Lucidity: a method 
 
Lucidity lies at the end of a sequence of steps, a method.23 The first step is to recognise 
absurdity. Camus’ definition of absurdity extends upon the common use of the term; to 
find something ridiculous or unreasonable. We recognise absurdity in the solipsistic 
universes surrounding us, that is, in the lives of others. To recognise this absurdity is to 
recognise the ‘ridiculous character of […] habit’, to recognise that the ‘mechanical aspect 
of [human] gestures, make silly everything that surrounds them’ (p. 21). We see such 
absurdity when we witness the contradictory actions of others in relation to their 
environment: ‘If I see a man armed only with a sword attack a group of machine-guns, I 
shall consider his act to be absurd’ (p. 33). But this absurdity has not yet touched the 
heart. The next step takes us inward. The feeling of absurdity is an ‘elusive feeling’ (p. 
18). It is phenomenological, we experience it first hand as happening in our own 
solipsistic universe. It is the ‘worm’ in the ‘heart’ (p. 13) that can strike at any moment, 
‘on a street-corner or in a restaurant’s revolving door’ (pp. 18‒19). It is ‘the void’ that is 
felt when connections with the world and others are lost. It is ‘that odd state of soul in 
which the void becomes eloquent, in which the chain of daily gestures is broken, in which 
the heart vainly seeks the link that will connect it again …’ (p. 19). This step concludes 
in a ‘revolt of the flesh’, but the absurd has ‘not been exhausted’ and a ‘step lower and 
                                                 
23 Camus (1977a) says: ‘It is clear in this way that I am defining a method […] The method defined here 
acknowledges the feeling that all true knowledge is impossible’ (p. 18).  
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strangeness creeps in’ (p. 20). Once absurdity is felt ‘the primitive hostility of the world 
rises up to face us across millennia’ (p. 20). It is then that we witness the world’s raw 
sense data without translation into the familiar, the conceptual and the habitual.24 The 
feeling of absurdity strips from the world ‘the images and designs that we had attributed 
to it beforehand’, and the world then ‘evades us because it becomes itself again’ (p. 20). 
Seeing the world as itself we recognize absurdity, we perceive ‘that the world is “dense”, 
sensing to what degree a stone is foreign and irreducible to us, with what intensity nature 
or a landscape can negate us’ (p. 20); we sense the absurd. 
 
The absurd once felt, leaves us with a choice, either to remain with the feeling and 
translate it into lucidity or to leap out of discomfort into hope or despair. I draw on Camus’ 
novel The Stranger to illustrate how we may come as far as sensing the absurd but fail to 
translate the experience into conscious awareness of the fallibility of our own narratives; 
to fail to become lucid.25 
 
In The Stranger (aka The Outsider), through the character Mersault, Camus (1960) tells 
us the tale of a dog who is regularly beaten and berated by its owner, Salamano. One day 
the dog goes missing. Without the dog, Salamano is lost, ‘his life had changed now and 
he didn’t quite know what he was going to do’ (p. 49). Mersault recounts how Salamano 
had obtained the dog as a puppy after his wife had died noting that ‘he hadn’t been quite 
happy with his wife, but on the whole he’d gotten quite used to her’ (p. 47), that is, he 
had habituated to her. Salamano, who beats and berates his dog, appears to hate him. 
However, his relationship with the dog is more complicated than it first appears. Later in 
the narrative we discover his sense of loss and accompanying sadness—as Mersault 
described it: ‘from the peculiar little noise coming through the partition wall, I realized 
that he was crying’ (p. 42). This too, is further complicated by the narrator’s detailing of 
the situation in such a way as to convey the force of habit that compels Salamano to act 
in such a manner. 
 
                                                 
24 According to Camus (1977a): ‘The feel of the absurd is not, for all that, the notion of the absurd’ (p. 32). 
25 This is a topic which will receive greater treatment in Chapter Seven where I detail how what I deem 
lucid facilitation can aid in the translation of the feeling of absurdity into lucidity, the translation of the 
phenomenological into the epistemic.  
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People are complex and irreducible without the use of force.26 What Camus counts as 
force is not restricted to the physical. Physical force comes after the initial force of 
judgment. Camus’ novels not only make one judge and later question one’s judgment, 
they also transmit a feeling of the absurd, to provoke us to examine our prejudices and, 
by extension, our habits. In this regard, the absurd bears resemblance to epistemological 
scepticism, which, according to Nagel (1971), ‘begins when we include ourselves in the 
world about which we claim knowledge’ (p. 723). When we view ourselves from the 
perspective Nagel proposes, as part of the world, and by extension, part of the inquiry, 
the ‘why’ arises and once the questions begin they do not end. Camus (1977a) illustrates 
this in the following way: 
 
Rising, streetcar, four hours in the office or the factory, meal, streetcar, 
four hours of work, meal, sleep, and Monday Tuesday Wednesday 
Thursday Friday and Saturday according to the same rhythm—this path is 
easily followed most of the time. But one day the “why” arises and 
everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement. (p. 19) 
 
Recognising our habits, we come to question the beliefs that underlie our habits and why 
we do what we do. Undertaking such an inquiry can cause us to feel out of step with our 
lives; a potentially unpleasant experience. Our conscious awareness of our mental 
constructs may be the cause of some angst, as often these same constructs are a source of 
comfort, but, as Camus suggests, questioning them can also spark our creativity. 
 
Understanding the force of habit, having the ability to stop our habitual actions long 
enough to question our judgments and re-evaluate our beliefs, is lucidity. The path toward 
lucidity begins where certainty ends. The disappearance of his dog broke Salamano’s 
habitual chain, plunging him into a state of disequilibrium. In the pages of The Stranger, 
Salamano, it seems, never took the next steps towards lucidity; that is, the breaking of his 
habits through external factors never compelled him, as it did Camus, to become aware 
                                                 
26 In Chapter Seven, I will argue that a person’s complexity is limited by epistemic violence. Epistemic 
violence comes from the privileging of a single position that interiorises or nullifies countless others, that 
totalises knowledge. Forced intellectual conformity to a dominant logic narrows both a person’s physical 
and intellectual horizons.  
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of his habits or to question the beliefs associated with them. Without questioning, lucid 
reconstruction toward a state of equilibrium is barred; Salamano’s habitual chains are 
only physically, but not mentally, severed and the freedom to lucidly create new habits is 
denied. He becomes trapped in a state of perpetual disequilibrium.  
 
Lipman’s (1973) tale of the Greek mythical figure, Prometheus, recounts such a feeling 
of disequilibrium.27 Prometheus Bound, an ancient Greek tragedy of debated authorship, 
tells the tale of Prometheus, a Greek Titan who is sometimes said to have created humans 
and all the time said to have drawn the ire of Zeus. In retaliation for stealing fire to give 
to humans, Zeus had Prometheus chained to a mountain and sent an eagle to feast on his 
liver by day, only to have it regenerate by night, allowing the cycle to start afresh the 
following day. Importantly for us, it is also said that Zeus casts Prometheus into an abyss 
and it is here that Lipman picks up on the story.  
 
Like any Titan, Prometheus had feared nothing. Now, nothing envelops 
him, and he is terrified. After all, he had loved the light and warmth of the 
sun, and the solid ground beneath his feet. The dark utter emptiness of his 
exile, its terrible coldness, with nothing to touch or hold to, reduces him 
to wretchedness. He has neither memory nor environment. He can think, 
but he can remember nothing to think of. He can perceive, but there is 
nothing around him that is perceivable. (p. 501) 
 
Unlike Salamano, Prometheus’ doubt later drives his reconstruction. Salamano and his 
dog were wretched companions, but this wretchedness tethered them to one another: ‘if 
only someone would take him in, but they won’t, everyone’s disgusted by his scabs’ 
(Camus, 1960, p. 41). Without the dog, Salamano experiences a different kind of 
wretchedness; a wretchedness akin to Prometheus’ experience. Without the dog, he is 
disconnected from his created life and once again sees the world as he did upon entering 
it, as he did as a ‘baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it all 
as one great blooming, buzzing confusion’ (James, 1890, p. 462). The loss of the dog 
                                                 
27 Prometheus’s experience echoes that of those that have endured solitary confinement. In Chapter Five, I 
explore the effects of solitary confinement, as argued by Lisa Guenther (2013).  
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shattered Salamano’s narrative, his sense of self and understanding of the world. 
Prometheus, however, accomplished what Salamano could not: namely, reconstruction 
leading to equilibrium.  
 
Lipman (1973) goes on to recount Prometheus’ emergence from this state of abject 
wretchedness to the development of an awareness of his actions that borders on artistic 
expression. It is in the perfection of each movement, driven by experimentation, not for 
any end goal as he has no hope of return from exile nor any memory of a place to return 
to for that matter, but for reasons of pure existence: ‘In a sense, he owes them [these 
movements] his life’ (p. 501). Divorced from his mental connections of his past 
experiences and his physical connections with the external world, Prometheus strengthens 
the only connection left open to him, that of his mind with his body. Unlike Descartes’ 
famed retreat to the cogito that provided certitude for his existence, Prometheus finds 
comfort in the exploration of his movements, in the interaction of his thoughts with his 
body, or as Denton would put it, his feelings with his cognition. When his memory 
returns, it is within this new framework of understanding of self that his thoughts are 
assimilated, and then re-explored and re-interpreted and a new layer of meaning created.  
 
His wound heals, his memory returns. Now, each act takes on far greater 
significance, as his relevant past can be brought to bear upon the present. 
Every structuring acquires a richer ambience of meanings, unexpected 
conjunctions appear, and for every new illumination there are untold new 
mysteries. (p. 501) 
 
Promethus’ understanding of this process of creation of meaning is what makes him lucid.  
 
The experience of absurdity can lead to lucidity, but equally it can lead us to philosophical 
suicide, a leap into old habits, hope or nihilism, if we do not translate such experience 
into an intellectual understanding of the absurd, that is, if we do not become lucid. In the 
next section, I will critique Weddington’s article, arguing that his adaption of Camus’ 
philosophy to education is open to Camus’ charge of philosophical suicide. I hold 
Weddington’s work up as an example of theoretical philosophical suicide, just as in the 
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section, entitled ‘Philosophical Suicide and the Death Penalty’, I draw on Camus’ 
extended essay, ‘Reflections on the Guillotine’, as an example of a form of philosophical 
suicide that ends in actual, rather than Weddington’s metaphorical, death.  
 
Weddington’s Philosophical Suicide 
 
I will argue that Weddington’s use of Camus’ ideas, when adapted to transformative 
education, leads not to lucidity but to philosophical suicide. I draw on his paper as a 
theoretical example of how we can recognise the absurd without becoming lucid, that is, 
without leaving a window open for inquiry. Lucid inquiry is important in the classroom 
as extinguishing inquiry can be a form of epistemic violence, which, if left unchecked, 
can hinder not only the child’s ability to learn, but also the teacher’s ability to learn and 
to teach (Thornton & Burgh, 2017). For as Paulo Freire (2009a) points out, a teacher must 
be willing and able to model learning, to effectively teach: ‘learning in their teaching is 
observed to the extent that, humble and open, teachers find themselves continually ready 
to rethink what has been thought and to revise their positions’ (pp. 31‒32).  
 
Weddington (2007) explores Camus’ idea of suicide, but as a metaphor for transformative 
education. Transformative education refers to learning via critical reflection on 
underlying beliefs to shift perspectives and to transform student’s conceptions of self. It 
is Weddington’s contention that education undertaken whilst in lucid recognition of the 
absurd allows for a rhythmic transformative education, progressing on the movement 
from lucidity to comfort or from nostalgia to absurdity. Transformative moments of 
suicide, he holds, allow for moments of escape from the tension of lucidity, brought about 
by recognition of the absurd that stimulate new periods of lucidity.  
  
I believe that education conceptualized as a rhythmic progression pulsed 
by periods of comfort and discomfort or nostalgia and absurdity represents 
a potentially perpetual suicide. This suicide provides a means for human 
beings to rid themselves of old selves or identities and be transformed 
through interactions with others. (p. 125) 
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Although Weddington commences his article in a way commensurate with an 
understanding of Camus’ body of work, he diverges from it in his adaptation of Camus’ 
ideas of lucidity, the absurd, hope and suicide. On the one hand, he grapples with and 
explains well the ways in which Camus’ philosophy differs from others, along with the 
alterations to our perception it entails, but, on the other hand, he consistently goes beyond 
or negates the distance he has covered and falls back from lucidity. His error in reading 
Camus comes early on in his article. Camus (1977a) wrote: 
  
I see many people die because they judge that life is not worth living. I see 
others paradoxically getting killed for the ideas or illusions that give them 
a reason for living (what is called a reason for living is also an excellent 
reason for dying). (pp. 11–12) 
  
Weddington (2007) quotes only the words in parentheses and misunderstands Camus’ use 
of paradox in the above context, and, therefore, misses the absurdity. In doing so, he 
reaches the conclusion that ‘the paradoxical nature of suicide is once revealed, for it is 
through death that living gains value and through living that death is pursued for awarding 
value to life’ (pp. 119–120). To this paradox, he attributes the absurdity of education and 
lucidity.  
 
Camus uses absurdity, as I outlined earlier, to highlight the ridiculous and pointless nature 
of people’s certainty in their reasoning, justifications, thoughts, ideas, beliefs and so forth. 
In ‘Homage to an Exile’, Camus (1988a) writes: ‘Many men have sacrificed everything 
to errors, and I have always thought that heroism and sacrifice were not enough to justify 
a cause’ (p. 99). Here he talks of heroism and sacrifice, whereas in the above quote from 
The Myth of Sisyphus he is less specific, but in both he is pointing out that people die for 
absurd reasons. This is a fundamental point in Camus’ (1977a) philosophy, and one of 
the overarching reasons he argues for the importance of lucidity, for if one can see the 
absurdity of their justifications they would be less likely to be committed to them to the 
point of suicide or murder, as both require an absurd (common usage) depth of conviction.  
 
The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the 
unreasonable silence of the world. This must not be forgotten. This must 
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be clung to because the whole consequence of a life can depend on it. (pp. 
31–32) 
 
Reasons for death are the very reasons Camus claims we must revolt against. Weddington 
(2007) thus enters unaware into absurdity (common usage), by asking: ‘shall I choose 
death because life is worth living and it is precisely through death that this worth is 
preserved?’ (p. 119). Instead, Camus (1977a) asks: ‘[d]oes [life’s] absurdity require one 
to escape it through hope or suicide?’ (p. 16). To put the question another way: Does 
living require meaning, and if so, given the absurd, does its lack of meaning require death? 
He answers this question with a resounding ‘no’, as explored earlier. Although Camus 
concludes that life is without ultimate and universal meaning, he contends that humans 
inevitably will construct meaning, but to avoid leaping out of the absurd and into 
uncontested firmly settled belief, unquestioned habit, hope or faith, we need to maintain 
a sustained awareness (lucidity) of the constructed nature of knowledge, thereby 
allowing, if not always the actuality, at least the potentiality for further inquiry.  
 
The power of Camus’ philosophy is drained away by Weddington through a 
misappropriation of terms. By changing the definition of suicide put forward by Camus, 
from the ending of one’s life by one’s own hand to that of a Jungian ‘concept of death as 
a symbol of liberation and preparation for rebirth’ (p. 132)⎯a concept more in line with 
Weddington’s own idea of education as transformation of self rather than with that of 
suicide⎯Weddington is fundamentally altering the terms of the argument in favour of 
his conclusions. Camus (1977a) states clearly that he is ‘not interested in philosophical 
suicide but rather in plain suicide’ (p. 50).  In direct contradiction with Camus’ meaning, 
Weddington’s (2007) notion of suicide is religious in nature; a ‘ridding of self’ in order 
to prepare for ‘rebirth’.28 His appropriation of Camus’ philosophy is in stark contrast also 
to Denton’s understanding of Camus. Rather than a naturalist reinterpretation of values, 
                                                 
28 Weddington seems to be following in the small vein of scholarship that claims Camus as Christian based 
on the recollections of conversations between a minister, Howard Mumma (2000), and Camus, rather than 
on Camus’ own documented rejection of Christianity. For example, in his lecture, ‘The Unbeliever and the 
Christians’, Camus (1988b) clearly states, ‘I don’t like priests who are anticlerical any more than 
philosophies that are ashamed of themselves. Hence, I shall not, as far as I am concerned, try to pass myself 
off as a Christian in your presence. I share with you the same revulsion from evil. But I do not share your 
hope, and I continue to struggle against this universe in which children suffer and die’ (p. 71). 
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we find an attempt to cast education as ‘warden of the soul’ (p. 125). To accomplish this, 
Weddington redefines not just suicide but also hope and lucidity; it ‘is the religious 
attitude that Camus argues is a limit to lucidity, but that I argue is a necessity for lucidity’ 
(p. 122). In doing so, he commits what Camus deemed philosophical suicide. The 
following passage by Camus (1977a), taken from The Myth of Sisyphus, could be read as 
a direct response to Weddington. 
 
If it is admitted that all the power of that notion lies in the way it runs 
counter to our elementary hopes, if it is felt that to remain, the absurd 
requires not to be consented to, then it can be clearly seen that it has lost 
its true aspect, its human and relative character in order to enter an eternity 
that is both incomprehensible and satisfying. If there is an absurd, it is in 
man’s universe. The moment the notion transforms itself into eternity’s 
springboard, it ceases to be linked to human lucidity. The absurd is no 
longer that evidence that man ascertains without consenting to it. The 
struggle is eluded. Man integrates the absurd and in that communion 
causes to disappear its essential character, which is opposition, laceration, 
and divorce. This leap is an escape. (p. 38, italics added) 
 
Weddington (2007) cites Sartrean bad faith to justify his claim for the need to escape from 
lucidity, moments ‘where we re-recognize the “why”’, because, not even Camus is ‘brave 
enough to live without reprieve from the absurd’ (p. 122). But if we understand Camus’ 
meaning of lucidity as recognition of the constructed nature of meaning due to the absurd, 
that is, as the elucidation of the absurd, then to forward the idea of ‘breaks from lucidity’ 
is tantamount to saying that we need to retreat from fallibilism, to retreat from the 
knowledge that our knowledge is limited and constructed⎯to retreat to ignorance, or as 
Camus would put it, to unreasonable hope or faith.  
 
Weddington’s attempt to fit Camus into the framework of transformative education is 
predicated upon this retreat to ignorance, a vacillation between ‘concern and complicity’ 
so that we may have a ‘reason for becoming lucid again’ (p. 122). This is highly 
problematic if we consider that one of Camus’ main reasons for positing the absurd was 
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to prevent actual, not metaphorical death. To be unconcerned and complicit, to escape 
from lucidity in its original form, would be to take a break from caring about the suffering 
of others, and to become complicit in their demise. Indeed, when Weddington asks how 
‘can any humans who must be concerned with their own security ever make an “other” 
the focus of their ultimate concern?’ (p. 125, italics added) he is rebutting Camus’ 
insistence on standing with those who suffer, arguing that only those who are truly 
exceptional can care for others when they themselves are suffering. The reference to 
‘ultimate concern’ is misleading; we do not have to be Jesus, Ghandi, or Martin Luther 
King, Jr., as Weddington suggests, to be concerned for our fellow human beings in 
adverse situations. Further, there is nothing in Camus’ philosophy that requires ultimate 
concern for humans to be lucid. Concern is enough. From this erroneous reasoning he 
derives the following: ‘So this suggests that to achieve the intellectual and moral lucidity 
of the absurd, one must first be secure’ (p. 125). Once more in Camus we find the 
opposite. In fact, the absence of the security Weddington describes can act as a catalyst 
to lucidity, that is, lucidity can be reached through suffering. In terms of education this is 
important, for as many of us can attest, education, like life, is not without its struggles, 
whether internal, external or both. 
 
Camus’ (1954) description of Oscar Wilde’s experience during his incarceration, in an 
article entitled ‘The Artist in Prison’, provides us with an example of this: 
 
“Do you know,” he said, years later, to Gide, “what prevented me from 
killing myself? It was pity.” Pity from the privileged and secure means 
nothing to a man who is suffering. Only the pity of a fellow-sufferer can 
move him. In the prison yard, a man, a total stranger, who was walking 
behind him at exercise, suddenly whispered: “Oscar Wilde, I am sorry for 
you; it is harder for the likes of you than for the likes of us.” And Wilde, 
overcome, replied: “No, my friend. Here we all suffer alike.” (p. 27, italics 
added) 
 
The recognition of shared suffering, of continual concern for others, is an important part 
of being lucid and, moreover, an important part of being human, as Denton argues. It is 
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my contention that lucidity as a method gives us a way to understand feelings of 
discomfort or suffering and learn from them, and in holding this conviction, I am 
following Denton. Further, Camus’ notion of philosophical suicide allows both students 
and teachers to be critical of values transmission, as I will touch on, in the section 
‘Denton’s use of Camus’, and in later chapters. But first, I will explore Camus’ (1977a) 
claim that ‘suffering exhausts hope and faith and then is left alone and unexplained. The 
toiling masses, worn out with suffering and death, are masses without God. Our place is 
henceforth at their side, far from teachers, old and new’ (p. 267). Camus opposed the 
death penalty for many reasons, but one of the primary reasons was its illogical nature. 
Capital punishment provides us with a real-world example of the suffering caused by 
philosophical suicide, just as Weddington provided us with a theoretical one. 
 
Philosophical Suicide and the Death Penalty 
 
Far from teachers, old and new … There are lessons to be learnt in the writings of Camus, 
lessons that he himself learnt and sought to clarify through the act of writing, both for 
himself and for others. To understand Camus’ perspective (or almost anyone’s for that 
matter) it is helpful to contextualise his education, by which I mean not just his schooling 
… In a 1946 review of The Stranger, Nicola Chiaramonte (2013) wrote: 
 
We were born at the beginning of the First World War. When we were 
adolescents, we had the Depression. When we were twenty, Hitler came. 
Then we had the Ethiopian war; the Spanish war; Munich. This is what we 
got, in the way of an education. (n.p.) 
 
Born in November 1913, less than a year before the First World War began, Camus was 
a young man during World War II. He lived in a period very much marked by death. For 
Camus (1977a), writing was a way of life. In his words, it was ‘an attempt to understand 
the time I live in’ (p. 11). If that time happened to be one rife with murder and suicide, 
then it was to these grim topics that he would turn his pen. Both of his major book-length 
philosophical essays, The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel, were attempts to address the 
culture of death he witnessed. In this section, I will examine further this culture of death 
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through an article entitled ‘Reflections on the Guillotine’. In The Myth of Sisyphus, as we 
have seen, he tackles suicide as a response to nihilism, but in ‘Reflections on the 
Guillotine’, Camus (1963) examines the reasoning used to justify capital punishment. 
This is a reasoning process all too often based on philosophical suicide. 
 
To begin, I turn to an address Camus gave in 1957 at the University of Uppsala entitled 
‘Create Dangerously’, in which he breaks into two camps those who commit 
philosophical suicide: the martyr and the lion. He says that ‘history’s amphitheatre has 
always contained the martyr and the lion. The former relied on eternal consolations and 
the latter on raw historical meat’ (Camus, 1964, p. 4). Both sides, he thought, were in 
error. By redefining terms in much the same way Weddington did, both camps fail to 
establish useful ethical limits; both transgress the absurd. The lion relies on the notion of 
sacrificing the human of today for a single imagined future. The lion believes that acts of 
violence are necessary to bring about a better future. His care is not for people who live 
and suffer today, they are willingly murdered for the betterment of those who are left 
tomorrow, usually those who are in possession of a certain set of characteristics that suit 
or match the characteristics of the lion. The martyr is likewise guilty of holding a belief 
in an imagined future, accepting the suffering and death of today as the will of a single 
God. The finite mind cannot know the infinite—the truth of all that supposedly lies in 
God requires a leap of faith, an unreasonable hope. As he says in The Rebel, ‘faith leads 
to immortal life, but faith presumes the acceptance of the mystery and of evil and 
resignation to injustice’ (Camus, 1977b, p. 51). Hence, faith and hope are the antithesis 
of grounded reason.  
 
In ‘Reflections on the Guillotine’, Camus (1963) claims that in a world free from 
knowledge of ultimate truth, ‘capital punishment upsets the only indisputable human 
solidarity – our solidarity against death – and it can be legitimized only by a truth or a 
principle that is superior to man’ (p. 158). Camus described his father’s reaction to 
experiencing, as a witness, the reality that the idea of capital punishment created. His 
father, we are told, agreed with the punishment prescribed, given the particularities of the 
case in question, so much so that for the first time 
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[h]e got up in the dark to go to the place of execution at the other end of 
town amid a great crowd of people. What he saw that morning he never 
told anyone. My mother relates merely that he came rushing home, his 
face distorted, refused to talk, lay down for a moment on the bed, and 
suddenly began to vomit. He had just discovered the reality hidden under 
the noble phrases with which it was masked. (p. 132, italics added) 
 
His father had in a sense discovered the absurd. What he discovered was not the reality 
he had expected; his sense of justice was not satisfied, and his sense of morality, the same 
sense that drove him to get up in the dark to witness such an event, was not vindicated. 
Instead, he witnessed ‘the obscenity hidden under the verbal cloak’ (p. 133), the gap 
between the reasoning that leads to the event and the reality that arises once the reasoning 
is translated into action.  
 
Any painter struggling to realise a vision on canvas is all too frustratingly aware of their 
limitations regarding perfecting the translation of their vision from head to world. Few 
possess the skill to do so effectively, and I doubt if any have ever done so perfectly. Those 
who come closest are usually celebrated for their achievement, for what they can create, 
what they are able to bring to the world. In the case of a painter, the paint that they apply 
to the canvas (typically) creates an image, but not only this, the image creates a reaction 
in the viewer. Whether it be one of shock or admiration or disgust is not the point; all 
feelings provoke thoughts, stir beliefs that go on to create other realties, some perhaps 
desired, most not. One would not usually think of the decapitation of another being as a 
creation, granted, but it is in the sense of bringing something into the world, by subtracting 
a life the actions of the executer create an impoverished reality, one that affects the viewer 
in different ways, although as we shall see, rarely the way intended. The application of 
paint to a blank canvas destroys the white to create an image. Decapitation destroys a 
human to create what? Justice? Peace? Morality? An abstract concept or greater 
suffering?  
 
The abstract reasons for which a human being creates the death of their fellow, with a 
stroke of a pen, are far from the reality that is brought into being by the act of ending a 
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life. In the case of the death penalty, the suffering created extends past the bounds of the 
logic that dictated it, past the murder, to the friends and family of the condemned: ‘the 
relatives of the condemned man then discover an excess of suffering that punishes them 
beyond all justice’ (p. 156). Camus (2006) stressed the importance of understanding the 
reality we create beyond the bounds of the imagined reality we think we are creating. For 
just ‘as we now love one another by telephone and work not on matter but on machines, 
we kill and are killed nowadays by proxy. What is gained in cleanliness is lost in 
understanding’ (p. 260).  
 
It is easy for us to judge based on abstract concepts, beliefs, before we have experienced 
the reality that our judgment helps to create, if we do not have to witness or directly bear 
the consequences, for this judgement is without the feeling that such a reality could stir, 
and in the case of the death sentence, without an understanding of the horror of the created 
reality. Camus (1963) argues that far from having the effect that the initial reasons for the 
instantiation of the death penalty should dictate, according to the logic of those who 
advocated it—one of fear of death as a deterrent to murder—witnessing death (or rather 
institutionalised murder) in such a way only serves to increase the desire to murder in 
those already so inclined and to make nauseous those who are not. As he put it, somewhat 
sarcastically, it 
 
is already possible to follow the exemplary effects of such ceremonies on 
public opinion, the manifestations of sadism they arouse, the hideous 
vainglory they excite in certain criminals. No nobility in the vicinity of the 
gallows, but disgust, contempt, or the vilest indulgence of the senses. 
These effects are well known. (p. 148) 
 
Camus further argues that it is impossible to tell how many people, if any, have been 
deterred from committing murder by the threat of the death penalty, whereas there is 
plenty of anecdotal evidence to the contrary.29 He cites a lack of awareness of the human 
                                                 
29 The anecdote Camus cites is from Arthur Koehler, but a similar one is found in More (1684): ‘English 
lawyers, who took occasion to run out in a high commendation of the severe execution of justice upon 
thieves, who, as he said, were then hanged so fast that there were sometimes twenty on one gibbet; and 
upon that he said he could not wonder enough how it came to pass, that since so few escaped, there were 
yet so many thieves left who were still robbing in all places. Upon this, I […] said there was no reason to 
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impulse toward destruction as another fault in the proponent’s reasoning; the threat of 
death is no threat to one who seeks it. Given the variation in the individual psychology of 
those who kill, the death penalty could likewise entice some to murder. This is yet another 
reason we are far from being logically able to claim its exemplary status, as those defend 
its use wish to. The result we do know is that ‘the State is consequently led to multiply 
very real murders in the hope of avoiding a possible murder which, as far as it knows or 
ever will know, may never be perpetrated’ (p. 147). Even if we use the logic of revenge; 
a murder for a murder, the sum does not add up. For the law ‘adds to death a rule, a public 
premeditation known to the future victim, an organization, in short, which is in itself a 
source of moral sufferings more terrible than death. Hence there is no equivalence’ (p. 
151). Such a law strips from the person their humanity, long before it strips their breath.30 
 
Camus also writes of society’s part in the creation of its criminals, extending the chain of 
reasoning beyond the simple facts of who did it, to the wider influences that lead to the 
crime being committed: ‘I shall not repeat the arguments that all sorts of thinkers have 
brought forth since the eighteenth century. They can be summed up anyway by saying 
that every society has the criminals it deserves’ (p. 157). Extending the history of the 
argument, one can see a similarity to Thomas More (1684), who linked the need for 
punishment with a lack of alternative education,31 in the following way:  
 
[I]f you suffer your people to be ill-educated, and their manners to be 
corrupted from their infancy, and then punish them for those crimes to 
which their first education disposed them, what else is to be concluded 
from this, but that you first make thieves and then punish them? (p. 25) 
 
Camus’ critique of the death penalty shows that the outcomes conceived of and used as 
justification for the action are absurd (common usage) when compared to the actual 
                                                 
wonder at the matter, since this way of punishing thieves was neither just in itself nor good for the public; 
for as the severity was too great, so the remedy was not effectual; simple theft not being so great a crime 
that it ought to cost a man his life, no punishment how severe soever being able to restrain those from 
robbing who can find out no other way of livelihood’ (p. 15). 
30 The idea and following actions, of stripping a person of their humanity will become vital in following 
chapters. As we shall see further, in Chapter Two, Plumwood’s critique of the logic of domination can be 
seen to underlie this phenomenon; one I will argue in the next section to be coherent with Camus’ notion 
of philosophical suicide.  
31 By positing epistemic violence, in Chapter Three and again in Chapter Seven, I am in a way extending 
upon More’s argument. The idea of Utopia will also be returned to in later chapters. 
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outcome. He goes to lengths to explicate the gaps in logic, the illogical leaps the 
proponents of the death penalty take in defending it; evidence of their philosophical 
suicide. If capital punishment were a scientific experiment, the hypothesis would fail. 
 
The absurd teaches that morality is a human enterprise for which the world cares not. 
Even if there were an ultimate morality, we would not have access to it. For Camus, the 
existence of suffering constitutes empirical evidence that the world is not inherently just, 
that it is not inherently good, and that it is not reasonable. The world is unreasonable in 
that it does not conform to our notions of reason, and by extension to our abstract moral 
concepts, such as good and justice. At the same time, it is not inherently bad, not 
inherently unjust, not ultimately nihilistic, as the existence of the sun, the sea, the 
experience of joy, of love, attest to that. Teaching a child to navigate through such a 
world, Denton thought, requires teaching them moral reasoning; however, he is quick to 
point out, as Camus did, that not all forms of morality are desirable. As previously noted, 
Denton’s (1963) ‘moral individual’ is ‘moral because, in the face of the absurd, he lucidly 
lives the philosophy of limits’ (p. 127). In the next section, I explore the basis of Denton’s 
theory.  
 
Denton’s use of Camus: Values education in a pluralist society 
 
Denton (1963) formed his views on education in America at a time when the separation 
of church and state, facilitated by the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, was extended to the separation of church and public 
education through the 1947 Everson v. Board of Education and 1962 Engel v. Vitale 
rulings of the United States Supreme Court. Denton noted that the shift in education from 
a ‘religious base to a secular, naturalistic one’ (p. 1) included a shift away from religious-
based moral education. This shift was characterised at the classroom level by the 
transition ‘from an emphasis on values to an emphasis on techniques of teaching Skills’ 
(p. 1), as skills, it was thought, were value-neutral. However, Denton counters that 
decisions of content and methodology, of what and how we teach, are themselves laden 
with values as ‘norms constitute the nature of those decisions’ (p. 2). Viewed in this light, 
skills training did not replace values education, it made it implicit, unexamined and 
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unintended; or put another way, the transmission of norms, values and beliefs in the 
classroom seep in from the social and political environment through classroom teachers 
and curricula. The general result is that values are taught, but not well. As it stands, young 
people are, as Denton (1963) says: 
 
inducted into a system of ethical decisions which, in the main, have 
already been made for them. In addition, the teacher is almost invariably 
concerned, not only with facts, but with goods and preferences and desires 
and “shoulds” which eventually reveal the kind of Universe the teacher 
feels ought to be. (p. 4)  
 
Values education becomes the realm of individual teachers in which their beliefs are 
transmitted uncritically and often unwittingly to their students. This generational 
unconscious transmission of values – now often called the ‘hidden curriculum’ as first 
coined by Philip Jackson in 1968 – goes some way toward providing an explanation of 
Christopher Hodgson’s (2004) lament in the following quote. 
 
If we take seriously the analogy bestowed by our heritage that nature is to 
be conceived as our mother and that God the Father is our source for 
Reason, Truth, and Justice then given Nietzsche's claim that we are a 
generation of fatherless children we should be a generation of naturalists. 
But the latter has yet to develop a strong following or even a consciousness 
about this cosmic divorce. (p. iii) 
 
Hodgon’s lament was pre-empted by Dewey (1960), when he asked ‘[w]hy has modern 
philosophy contributed so little to bring about an integration between what we know about 
the world and the intelligent direction of what we do?’ (p.71). To address this problem, 
Denton (1963) argues education needs a methodology. To start, he suggests we take note 
of terms commonly used in the philosophy of education literature to describe values, 
educational terms like, 
 
moral enterprise, norm-acquisitions, worthy-ends, valuational boldness, 
the school as an axiological institution, moral behavior—and not be afraid 
48 
 
to grapple with the most basic question: In a democratic, pluralistic society 
what shall be the philosophical ground for these terms? What gives them 
meaning and substance? (p. 5) 
 
In other words, we must rethink values education as naturalists. Not to wittingly transmit 
a single, uniform ‘Universe’32 to students, but to teach them how to discern between 
‘Universes’, that is, how to recognise, evaluate and consciously choose which values to 
keep and which to discard from their personal ‘Universes’ or value systems. Not in a 
haphazard or biased way, but in a way that integrates what we collectively ‘know about 
the world’ with ‘the intelligent direction of what we do’. This is a task for which Denton 
employs Camus’ philosophy.  
 
In a previous section I highlighted Camus’ method of lucidity. Denton points out that 
education 
 
has no a priori commitment to method, but, rather, has as its primary 
activity involvement with developing human beings. Education is 
committed, therefore, by the nature of this involvement, to concerning 
itself with the problem of feeling and its relation to knowledge and 
knowing. (p. 125) 
 
Given the above, he argues that what is needed is a methodology, ‘which demonstrates 
the necessary relationship between feeling and cognition’ (p. 127). I agree with Denton 
that, on this count, Camus’ philosophy ‘holds considerable promise for philosophy of 
education’ (p. 127) in the form of an adaptation of lucidity and philosophical suicide (in 
the ways in which Camus meant them) to pedagogy, which I will attempt to do in Chapter 
Seven. To be lucid one must be critically engaged, not only cognitively, but emotionally. 
However, it is important to first understand why feelings and cognition have for so long 
                                                 
32 Camus (1977a) talks of the importance of Universes: ‘Great feelings take with them their own universe, 
splendid or abject. They light up with their passion an exclusive world in which they recognize their climate. 
There is a universe of jealousy, of ambition, of selfishness, or of generosity. A universe in other words, a 
metaphysic and an attitude of mind. What is true of already specialized feelings will be even more so of 
emotions basically as indeterminate, simultaneously as vague and as “definite,” as remote and as “present” 
as those furnished us by beauty or aroused by absurdity’ (p. 17). 
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been split and how this plays into our existing social, cultural, political and educational 
systems. This will be the topic of the next chapter, but for the purposes of this chapter I 
need to offer a brief explanation here. Plumwood (2002) argues that by creating a split 
between the Forms and nature, Plato created a hierarchy of values, a fundamental dualism 
between reason (the means by which the forms are known) and nature, including the 
bodily feelings. The human body being part of nature and the soul part of the higher realm 
of the Forms constitutes a philosophy that advocates the release of the soul, the true 
identity, from the body and from the earth; the privileging of the immaterial over the 
physical, mind over body, reason over emotion.  
 
For Plato, what is real or what is human is defined in opposition to nature. According to 
this framework, to be human is to overcome, to dominate and control nature, including 
our own emotional human nature. Those deemed lacking the requisite characteristic of 
reason are excluded from the category of human and defined with nature as non-human 
and inferior and, therefore, as irrational or emotional. Such a separation—of the planet 
and human ‘Others’—opens the means of justification for the instrumentalisation and 
domination of both.33 Turning Plato’s dualisms on their head, Plumwood’s project was to 
reclaim rationality from what she argued were an interconnecting set of irrational 
dualisms. 
 
Like Plumwood, Camus does not seek to destroy all reason, and, also like Plumwood, he 
seeks to return it to the realm of the embedded human. To Camus (1977a), Plato’s split is 
a kind of unreasonable reasoning that requires a leap of faith; the religious kind that 
negates all reason. Becoming lucid is to maintain an awareness of the absurd, which 
means recognising the limits of reason. Such recognition, however, does not mean that 
reason is useless or non-existent. As Camus put it, ‘if I recognize the limits of the reason, 
I do not therefore negate it’ (p. 42); this is the illogical leap, just like the absence of 
ultimate meaning to life does not necessarily negate life, the absence of ultimate reason 
does not necessarily negate all reason. The method Camus sought was the one that would 
create a path between ‘the opposite paths of humiliated reason and triumphal reason’ (p. 
48); an absurd reasoning. The absurd reduces reason to the human, and in so doing 
                                                 
33 The environmental consequences of which will be explored in detail in the next chapter.  
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becomes again ‘an instrument of thought and not thought itself’ (p. 49). A limit needs to 
be established; not an absolute limit, but one that holds philosophical suicide at bay. The 
Greeks, Camus thinks, had such a limit:  
 
The Greeks, who for centuries questioned themselves as to what is just, 
could understand nothing of our idea of justice. For them equity implied a 
limit, whereas our whole continent is convulsed in its search for a justice 
that must be total. (p. 168) 
 
In the absence of ultimate reason, Camus could be said to reason from the breath. With 
each breath he understands that his life is valuable, at least to him. Casting his thoughts 
outward, he understands that when others also breathe, their lives are valuable to them. 
He forms his sense of value on that which he deems most fundamental and irreducible: 
life.  
 
The only truth that might seem instructive to him is not formal: it comes 
to life and unfolds in men. The absurd mind cannot so much expect ethical 
rules at the end of its reasoning as, rather, illustrations and the breath of 
human lives. (p. 65) 
 
He turns his critique then to the ways in which suffering is hastened upon us, and declares, 
contra Descartes, ‘I rebel, therefore we exist’ (Camus, 1977b, p. 28). When individually 
we rebel against suffering in all its forms, collectively we flourish. Awareness of the 
limits of our life and mortality can lead to a newfound appreciation of life in all its naked 
glory, stripped bare of delusion and crying out for exploration—for alternative ways of 
thinking and living. Instead of wishful thinking and escapism in the face of suffering, 
oppression and adversity, Camus’ work teaches the philosophical attitude needed to keep 
our shared struggle for existence in plain sight to most effectively revolt against all forms 
of oppression. As Camus says: ‘Having started from an anguished awareness of the 
inhuman, the meditation on the absurd returns at the end of its itinerary to the very heart 
of the passionate flames of human revolt’ (p. 62). To follow Camus (1977b) we must 
resist philosophical suicide and heed his claim that ‘[a]bsurdist reasoning cannot defend 
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the continued existence of its spokesman and accept the sacrifice of other’s lives’ (p. 15). 
Camus teaches us the intellectual humility that stays one’s hand; there is no reasoning 
that justifies suffering. If it is granted that the ability to recognise and respond to our own 
suffering and the suffering of others is vital to being human, and that the task of education 
is human development (which inevitably includes identity formation and nation building, 
whether explicit or implicit), then lucidity, in so far as it holds promise for the 
development of such an ability, has the potential to contribute positively to education. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The struggle to become lucid is at the heart of The Myth of Sisyphus. According to 
Weddington, Camus is too hard a task master, allowing no reprieve from lucidity. 
However, this interpretation betrays Camus’ explanation of lucid. Lucidity as we have 
seen, is the elucidation of the absurd. In this chapter, I have pointed to the errors in his 
argument, and explicated a view of lucidity that I think is congruent with Camus’ 
explanation. Following Denton, I have argued that the greatest potential for Camus’ work 
to contribute to educational philosophy is to be found in the extension of his philosophy 
to the classroom, particularly those of lucidity and philosophical suicide. Lucidity taken 
as a method can point the way toward the development of absurd reasoning for both 
teachers and students. As Camus (1977b) pointed out: ‘there are crimes of passion and 
crimes of logic’ (p.11); philosophical suicide precedes crimes of logic, thought precedes 
most actions, and we are living in an age where the pen can order the sword, or the 
guillotine as we have seen.  
 
We are living in the era of premeditation and perfect crimes. Our criminals 
are no longer those helpless children who pleaded love as their excuse. On 
the contrary, they are adults, and they have a perfect alibi: philosophy, 
which can be used for anything, even for transforming murderers into 
judges. (p. 11) 
 
Camus teaches that certain philosophies are fatal, and of those that are, philosophical 
suicide is to be found at their source. Philosophical suicide is the moment when reasoning 
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turns away from possibilities for the expansion and support of life, and toward 
possibilities that destroy life or the conditions that support it. Whilst all life, including 
human life, is conditional on the environment that supports it, human life is particularly 
complex in that it is dependent not only on the physical biological needs of the species, 
but also on the intellectual conditions imposed by societies, the systems created by 
countless humans. When we can think into existence supposedly superior social and 
political systems that paradoxically threaten our very existence as a species, such as the 
spread of neo-liberal politics founded on a logic of identity of extreme individualism, then 
it is time to develop different ways of thinking and living. Absurd reasoning stands in the 
path of philosophical suicide, so to develop in children and adolescents the capacity for 
absurd reasoning through education can be a preventative to that error in logic that Camus 
argued leads to violence (and suffering), both epistemological and physical.  
 
Weddington provides an example of how philosophical suicide can enter educational 
theory; an example of the uncritical transmission of values in education. According to 
Olof Franck and Christina Osbeck (2017), the uncritical transmission of values presents 
a risk not only to education but to democracy and sustainability. 
 
Another challenge stems from the risk that undemocratic—or 
pseudodemocratic—relations between teachers and students take the form 
of indoctrination in the sense that students are taught how to act in moral 
matters without having an opportunity to question and criticize the reasons 
and intentions behind such prescriptive teaching […] These challenges are 
more or less visible also with regard to democratic sustainability 
education, which is not surprising because ethics is counted as one of the 
main dimensions of sustainability. (p. 2)  
 
The absurd helps us to understand that there is, as Freire (2009b) points out, ‘a dynamic 
movement between thought, language, and reality that, if well understood, results in a 
greater creative capacity’ (p. 3), or what Camus would call lucidity. A lucid teacher 
understands the danger of philosophical suicide ‒ the danger in trying to make the world 
conform ‒ and in response cultivates an awareness of their own universes, their own 
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values, to avoid unwittingly transmitting them to others. A lucid inquiry, then, is one in 
which the teacher is not the repository of knowledge, but a co-inquirer, one who is willing 
and able to question values, both their own and those found in the classroom environment, 
including the curricular materials and other teaching resources—and, thus is actively 
engaged in mitigating the problem of the hidden curriculum. In doing so, a lucid teacher 
describes not a world that is fixed and final, but one that is historically constructed, 
created, and open to improvement, to reconstruction.  
 
In this chapter I started from instances of philosophical suicide, in the next chapter I 
broaden my approach by turning to the work of Plumwood and the logic of domination, 
to examine the ways in which philosophical suicide is enmeshed in liberal-democracy. In 
successive chapters I will argue that the community of inquiry as first conceived of by 
Charles Sanders Peirce and extended to the classroom by Lipman, as an existing 
pedagogy, can be adapted to accommodate Camus’ philosophical concerns toward the 
education of lucid individuals.  
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Chapter Two 
Economic Rationality and Ecological Failure 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Climate change is, in many ways, a spectre too vast to be seen or fully experienced. As a 
result, our cognitive awareness of it is abstract, although we may experience certain 
symptoms. This experiential gap can lead to philosophical suicide; allowing space for 
denial, and time for distractions, entertainment, arguments, habits, beliefs, etc., that 
postpone action by shifting our focus from the feeling of existential dread that the danger 
of climate change properly understood could provoke. The absurd, the gap between our 
epistemology and ontology, means we can jump to any conclusion we wish; the impetus 
to commit philosophical suicide is given by the uncomfortable thought of our morality. 
We may not wish to face the growing consensus of the scientific community or the 
implications of their findings, that is, the unsustainability of our ever-increasing 
consumption on a finite planet which we rely on for our very survival, and hence we may 
be tempted to leap as Camus put it. We are tempted to turn away from such knowledge, 
to flee in the face of uncertainty and doubt in our existing institutions and instead of 
heeding the calls for action, for change, we commit philosophical suicide by hoping for 
alternative explanations, sticking our head in the sand, appealing to a higher authority to 
save us, and so on.34 Plumwood (2002) argues we are in the 
 
ecological parallel to the Titanic story, we have reached the stage in the 
narrative where we have received the iceberg warning, and have made the 
remarkable decision to double the engine speed to Full Speed Ahead and 
go below to get a good night’s rest. A change of course might be bad for 
business, we might have to slow down, lose time. Nothing, not even the 
                                                 
34 The different ways in which we can settle uncomfortable feelings of existential dread or doubt will be 
examined using the Peirce’s philosophy in Chapter Six. 
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ultimate risk of the death of nature, can be allowed to hold back the 
triumphant progress of the ship of rational fools. (p. 1) 
 
Why have many of us, in the face of the spectre of climate change, decided to ‘go below 
to get a good night’s rest’? This question will frame this chapter, and Plumwood will be 
our guide to exploring it.  
 
Plumwood points out that if we consider the damage done to the environment, to our life 
support system, what we think of as rational, in the past and the present, is, to a large 
extent, irrational. Our systems of human organisation are not capable of responding to the 
environmental crisis as they are implicated in creating it. If this is the case, they must 
change, as ‘no culture which sets in motion massive processes of biospheric degradation 
which it has normalised, and which it cannot respond to or correct can hope to survive for 
very long’ (p. 1). This has implications for education, especially environmental education, 
but also for historical, political and social education. It is imperative, therefore, that we 
understand the ways in which our systems are failing. How do we do this? The following 
analogy by Plumwood sets us on the trail to discover the ways in which our societal 
structures are propelling environmental degradation and injustice and in so doing 
illuminates areas in need of rethinking, the task of later chapters.   
 
But in the real ecological world on which we are passengers, unlike the 
Titanic, the millionaires don’t go down with the ship, and it’s certainly not 
women and children first. So to understand fully the irrationality of the 
kind of decision-making that guides our collective course, we must look 
carefully at where the decisions come from and at the class composition 
of the passenger lists, at who will perish and who will thrive, and at who 
is in a position to make good decisions. Above all we need to look self-
critically at why bad decisions are made, and under what dominant 
illusions. (p. 2) 
 
Returning briefly to Chapter One, Fricker (2013) tells a similar story: ‘If one wants to 
discover the conditions of a given positive social value (justice, freedom, independence, 
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equality …), it tends to be instructive to look first at the various ways in which it is likely 
to fail’ (p. 1318). The value I am interested in preserving is environmental rationality over 
collapse into environmental irrationality which is vital for an effective education as 
environmental rationality is integral to education’s task of identity formation. Just as 
Camus (1977a) examined the logic of suicide and found the ‘worm in the heart’ (p. 13) 
to be philosophical suicide, Plumwood (2002) looked to the logic of domination, ‘a 
hubristic and sado-dispassionate form of economic and scientific reason’ (p. 2) and found 
at the root, human exceptionalism, which ‘foster[s] illusions of invincibility and hide[s] 
our real danger’ (p. 3). Where Camus finds illusions of certainty, Plumwood finds 
illusions of invincibility, of human superiority. It seems to me that both are expressing 
different ways of looking at the same problem; both are concerned with philosophical 
suicide. Their conclusions can be instructive in helping us, as Plumwood says, to ‘oust 
the mad captain, get out the maps and begin to chart a new course’ (p. 3).  
 
Plumwood criticises the historical use of the term ‘human’, specifically its use in a 
traditional Western form of dominant rationality that fails to acknowledge dependency 
on the Other and on nature.35 According to Plumwood, it is the ‘human’ dominance of 
the latter (nature) that has sown the seeds for the systematic, ecological failures we are 
now facing. The failure to acknowledge dependency stems from the identification of the 
fully human with reason defined as the opposite of nature; those close to nature are then 
made to share in its instrumental status. Climate change denial is yet another symptom of 
the backgrounding of nature.36 To uncover prejudices stemming from anthropocentric 
thinking I combine Plumwood’s critique of liberal-democracy with past and current 
environmental studies. But first, in the next section I draw on her experience with a 
crocodile to illustrate how the myth of human superiority blinds us to ecological risk, 
before following her critique back to Plato and the split between knowledge and earth in 
the section entitled ‘Heavenism: The split that caused the death of nature’.  
                                                 
35Although a geographical concept, ‘the rubic “Western” is a historiological concept and signifies today’s 
European history and culture, which were inaugurated by the Greeks and especially by the Romans and 
which were essentially determined and borne by Judeo-Christianity’ (Heidegger & Rojcewicz, 2015, p. 16). 
I follow Plumwood’s use of the term in the remainder of the thesis while recognising it has limitations.  
36 In response, Plumwood points to the need to develop ‘traitorous identities’, a call I interpret as an 
educational imperative, requiring a new framework of ecologically rational education—an idea I develop 
in Chapter Seven. 
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Environmental degradation brought about by human subjugation of environment by 
means of a logic of domination, from the felling of trees to climate change, stems from a 
failure to acknowledge our human ‘being’ as a part of ‘nature’. The tendency to view 
ourselves as above and separate from ‘nature’, Plumwood tells us, can be found prior to 
Plato, but was re-invigorated in Western thought through his philosophy. I introduce the 
concept of ‘heavenism’ to describe this split. In the section entitled ‘Nature Reinstated’ I 
emphasise the animal in human animal to reinstate humans as part of ‘nature’ before 
giving an historical overview of the development of the climate change literature, which 
demonstrates both a growing awareness of the damage we are inflicting on our 
environment and the need to change. In ‘A Growing Awareness of Ecological Failure’ I 
cover a range of proposed solutions to the problem of climate change and argue, extending 
on the work of John Houghton, that they all have underlying attitudes which are 
problematic in one way or another. In the final section I argue, following Plumwood, that 
liberal-democracy is implicated in contributing to our inability to respond to the 
environmental crises—which, undeniably, has implications for education, including 
education policy, curriculum planning and, consequently, human development itself 
through a focus on liberal individualism as the dominant ideology in identity formation.  
 
Plumwood’s Crocodile 
  
Few have experienced a crocodile’s death roll and lived to tell the tale. Even fewer have 
recognised and explored the resultant discrepancy between their experience and their own 
privileged conception of how the world does and should operate, as Plumwood (1999) 
did. 
 
Before the encounter, it was as if I saw the whole universe as framed by 
my own narrative, as though the two were joined perfectly and seamlessly 
together. As my own narrative and the larger story were ripped apart, I 
glimpsed a shockingly indifferent world in which I had no more 
significance than any other edible being. (p. 91)  
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The encounter, of which Plumwood (2012) speaks, was with a large crocodile intent on 
consuming her. The crocodile’s intent became shockingly, story-shatteringly clear, as she 
felt its teeth pierce her flesh; to the crocodile she was meat and nothing other than meat. 
Incredibly, her experience highlighted a much larger problem, a problem that extended 
beyond the life or death of one woman, the problem of human exceptionalism or 
anthropocentrism. It was a problem she recognised herself to be susceptible to, the 
moment she recognised the crocodile as predator, and herself as prey.  
 
Until that moment, I knew that I was food in the same remote, abstract 
way that I knew I was animal, was mortal. In the moment of truth, abstract 
knowledge becomes concrete. You gaze with dumb astonishment as your 
own death, known only as a shadowy, distant stranger, suddenly rises up 
right before you in terrifying, technicoloured detail and gasp in disbelief 
that some powerful creature can ignore your special status and try to eat 
you. How had I come to make this terrible mistake about myself, my place, 
my body? (pp. 10‒11, italics added) 
 
We all live confined in our narratives, our own stories of the world constructed around 
our experiences. Plumwood’s experience with the crocodile crumbled her narratives of 
safety and invincibility; no longer could she see herself as superior to the crocodile or as 
separate from its jaws. All the values and meanings she had built up over a lifetime were 
in an instant trumped by the survival value her flesh held for the hungry crocodile. At the 
moment her abstract knowledge became concrete experience, she recognised the 
disconnect between the story she had long held to be true, the story that told her she was 
more than a meal, and the world’s indifference to her survival. The abstract narrative of 
superiority she initially laboured under fought against her recognition of the crocodile’s 
intent and the reality of the situation, delaying her reaction and, thereby, hampering her 
chances of survival. Only when she felt herself in the crocodile’s jaws did the boundaries 
between self and all existence ‒ the narratives that sheltered her from the concrete 
knowledge of her mortality, the ultimate end to her personal stories ‒ fall away. This 
experience helped Plumwood to become critical of the belief in human superiority over 
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the ‘natural’ world and allowed her to see the often hidden or denied narratives that drive 
the belief.  
 
At the time of her attack, Plumwood was already a prolific philosopher working in a 
diverse range of areas, although she considered herself an activist first. Plumwood was 
formerly known as Routley before she divorced Richard Routley, later to be known as 
Richard Sylvan, and like Plumwood, also a famed Australian philosopher. The two shared 
a love of both philosophy and the environment. Together they wrote extensively on logic, 
metaphysics and environmental ethics. Plumwood and Sylvan 
 
recognised that the environmental problems that were coming into view at 
that time were the result not merely of faulty policies and technologies but 
of underlying attitudes to the natural world that were built into the very 
foundations of Western thought. According to the Routleys, these attitudes 
were the expression of human chauvinism, the groundless belief, 
amounting to nothing more than prejudice, that only human beings 
mattered, morally speaking; to the extent that anything else mattered at all, 
according to this attitude, it mattered only because it had some kind of 
utility for us. (Mathews, Rigby & Rose in Plumwood & Shannon, 2012, 
p. ix) 
 
After her attack, Plumwood went on alone to develop some of the most influential work 
in ecofeminism to date (Mathews, Rigby & Rose in Plumwood & Shannon, 2012, p. 1). 
In Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, she critiques the form of rationality that 
underpins human chauvinism, teasing out the multiple uses of the term ‘rational’. The 
problematic dominant form of rationality Plumwood (2002) highlights is linked to 
dualisms ‘through the narrative which maps the supremacy of reason onto human 
supremacy’ (p. 4). Plumwood (1993b) takes this point up in relation to Western thought: 
  
Western thought and society has been characterised by a set of interrelated 
and mutually reinforcing dualisms which permeate culture, forming a fault 
line which runs through its entire conceptual system. Each of them has 
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crucial connections to other elements, and has a common structure with 
other members of the set. The interrelationship of the elements of 
contrasting pairs is determined not in isolation but at least in part by the 
other members of the set. They should be seen as forming a system, an 
interlocking structure. (p. 443) 
 
Whilst not attributable to one philosopher, indeed, to do so she thinks would be ‘absurd’,37 
Plumwood (1990) locates an influential elaboration of dualisms in the thought of Plato, 
specifically in his theory of Forms (or theory of ideas). Her concern is with Plato’s 
assertion that the non-material, abstract Forms are timeless and unchanging and the 
essences of various objects—the fundamental reality that he contrasts with the material 
world known to us through sensation. According to Plumwood, Plato’s theory of the 
Forms creates a fundamental dualism, with rationality as the means by which the mind 
comes to know the Forms, while the body is defined as part of the material and ‘corrupt 
state of the world of nature’ (p. 525). The ‘rationalist tradition’ that followed Plato 
incorporated and strengthened the dualism, reaffirming that ‘what is to be valued in 
human character and culture, and in the world generally, is not nature and what links 
humans to nature, but what is distinct from and sets humans apart from nature, especially 
rationality’ (p. 525). The human body being part of nature and the soul part of the higher 
realm of the Forms constitutes a philosophy that advocates the release of the soul, the true 
identity, from the body and from the earth; the privileging of the immaterial over the 
physical. In this sense, Plumwood argues it is a philosophy of death: ‘Death is the goal of 
the philosopher because it is the final and most complete attainment of these goals of 
separation and denial of dependency’ (p. 92). 
 
The traditional Western conception of rationality Plumwood (2002) outlines plays a key 
role in the justification of the maltreatment visited upon those it relies on and 
simultaneously excludes from the realm of reason and the category of fully human. These 
exclusions amount to a denial of humanity, which Plumwood (1993a) argues results in 
                                                 
37 Plumwood (1997) writes that ‘Plato may have theoretically elaborated and perfected the emphasis on 
reason as the representative characteristic of each of the associated elites and nature as that of the lower 
orders, but in this he clearly drew on a larger socially established framework. I claim to show that 
reason/nature dualism can be traced in Plato’s work, not that Plato invented it or is the author of our 
ecological problems’ (p. 150). 
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the creation of a class of ‘Others’; humans grouped as non-humans, lumped with other 
non-human animal species and nature to ‘naturalise domination’ (p. 54). The 
naturalisation of domination is implicit in most appeals to nature. Under this framework 
of reason nature ‘can be thought of as a sphere of multiple exclusions of various areas of 
difference marginalised as other’ (p. 445). Traditionally, predominantly women and 
minority groups have been placed in this category. Consider the following, by Marilyn 
Frye, as quoted by Plumwood (1993a).  
 
For efficient subordination, what’s wanted is that the structure not only 
not appear to be a cultural artifact kept in place by human decision or 
custom, but that it appear natural–that it appear to be a quite direct 
consequence of the facts about the beast which are beyond the scope of 
human manipulation or revision. It must seem natural that individuals of 
the one category are dominated by individuals of the other and that as 
groups, the one dominates the other. (p. 436)  
 
Plumwood argues that ancient dualisms, such as reason/nature, act as cultural artefacts, 
paving the way for the introduction of others, ‘male/female, mental/manual (mind/body), 
civilised/primitive’ (p. 443), and the list goes on. While she locates a major point of 
development for such dualisms in Plato, as mentioned, she also notes that the split can be 
traced as far back as Pythagoras’ early set of contrasts, and his comment: ‘There is a good 
principle, which has created order, light and man; and a bad principle, which has created 
chaos, darkness, and woman’ (Pythagoras in Plumwood, 1993b, p. 444).  
 
Plumwood was careful not to condemn all forms of reason. Making logic ‘the basic 
problem was to valorise reason and the realm of ideas too much and assume the primacy 
of theory over practice’ (Hyde, 2014, p. 195). Plumwood (2002) notes, ‘we would not 
need to deliver the sweeping and pessimistic judgement that reason itself is dysfunctional 
if we recognised reason as plural, and understood its political character as part of its social 
context’ (p. 5). A complex understanding of reason needs to consider the role of culture 
in the naturalisation of domination, for as much as an understanding of the breakdown of 
domination is important, so, too, is an understanding of the extent of domination. 
According to Plumwood (2002), the logic of domination provides a framework for many 
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cultures worldwide, enabling ‘ecological and ethical failures’ on such an enormous scale 
that we ‘must change this culture or face extinction’ (p. 5). Changing this culture, 
however, is no easy task. Humans are embedded in culture and we become unwittingly a 
part of it, and, therefore, we can fail to recognise our prejudices, that is, the beliefs that 
contribute to the present environmental crisis. As Plumwood’s (1999) encounter with the 
crocodile revealed, it is quite 
 
possible for people—as individuals, groups, perhaps whole cultures that 
subscribe to a particular dominant story—to be completely and 
systematically wrong about quite simple and basic things—our 
relationship to food, to one another, the intertwining of life and death, the 
fleshly, embodied character of human existence—and be quite unaware of 
it. (pp. 12‒13, italics added)  
 
If we are ignorant of our limits we are in danger of transgressing them. As Plumwood 
(1990) names Plato the ‘father of Western Philosophy’ and one of its most influential 
cartographers, in the next section I look to Plato’s Phaedrus for evidence of the split that 
felled nature.  
 
Heavenism: The split that caused the death of nature 
 
Socrates (in Plato, 1999a) is fond of splits: ‘I am myself a great lover of these processes 
of division and generalization; they help me to speak and to think’ (p. 196). No doubt, 
divisions help us to describe and cognise the world, to order our experiences, and to 
communicate them to others. The trouble comes when we faithfully believe in them, 
without question, when, as part of our description of the world, we write them into being, 
transform them into systems, laws, institutions, cultural practices, without recourse to 
redefinition, to reconstruction when problems arise. When we have ample feedback that 
these systems are no longer viable, and yet we persist in strengthening and renewing them 
anyway, bolstered by our unshakable beliefs, we commit philosophical suicide.  
 
Long before Descartes, Socrates deemed the soul to be prophetic, the true self, pure, ‘and 
not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned 
63 
 
in the body, like an oyster in his shell’ (p. 153). In Phaedrus, he splits humans into body 
and soul. Further, he splits the soul into three: two winged horses and a charioteer of the 
gods (p. 143). One horse is described as white, beautiful and easy to command, the other, 
dark with blood shot-eyes and unruly. The dark horse must be forced to submit by the 
charioteer, who 
 
drags the bit out of the teeth of the wild steed and covers his abusive tongue 
and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches to the ground and 
punishes him sorely. And when this has happened several times and the 
villain has ceased from his wanton way, he is tamed and humbled, and 
follows the will of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one he is 
ready to die of fear. (p. 164) 
 
The dark horse must be controlled in order to the follow the gods. Those who cannot 
control the ‘ignoble breed’ lose their wings and fall to earth. In Plato, what is real or what 
is human is defined in opposition to nature. Accordingly, to be human is to overcome, to 
dominate and control nature, including our own human nature. According to Plato, the 
philosopher holds pride of place in the hierarchy of the corrupt because a philosopher’s 
soul supposedly has the best memory of what Plato calls the plain of truth, described as 
the divine and perfect mystery to which the soul was once exposed when it followed Zeus 
in the heavens, before it became corrupted, lost its wings, fell to earth and became mortal 
(pp. 146–148).  For when gods ‘stand upon the outside of heaven’ (p. 146), they witness 
‘the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; the colourless, formless, 
intangible essence, visible only to mind, the pilot of the soul’ (p. 146). The story 
continues, immortality is corrupted by mortality, a succession of lives ensues, during 
which the soul strives to gain access once again to the realm of the gods and the intangible 
essence of true knowledge. For the philosopher, it can take as little as three thousand years 
to regain his wings, for others it is a harder path: 
 
And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil 
souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may 
take any which they please. The soul of a man may pass into the life of a 
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beast, or from the beast return again into the man. But the soul which has 
never seen the truth will not pass into the human form. For a man must 
have intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many 
particulars of sense to one conception of reason;—this is the recollection 
of those things which our soul once saw while following God. (pp. 150–
151) 
 
On this account, the ability to reason from particulars to universals is literally the criterion 
for being human. For those charioteers (recall the soul is in three parts, the charioteer, and 
the two steeds it controls) not strong enough to guide their steeds to the truth while still 
in soul form, upon losing their wings and falling to earth, find themselves denied human 
form. One who glimpses truth just enough to gain human form, but not enough to 
remember and recognise it on earth, acts like a beast ‘and is not afraid or ashamed of 
pursuing pleasure in violation of nature’ (p. 155). Such a person, after their first thousand 
years is judged, ‘and after the judgment they go, some of them to the houses of correction 
which are under the earth, and are punished’ (p. 150). The inability to reason correctly is 
the criterion for afterlife punishment.  
 
In Phaedo, Socrates (in Plato, 1999b) reiterates the philosopher’s claim to knowledge and 
makes the study of philosophy a prerequisite for being in the company of the gods (p. 
166). Hence, we find in Socrates, and by extension Plato, a form of heavenism; an 
instantiation of true knowledge far away from that of earthly knowledge.38  
 
For there is no light of justice or temperance or any of the higher ideas 
which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of them: they are seen 
through a glass dimly; and there are few who, going to the images, behold 
in them the realities, and these only with difficulty. There was a time when 
with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in brightness,—
we philosophers following in the train of Zeus, others in company with 
other gods; and then we beheld the beatific vision and were initiated into 
a mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our 
                                                 
38 A concept drawn from Plumwood, to which I will return in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when 
we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm 
and happy’. (p. 153) 
 
In Plato, through Socrates, we see a resounding split between the heavens and the earth, 
between the good and the bad, the innocent and the evil, the perfect and the corrupted, 
the immortal and the mortal, gods and men, and men and animals. On both sides of the 
dualisms he creates a hierarchy, degrees of good and evil, the navigation of which he 
believes, defines human life. No doubt Socrates and Plato were influenced by those who 
came before them, but it is also clear that they had a great and lasting influence on those 
who came after them. If Plato is, as Plumwood attests, the ‘father of Western Philosophy’, 
then it is not hard to trace the lineage of the splits he created. In the next section I seek to 
reinstate the human as part of nature.  
 
Nature Reinstated 
 
The terms ‘human’ and ‘nature’, when thought of dualistically, are problematic. We 
humans are of this planet; we depend upon it for our survival, we are born upon it and 
destined to die upon it. Even the artificial, which we tend to think of in stark opposition 
to the natural, likewise exists on this planet, is created out of this planet, granted by human 
hands, but if we deny that humans are separate from nature, then they become natural 
also. As Mathews (1999) put it: 
 
What environmentalists in fact usually seem to have in mind, in their 
references to nature, is parts or aspects of the world which have not been 
created or unduly modified by human agency. Is this a tenable 
environmental definition of nature? Implied in the definition is a 
distinction between the artefactual and the natural. I however, like many 
others, would immediately question the validity of defining the natural in 
contrast to the artefactual in this way, on the grounds that, since human 
beings, as biological organisms, surely belong to nature, and since making 
things comes to us as naturally as eating and drinking do, our handiwork 
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itself has as much a claim to be considered part of nature as the handiwork 
of spiders, insects and marine life does (Mathews 1996). Therefore to 
regard trees and rocks and animals, not to mention webs, hives, termite 
mounds and coral reefs, as falling within nature, and cars and ships and 
computers as falling outside it, is to over-simplify the issue. (p. 120) 
 
Humans too are natural. True, we have influenced our own evolution with our own 
creations over the centuries to some extent, but we are still as Mathews says, biological 
creatures. We came to be through the same evolutionary processes that shaped the rest of 
life on this planet; we are animals, as Thomas Suddendorf (2013) explains in a book aptly 
entitled The Gap. The following is a long quote, but it beautifully positions humans as 
organisms in a shared world and demonstrates the prevalence of the belief in human 
exceptionalism. 
 
Biology puts beyond doubt that you are an organism. Like all organisms, 
humans metabolize and reproduce. Your genome uses the same dictionary 
as a tulip and overlaps considerably with the genetic makeup of yeast, 
bananas, and mice. You are an animal. Like all animals, you have to eat 
other organisms—whether plant, fungus, or animal—for sustenance. You 
tend to approach things you want to eat while avoiding things that want to 
eat you, just as spiders do. You are a vertebrate. Like all vertebrates, your 
body has a spinal cord that leads up to the brain. Your skeleton is based 
on the same blueprint—four limbs and five digits—as that of a crocodile. 
You are a mammal. Like all placental mammals, you grew inside your 
mother and after birth received her milk (or someone else’s). Your body 
features the same terminal hair as a poodle. You are a primate. Like other 
primates, you have an immensely useful opposable thumb. Your view of 
the world is based on the same color vision as that of a baboon. You are a 
hominid. Like all hominids, you have shoulders that allow your arms to 
fully rotate. Your closest living animal relative is a chimpanzee. Yet it 
would be prudent of me to call you an ape only from a safe distance. 
Humans tend to think of themselves as better than, or at least separate 
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from, all other species on this planet. But every species is unique, and in 
that sense humans are no different. (p. 2) 
 
Humans are a unique species, but not so unique as Plato envisioned. We now know 
enough to have no need to create a hierarchy of corruption among species as he did, yet 
the problem of human exceptionalism or anthropocentrism, as Plumwood’s experience 
with the crocodile highlights, persists for most of us to some extent. It is an age-old notion 
that, as we have seen, can be found in Plato and one that has had great effect on our 
systems of human organisation, including government, education and, as the following 
quote from Suddendorf illustrates, religion.  
 
We have become so successful that many of us think a god singled our 
species out to run the world. Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions, for 
example, all share the fundamental belief that a universal god created 
humanity in his image, that only we are imbued with a soul, and that a 
glorious afterlife awaits those who follow a set of divine prescriptions. 
Nonhuman animals in these plots are cast as extras, and humans are given 
express rights to exploit them. (p. 3) 
 
This form of anthropocentrism can be found in values education and carries through to 
notions of progress39 and hierarchy in popular science, ‘[p]erhaps because of the search 
for continuity and links, a picture persists of our ancestors evolving in a straightforward, 
single, and direct trajectory, up a stairway to Homo sapiens. This was not the case’ (p. 
11). Suddendorf is eager to point out that we do not carry the distinction of being the only 
species of humans to have existed, merely the only one to have survived this long: ‘Only 
                                                 
39 Similar to ‘growth’, progress can be understood in relation to an end goal as it is here, or as a goal in 
itself as it is in the community of inquiry. That is, the concept of ‘progress’ has both negative and positive 
connotations. Its negative association is illustrated best with unsustainable growth or development. For such 
progress to be positive would require sustainable growth. While there is very little written on it, progress 
in a community of inquiry refers to philosophical progress or participants’ progress with making sense of 
their world. To this end, Clinton Golding (2009) defines philosophical progress as ‘the movement from 
philosophical problems to philosophical resolutions, or in other words, from incongruous and inadequate 
conceptions to transformed conceptions where the problems no longer occur’ (p. 223). Philosophical 
progress is also linked to Dewey’s idea of growth regarding inquiry (see Chapters Six and Seven). See also 
Golding (2011).  
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two thousand generations ago humans still shared this planet with several upright-
walking, fire-controlling, tool-manufacturing cousins’ (p. 10). Yet, to many, the thought 
of human extinction is beyond the pale, as many of us are as assured of our superiority as 
a species and of our existence as Plumwood (2012) was of her superiority over the 
crocodile; we recognise our own mortality ‘only as a shadowy, distant stranger’ (pp. 10–
11). Climate change is our species’ crocodile, and many of us fail to recognise that we 
are in its jaws.  
 
In the next section, I give an overview of the growing philosophical and scientific 
awareness of ecological failure. Various authors have claimed various starting points for 
research on climate change, rather than try to pinpoint one beginning, I highlight the 
contention and cover some significant philosophical and scientific shifts in thinking about 
the climate, reaching back to the time of Aristotle and forward to the 2017 Australian 
Panel of Experts on Environmental Law. I do so to problematise the search for a silver bullet 
solution to climate change. If climate change is, as Plumwood argues, a structural problem, 
then it requires structural solutions, that is, a restructuring of our socio-political institutions 
(and the epistemic frameworks on which they are built), including education. I follow 
Plumwood in criticising the social structuring inability of liberal-democracy to create 
positive environmental change.  
 
A Growing Awareness of Ecological Failure  
 
The 1970s represented somewhat of a starting point for environmental consciousness, 
although, if we deem such a consciousness present in thinkers that link rather than 
separate human and nature, we can see a litany of writers strewn throughout history who 
fit the bill. Green Studies has claimed as a starting point for ecocriticism ‘Romanticism 
and its afterlife – with its search for a symbiosis between mind and nature, the human and 
the non-human’ (Coupe, 2000, p. xvii). In Europe, a diverse range of writers have been 
claimed, in one way or another, by environmental philosophy, for example: Adorno, 
Spinoza, Wordsworth, Diderot, Heidegger, and Rousseau. Jean-Jacques Rousseau was 
one of the early influencers of the Romantic Movement, which ‘later became a part of 
American Transcendentalism’ (LaFreniere, 1990, p. 41). Indeed, in the USA, Rousseau’s 
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work ‘directly influenced Emerson, [and] at least indirectly influenced Thoreau and John 
Muir through Wordsworth’ (p. 41).  
 
Mathews (2010) reminds us that in Australia, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s,   
 
[s]pectacular campaigns were fought for the Great Barrier Reef, the 
Colong Caves in the Blue Mountains, Fraser Island and Lake Pedder. 
Meanwhile, along the eastern coast of the continent the native forests, 
threatened with wholesale wood-chipping by the Forestry Commission 
were providing a training ground for young environmental activists. (p. 1) 
 
Among these young environmental activists were Plumwood and Sylvan (then both 
Routley). Their book, The Fight for the Forests: The takeover of Australian forests for 
pines, wood chips and intensive forestry, as Mathews observed, ‘set the bar’ for 
environmental philosophy in Australia. William Lines (2006) offers an explanation as to 
why this might be the case: 
 
No Australian author or authors had ever combined philosophical, 
demographic, economic, and ecological analysis in one volume as part of 
one connected argument. The Routleys were unique. They challenged 
conventional academic boundaries as barriers to understanding and 
dismissed claims to objectivity as spurious attempts to protect vested 
interests. They exposed both wood-chipping and plantation forestry as 
uneconomic, dependent on taxpayer subsidies, and driven largely by a 
‘rampant development ideology’. (pp. 144–45) 
 
Together Plumwood and Sylvan turned their well-honed philosophical skills toward the 
practical application of environmental activism. In turn, the practical application 
informed their philosophical views as the ‘fight for the forests brought to their attention 
a jumble of unexamined values, [and] assumptions’ (Mathews, 2010, p. 1). 
 
Twenty-three years ago, Plumwood (1995) asked the question: Has Democracy failed 
ecology? To address her own question, she begins with the following words: 
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As we approach the fourth decade of ecological consciousness and 
scientific concern about the degradation of the earth’s life support systems, 
the evidence is mounting that the unprecedented level of public concern 
and activist effort which these decades have seen is not reflected in 
adequate, effective or stable forms of change at the political level. (p. 134) 
 
Two decades have passed since Plumwood wrote this passage, making it six decades of 
‘environmental consciousness and scientific concern’. Plumwood used these expressions 
purposefully to demarcate a shift in thinking that she believed was necessary to 
understand and that I will briefly cover before moving on to look at how ecology relates 
to democracy. Environmental consciousness, in the way Plumwood meant, permeated 
into philosophical literature in the 1960s, pushing into public awareness primarily in the 
early 1970s. As Plumwood (1990) put it, ‘assumptions about the role of nature remained 
largely unchallenged in philosophy until the early 1970s, when they began to be brought 
up explicitly for questioning and discussion’ (p. 526). While I will not be going into a full 
historical analysis, there are a few events, commonly cited as contributing to this increase 
in environmental awareness, that need to be covered. One of them is visual. On 7 March 
1947, people saw the first partial photographs of earth ever taken from space. The grainy 
black and white images were shot by a camera strapped to a missile at an altitude of over 
100 miles above the planet’s surface and showed the curvature of the planet but were still 
far from the first full view of earth. It was not until the crew of Apollo 17 left earth headed 
for the moon, on 7 December 1972, that the entire planet was photographed for the first 
time. It is no great stretch to imagine that this was a momentous occasion, allowing 
humans for the first time ever to see where we live contrasted against the vastness of 
space. This vision of the finitude of Earth came to us thirteen years after Earth’s 
population reached three billion in 1959 and just two short years before it reached four 
billion in 1974.  
 
Around the same time, the scientific community became increasingly vocal about the 
dangers of living on a finite planetary system with an ever-increasing population and an 
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economic model of unfettered growth.40 In 1968, Stanford ecologists Paul and Anne 
Ehrlich largely reinvented41 this conversation with their book The Population Bomb, 
although Anne Ehrlich was not credited at the time, and often still is not. As the title 
suggests, the book was designed to raise environmental awareness, and did so. Their 
predictions of worldwide mass famines in the 1970s and 1980s did not eventuate, 
although Paul Ehrlich still maintains that there is a high chance of such famines occurring 
in, the not too distant, future.42 The most substantial criticism the Ehrlich’s (1968) 
received was regarding some of their proposed solutions to what they argued was a 
population crisis. Such solutions included a tax on children, the development of mass 
sterilisation agents that could be added to the water supply (although on this count he 
readily admitted ‘society’ would most likely reject such an option), and research on how 
to make first-borns male as in ‘our country and elsewhere couples with only female 
children “keep trying” in hope of a son’ (p. 139), and so on. All of these ‘solutions’ can 
be seen writ large as an argument for what Plumwood called an eco-republic, an idea I 
will return to in greater detail a little later.  
 
Today, however, the focus of discourse has shifted to a related, but much older topic, that 
of how we as humans are changing the Earth’s climate. I say older as records can be found 
of the observation of events in which small-scale climate changes occurred due to, as it 
was then speculated, human activities, reaching back to the time of Aristotle’s student 
Theophrastus, who is credited with coining the term ‘climate’ as we would recognise it 
today (Boykoff, 2011, p. 6). Theophrastus observed and recorded events such as an 
increase in frost in an area after a marsh previously occupying the space had been drained, 
land becoming warmer after the felling of forests, and so on (Neumann, 1985, p. 447).  
 
William Hay (2016) notes that early North American colonists were concerned with the 
environment and with the climate, as they were determined to make it ‘civilised’, make it 
more like back home in Britain. It was a sentiment that was endorsed in 1785 by Thomas 
Jefferson.  
                                                 
40 Growth is used in this instance to denote economic growth, usually measured by gross domestic product.   
41 I say reinvented as Thomas Malthus’ 1798 ‘An essay on the principle of population’ was a well-known 
precursor. 
42 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/oct/23/paul-ehrlich-global-collapse-warning 
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The colonists thought that the problem with North America was the 
forests. If they could clear enough land of trees, the climate would 
ameliorate and become more like that of Britain. They thought that the 
trees were responsible for the high humidity, and they attributed disease 
to the unsuitable climate. The idea that human activity could modify the 
climate was not a fantasy to them. It was their hope for creating reasonable 
living conditions. (p. 4) 
  
Reasonable, but according to their conception of reason, which was entirely British. Fast 
forward to recent history and we find a different story, or rather a myth, an intentional 
muddying of the waters surrounding the age-old story of human influence on climate.  
 
The idea that human activity has no appreciable effect on climate is a 
fiction invented over the past few decades. It appears to have arisen from 
those interested in maintaining a clear path toward short term profits in the 
petroleum and coal industries, and it is largely a phenomenon of the USA. 
(p. 4) 
 
However, it is certainly not confined to the USA alone. Putting such myth-making aside 
for the moment,43 the scientific research on climate is marked by a number of papers that 
significantly increased the scope of scientific knowledge, although there is some 
contention over when this body of research began. In 1824, Joseph Fourier wrote a paper 
that is often credited with introducing the term ‘the greenhouse effect’, although James 
Fleming (1999) points out that the choice of this particular paper is somewhat arbitrary:  
 
The question of terrestrial temperatures was on Fourier’s mind as early as 
1807, when he wrote on the unequal heating of the globe. By 1816, he had 
composed a manuscript of 650 pages on the subject. His magnum opus of 
1822 discusses the problem of terrestrial temperatures and the principles 
governing the temperature of a greenhouse. In his writings, Fourier 
                                                 
43 In the next chapter I will argue that the roots of such myth-making run back to the doctrine of discovery. 
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acknowledged earlier works on heat by John Leslie, Count Rumford, and 
others. One of the earliest such references was to the work of Edme 
Mariotte who wrote in 1681 that although the Sun’s light and heat easily 
passed through glass and other transparent materials, heat from other 
sources did not. (p. 73) 
 
Marx, Haunschild, Thor and Bornmann (2017) offer a comprehensive list of works ‘in 
the context of the history of climate research and the discovery of the greenhouse effect’ 
(p. 336). They draw their analysis back to Edmond Hally’s 1686 paper identifying ‘solar 
heating as the cause of atmospheric motions’ (p. 342). They also note that in 1861 John 
Tyndall linked atmospheric gases to radiant heat (p. 349), but, nonetheless, credit the first 
paper that can be called climate change research to Svante Arrhenius’ 1896 paper linking 
carbon dioxide (CO2) to the greenhouse effect. Guy Callendar (1938) used the records 
from globally positioned weather balloons to first connect CO2 with climate warming. 
He opened his paper with the following passage: 
 
Few of those familiar with the natural heat exchanges of the atmosphere, 
which go into the making of our climates and weather, would be prepared 
to admit that the activities of man could have any influence upon 
phenomena of so vast a scale. In the following paper I hope to show that 
such influence is not only possible, but is actually occurring at the present 
time. (p. 223) 
 
How right he was. In 1988, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was 
‘established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) to provide the world with a clear scientific view on 
the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and 
socio-economic impacts’ (n.p.).44 On Page 3 of its 2015 Summary for Policymakers, the 
IPCC opens with the following line: ‘Human interference with the climate system is 
occurring, and climate change poses risks for human and natural systems’.   
 
                                                 
44 https://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml 
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Sir John Houghton (2009), the lead editor of the first three IPCC reports, notes in his 
book, entitled Global Warming: The Complete Briefing: ‘Humans are an important part 
of the global ecosystem; as the size and scale of human activities continue to escalate, so 
can the seriousness of the disturbances caused to the overall balances of nature’ (p. 240). 
He went further to outline three main attitudes to the planet that he believes to be 
‘unbalanced’, which he names: exploitation, back to nature, and the technical fix. 
 
The first, exploitation, is somewhat intuitive, and well covered by Plumwood; we are 
using the planet’s resources in a way that is non-sustainable. Of this attitude he writes:  
 
Great benefits have come to humankind through the use of fossil fuels, 
minerals and other resources. Yet, much of this exploitation has been 
carried out with little or no thought as to whether this use of natural 
resources has been a responsible one. (p. 241) 
 
The second attitude could be understood as the advocacy for a return to nature. That is, a 
return to pre-industrial times, pre-fossil fuels, pre-supermarkets, a simpler more ‘natural’ 
time. This is a lifestyle choice made by some, and not a choice at all but merely a necessity 
of life for a great many others; however, if we as a species are reliant on everyone, or at 
the very least a great proportion of those with access to modern life, to give up their 
current lifestyles and adopt subsistence farming, then the future looks pretty bleak. When 
the choice is to hand over your phone, television, laptop, washing machine, refrigerator 
etc., or the earth gets it … well we are already living the answer to that one. The use of 
such devices becomes habitual, an assumed right, and such habits form part of our 
identity. Further, Houghton outlines two main reasons why a return to nature is an 
unrealistic solution to our environmental problems. The first is simply that there are too 
many people to feed in this way, and, therefore, we would run into famines, such as those 
predicted in the Population Bomb, as much of the world’s population is reliant on modern 
agriculture and means of food distribution (p. 241). Houghton also notes that abandoning 
science and technology altogether would require a cessation of human creativity, which 
he also thinks impossible. ‘Human scientific and technical development cannot be frozen 
at a given point in history, insisting that no further ideas can be developed’ (p. 242). 
However, the back to nature fix he outlines is unnecessarily severe in scope and 
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unnecessarily dismissive of a simpler life. The back to nature fix should not be relied on 
as a singular solution, but it may well have a part to play in reversing some of humanity’s 
more damaging exploitive attitudes. I will come back to this point later, as Plumwood 
also has a few things to say on the problematic framing of the back to nature choice.  
 
The third and last attitude Houghton outlines, namely, the technical fix, is the belief that 
human ingenuity will be able to fix the problems it creates; it is the science and technology 
as savior attitude. He notes that on ‘the surface the “technical fix” route may sound a good 
way to proceed; it demands little effort and no foresight. It implies that damage can be 
corrected […] rather than avoided in the first place’ (p. 242). It also brings to mind the 
old adages, ‘a stitch in time saves nine’ along with ‘too little too late’. Houghton labels 
such an attitude as ‘arrogant and irresponsible’ (p. 243). As the amounts of carbon 
released now drives climate change far into the future,45 this can also be seen as unethical 
in terms of shifting the burden onto future generations and failing to address 
environmental injustices amplified by the effects of climate change that are occurring 
now. Viewing the solution to climate change as simply a technological fix limits the 
solutions to the technological realm and discounts the role of socio-political organisation 
in creating the problem. Again, this is not to say that technology has nothing to contribute, 
only that, like the back to nature fix, it should not be our only recourse to action. In the 
next section I address the ecological failures of liberal-democracy and a growing sense of 
ethical awareness in the climate change literature.   
 
Liberal-democracy and the EcoRepublic 
 
In the paper ‘Has Democracy Failed Ecology? An Ecofeminist Perspective’, Plumwood 
(1995) argues that ‘the escalation of the processes responsible for ecological degradation, 
despite the great citizen effort which has gone into challenging them in democratic 
                                                 
45 According to the IPCC website, different greenhouse gasses remain in the atmosphere for differing 
amounts of time, ranging from decades to centuries depending on ‘the rates of processes that remove it 
from the atmosphere’. Even if CO2 emissions globally began to decrease today, slow rates of removal 
would mean that CO2 levels would continue to rise. ‘In fact, only in the case of essentially complete 
elimination of emissions can the atmospheric concentration of CO2 ultimately be stabilised at a constant 
level’. https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/faq-10-3.html. 
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polities, therefore represents an alarming failure’ (p. 135) of our current political systems. 
Liberal-democracy, she argues, is an authoritarian political system, with its ‘military 
systems organised around protecting privilege which control so much of the planet’ (p. 
136), and as a result, fails to protect nature. She does not, however, see democracy per se 
as inherently authoritarian.  
 
The superiority of democracy to other systems in detecting and responding 
to ecological problems would seem to lie largely, then, in its capacity for 
adaptation and correction. So in order to discover why democracy is 
failing, we must now ask which political features of democracy contribute 
to and what forms hinder its capacity for correction? (p. 137) 
 
For Plumwood, a major obstacle that hinders this capacity is radical inequality, which, 
she claims ‘is both itself a hindrance to correctiveness and a key indicator of other 
hindrances to societal correctiveness’ (p. 137). I return to this in later chapters when I 
look at an approach to education which aims at self-correction as a fundamental aspect of 
inquiring communities. 
 
Like Houghton, Plumwood (2002) is critical of proposed solutions to the political failing. 
Her vision of an environmental oligarchy, which she dubs the EcoRepublic, can be seen 
as a response to a purely techno-science fix. She writes: ‘Let us imagine a future 
ecological and global version of Plato’s great rationalist utopia, the EcoRepublic’ (p. 63).  
She goes on to envision a dystopic world, with a storyline not unlike recent post-
apocalyptic movies, in which the diversity of life has been greatly, almost completely, 
diminished. On the ground of ever-increasing environmental degradation and the threat 
of total species loss, a new world order is established, a so-called EcoRepublic. Following 
the dictates of scientific reasoning gone mad, its means are justified by its goal, 
preservation of life at all costs, including absurdly, the extinguishing of life. But only a 
certain subset of life is extinguished, namely, those without the power to defend 
themselves or improve their position, those the EcoRepublic has previously excluded and 
deemed non-human according to its prevailing rationality. A notable feature of the 
EcoRepublic is its ‘top-down military style decision-making chain’ (p. 63), which allows 
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maximum flexibility with minimal limitations on implementation. Those who govern are 
EcoGaurdians, headquartered in one of the few remaining relatively preserved patches of 
Earth, which they diligently police to exclude an influx of non-guardians. No political 
voice is given to those closest to the sources of environmental degradation, no provision 
is made for their suggestions to be heard or for their situation to improve in any way.  
 
Speaking of our society, Plumwood (1995) writes that ‘it is the privileged members of 
society who can most easily insulate themselves from […] environmental degradation’ 
(p. 138). Further, she stresses that ‘the most oppressed and dispossessed people in a 
society are those who are made closest to the condition of nature, who are made to share 
the same expendable condition as nature’ (p. 139). Unfortunately, a prime example of this 
logical failure is the treatment of First Nations people in Australia, both historically and 
today, as I will explore in greater detail in the next chapter.  
 
In respect to climate change, Schneider, Rosencranz and Niles (2002) argued that this 
inequality plays out on a global scale:  
 
[A] consensus is building in the scientific community that the damages 
that climatic changes might inflict on societies will depend in part on the 
adaptive capacities of those future societies, which in turn depend on their 
resource bases and technological and infrastructure capabilities. This 
suggests ... that damages may be asymmetrically felt across the 
developed/developing country divide. The scenario where the northern 
rich countries get longer growing seasons and the poor tropical nations get 
more intense droughts and floods is clearly a situation ripe for increasing 
tensions […]. Thus, not only is the climate-policy community faced with 
the need to estimate the impacts of a wide range of plausible climatic 
futures, but it must also estimate the relative adaptive capabilities of future 
societies so as to assess the equity implications of the consequences of 
slowing global warming. All of this is played out against the historical 
background of large inequities in access to resources that make it difficult 
to achieve agreements that protect the global commons. (pp. 35‒41) 
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A study in Nature by John Mutter (2010) shows that ‘natural disasters’, a feature of climate 
change, disadvantage the already disadvantaged in both developed and developing 
countries. To show the former, he cites the gap in redevelopment between the wealthiest and 
poorest districts of New Orleans five years on from hurricane Katrina. 
 
The poorest district of New Orleans — the Lower Ninth Ward — has about 
24% of its former residents, whereas the wealthy Central Business District 
has seen 157% repopulation. Low-income black workers were seven times 
more likely to lose their pre-Katrina jobs than higher-income white workers. 
And low-income people have found it more difficult to attain basic living 
conditions, including good access to health care. (p. 1042) 
 
Zooming out from the internal inequality of a developed nation to that of a developing 
country, the same pattern is evident.  
 
The world is even more divided than New Orleans. The bottom billion of the 
world's population is falling further and further behind. Whereas rich nations, 
such as the United States, can buffer the effects of terrible natural blows on 
a national level, small countries with weak economies can be overwhelmed 
by disasters. Samoa's economy was set back 30 years by a series of 
hurricanes that devastated the entire island; Madagascar is estimated to have 
lost a decade in its economic development because of similar disasters. The 
magnitude-8.8 earthquake in Chile in February 2010 released about 500 
times as much energy as the 7.0 quake a few weeks earlier in Haiti. Yet the 
death toll in Haiti — the much poorer nation, with a GDP more than 20 times 
smaller than that of Chile — was almost 500 times larger, and the nation's 
prospects for recovery are much worse. (p. 1042) 
 
Chapter 13 of the 2014 IPCC report is entitled ‘Livelihoods and Poverty’ and ‘is devoted to 
exploring poverty in relation to climate change, a novelty in the IPCC’ (p. 798). Its addition 
reflects growing global recognition and concern over the effects of climate change on those 
already economically and ecologically disadvantaged. 
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Moving now from science to law, 2017 saw the release of eight technical papers drafted by 
The Australian Panel of Experts on Environmental Law (2017), a body set up to ensure ‘a 
healthy, functioning and resilient environment for generations to come’.46 In the paper, 
entitled ‘Democracy and Environment’, the panel state the following: 
 
The environment is a source of human benefits, well-being, needs and, 
indeed, existence. Democracy informs its governance, in the form of rights 
and obligations, procedures, the distribution of benefits, models of conduct, 
the representation of ‘voices’, and the protection of vulnerable subjects both 
animal and human. (p. 6, italics added) 
 
Liberal-democracy, Plumwood (1995) argued, is failing on all points. Rather than being 
protected, nature and ‘vulnerable subjects’ are instrumentalised, backgrounded or as 
Houghton would put it, exploited. A prime example of the backgrounding of nature is what 
is called the ‘hidden subsidy’. In a recent study, Coady, et al. (2016) found that the cost 
of fossil fuel subsidies was ‘$4.9 trillion worldwide in 2013 and $5.3 trillion in 2015 
(6.5% of global GDP in both years)’ (p. 12). Further, in their 2015 working paper for the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), they stressed that reforming subsidies holds the 
potential to increase ‘government revenue by $2.9 trillion (3.6 percent of global GDP), 
cut global CO2 emissions by more than 20 percent, and cut pre-mature air pollution deaths 
by more than half’ (p. 7). Although Ross McKitrick (2017) makes a case for caution in 
accepting these figures, taking issue with how the subsidies are defined and measured, he 
still admits that the ‘economic case against subsidies for energy production or 
consumption is well-established and sound’ (p. 384). Others, notably Gabriela Mundaca 
(2017), support the findings of Coady, et al. while also highlighting the important role 
revenue growth can play in ‘increased public investments in health, education, and 
infrastructure’ (p. 103).  
 
Both locally and globally, those in the most disadvantaged positions are the ones most 
likely to suffer the greatest effects of climate change and other environmental 
degradation. As a result, they are often the ones in the best position to provide information 
                                                 
46 http://apeel.org.au 
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on ecological issues, as they are often the first to observe them and have the greatest 
personal interest in preserving the environment in which they are embedded. However, 
as Plumwood (1995) stresses, they are also the ones most likely to be silenced, the least 
likely to be given a voice to influence policy. Hence, she concludes that our political 
system suffers from a communication problem that makes ecological correction difficult, 
if not impossible. In this way, environmental injustice goes hand in hand with an 
embedded human injustice. Ours is an active system of creating and distributing 
environmental ills, or as Plumwood put it, ‘impoverishment and environmental 
degradation are produced as twin offspring of the same processes of development’ (p. 
139). Nature is viewed simply as a backdrop to human activities and a means to our 
individual liberation. This picture of liberal-democracy is not one of a responsive 
democracy, insofar as it is founded on a conception of society as an aggregate of 
individuals, mutually disinterested, and who each have interests that are of their own 
choosing, which does not provide the kind of correctiveness necessary to mitigate 
ecological failure. Conceptions of liberty that centre on independence, rather than 
interdependence, fail to acknowledge the source of their so-called independence.   
 
The man of property assumes the contribution of nature in the form of a 
continuing support base for production, accumulation and renewal, but 
also denies it, not infrequently in even stronger terms than he denies these 
human Others, failing to recognise and allow, in his economic and cultural 
systems, for nature’s reproduction and continuation. (p. 149) 
 
Once again this is illustrated in the case of climate change, for as Houghton (2009) attests: 
 
Nature took about a million years to lay down the amount of fossil fuel 
that we now burn worldwide every year – and in doing so it seems that we 
are causing rapid change of the Earth’s climate. Such a level of 
exploitation is clearly not in balance, not harmonious and not sustainable 
(p. 242) 
 
The division between humans and nature creates a false sense of control over nature, 
further driving exploitation. Plumwood’s (2002) example of the fate of a single penguin 
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she discovered washed up dead along a shoreline in Tasmania gives another example of 
ways in which ‘technoscience has contributed to producing the environmental crisis 
[when] applying to highly complex situations and systems specialised and highly 
instrumentally-directed forms of knowledge whose aim is to maximise outputs’ (p. 38). 
Upon initiating investigations into the cause of death, an autopsy revealed the penguin 
had died of starvation. Plumwood was later to discover that an important food source for 
penguins and other marine life had fallen victim to reductionist economic rationality. 
Sometime before the penguin had been discovered, quarantine restrictions in Western 
Australia were lifted, allowing fish farmers to make the economic decision to import 
marginally cheaper South African pilchards to feed their fish, rather than continuing to 
use local stocks. As is often the case with introduced animals, disease spread rapidly to 
local stocks. Lacking in immunity, millions of wild pilchards died, and the effects were 
felt throughout the complex food web (p. 14). If the possibility of such an occurrence was 
taken into consideration, easy enough to do if one consulted the plentiful research on the 
topic,47 and the animal lives lost were valued, importing the pilchards would not have 
been viewed as an attractive option. The environmental irrationality of the situation is 
apparent if we consider the factors the fish farmers chose to take into consideration when 
making the choice of importing food from overseas or using the local stock. In making 
their choice they privileged economic factors, backgrounding environmental 
consequences and effectively reducing a complex chain of possibly predictable effects 
down to the economic benefits to themselves. Privileging economic rationality blinded 
them to the ecological limitations of the situation. An effective ecological rationality, 
therefore, needs to include the requirement to frame decision-making in ecological as well 
as economic terms.   
 
While ecologically rational decision-making is important on all levels, including the 
individual, we must be wary of explanations that seek to place all responsibility for 
change on the individual. If you recall, this is the problem I noted earlier with the return 
to nature attitude and the framing of the choice to hand over all your modern conveniences 
or the planet gets it. The liberal explanation for ecological failure, as Plumwood puts it, 
                                                 
47 Daniel Gaughan (2001), for instance, argues for ‘the need to undertake a review of the current 
international standards for import risk analysis (IRA)’ (p. 113).  
 
82 
 
‘treats change in liberal terms as a matter of consumer willpower and argues back from 
the absence of change to the absence of consumer concern’ (p. 142). This argument, 
however, only works on the ‘self-defeating assumption that ecologically harmful, self-
maximising “consumerist” behaviour is a natural, invariant aspect of “human nature”, 
rather than one itself institutionally constructed and specified as rational within the 
framework of liberal capitalism’ (p. 143).  
 
How many times have we heard someone say: ‘that’s just x’s nature’ or ‘we can’t change 
that, it’s human nature’? The recourse to human nature as explanation naturalises 
domination, making the problem seem beyond human intervention, as if we should be 
satisfied with the ‘that’s just the way it is’ explanation. Such an explanation shifts the 
blame away from the system that creates the behaviour and helps enforce the rigidity of 
thinking of an existing system as being the only one possible. It also serves to shift the 
focus onto individuals and away from groups, governments and corporations which are 
major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions.48 Such a narrative is also important in 
establishing the authority to punish.  
 
The inevitable outcome of attempting to give priority to saving the 
conventional identification of liberalism with democracy is to cast the 
ecological failure of liberalism as a conflict between environment and 
democracy, and thus ultimately to force a reluctant construction of 
ecological failure as lending support to authoritarian strategies and 
regimes oriented to coercion of this recalcitrant ‘human nature’. (p. 143) 
 
The positioning of human nature as the source of failure is used to justify punitive 
measures against the individual or group of individuals, such as in the example of the 
EcoRepublic. The instrumentalisation of the poor by the powerful is dressed in ‘organic’ 
clothes, and the narrative of the ‘natural’ is weaponised. Sylvan and Plumwood, then 
Routley and Routley (1982), commented on the relation between theories of society and 
human nature:  
                                                 
48 For the top 100 toxic companies in terms of greenhouse gas emissions see The University of 
Massachusetts’ Political Economic Research Institute: https://www.peri.umass.edu/greenhouse-100-
polluters-index-2018-report-based-on-2015-data. 
83 
 
 
The question of the character of human interests and preferences and the 
extent of their determination by the social context in which they occur is 
fundamental to the whole question of social and economic arrangements, 
and also accordingly to arguments for the State on the basis of human 
propensities. (p. 25) 
 
Eric Bonds (2016) reports on a growing number of authors who both publish articles that 
promote a version of ‘recalcitrant human nature’ under the topic of climate conflict, and 
a number, like Plumwood, who seek to expose the underlying structural violence inherent 
in such research. Bonds begins by asking, ‘[w]ill climate change make the world a more 
violent place?’ (p. 3) and highlights the growing body of literature that answers in the 
affirmative. However, as the February Editorial (2018) in Nature cautions, the authors of 
such studies need first to answer the questions ‘did climate change alter the weather? And 
did the change in the weather provoke the conflict? Only a solid yes to both can justify 
bold statements that global warming promotes violence — and establishing this answer 
is difficult, if not impossible, in many cases’ (p. 275). Bonds (2016) points out that the 
critiques of the climate conflict literature object to the frequent use of ‘colonial 
stereotypes of the global South, implying that its peoples are somehow more predisposed 
to violence than those of European ancestry’ (p. 4) He argues that the focus on the 
‘potential violence of the poor’ is an attempt to obfuscate the climate violence of the 
powerful.49 
 
Why […] has orthodox climate conflict research continued to flourish, and 
to enjoy such a high public profile? Critics warn that this is because the 
perspective so closely matches, and is so useful to, governments that are 
securitizing the issue of climate change and using it as a means to 
legitimate militarism and ongoing interventions in the global South. (p. 4) 
 
                                                 
49 This is an example of what I will refer to in the next chapter as a ‘myth of reversal’, a reversal of the 
situation to advance the platform of the powerful, or, as Bond (2016) puts it, to overlook ‘the violence of 
the wealthy and powerful groups who benefit most from, and actively work to sustain, a fossil fuel-
dependent neoliberal capitalism’ (p. 5). 
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It is a means of creating an EcoRepublic, as Plumwood predicted. Alternative theories of 
society, based on differing assumptions of human nature are not new. Rousseau, a 
forerunner of Romanticism, for example, represents a break in classic liberal thinkers’ 
insistence on nature as corrupt. He sought to reverse the Platonic dualism, arguing that 
both nature and human nature are pure, but adding that it is society that corrupts. He 
argued that we learn through our flawed society to follow dictates other than those of our 
conscience. Rousseau (1987) thinks it is a learned response for a human to say to 
themselves ‘at the sight of a man suffering, “Perish if you will – I am safe”’ (p. 47). For 
Rousseau, selfishness is not inherent, it is learned and must be unlearned through the 
proper development of reason through education. While rightly criticised by feminists for 
his lack of attention to female education, his book, Emile, nonetheless inspired many 
educational reformers, such as Johann Pestalozzi, Friedrich Froebel, and A.S. Neill.  
 
A further complication to the development of ecologically rational democratic structures, 
is the above-mentioned denial not only of the Other, but of habituation to the effect 
created by and subsequent denial of climate change. Plumwood (1995) notes that ‘liberal-
democratic political systems are not responding in more than superficial ways to a state 
of ecological crisis which every day grows more severe but which every day is perceived 
more and more as normality’ (pp. 141–142). According to Schneider, et al. (2002), this 
growing sense of normality is only added to by a media that attempts to portray both sides 
equally and as adversaries, giving a ‘contrarian view publicity vastly disproportionate to 
its meager support in the community of climate scientists’ (p. 41). To counter this, 
Schneider spent a large proportion of his career committed to educating citizens and 
policymakers in the basics of climate science, to help them make more informed choices 
and clear up common misconceptions.  
 
The idea of the need for an informed citizenry is not new; indeed, it has been a goal of 
education for centuries. At the beginning of the last century, Dewey (1910), who was a 
famous advocate of education as a social and interactive learning process and, thus, school 
as a social institution through which social reform can occur, cited the need for educating 
students in the scientific method to prevent rigidity of mental habits and aid people in 
understanding a world that is largely being shaped by science in one way or another. He 
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wrote, ‘actively to participate in the making of knowledge is the highest prerogative of 
man and the only warrant of his freedom’ (p. 127). But how do we participate in a way 
that does not reinforce dualisms?  
 
Bleazby’s (2013) work connecting feminist philosophy with Dewey demonstrates that 
Dewey ‘is highly compatible with many contemporary feminist philosophies’ (p. 13). 
Further, she argues that ‘[b]y integrating various feminist theories and Dewey’s 
philosophy, we can more fully explain the epistemological, educational, political and 
social consequences of these dualisms and develop a method for reconstructing them’ (p. 
13). I follow Bleazby in using Plumwood for these purposes and add environmental to 
Bleazby’s list of things we can better explain. Plumwood (2002) argues for the 
development of ecologically rational democratic structures, characterised ‘by dialogical 
relationships in order to set up the logical and cultural basis for negotiation’ (p. 11). To 
develop such relationships from within a monological model requires the examination of 
the role of culture in the construction of self. To this problem, others, such as Arne Naess 
and those that have followed him in the Deep Ecology movement, argued for a relational 
construction of self, one that leads to an identification of self with all others, both human 
and non-human. Whilst the movement shares some similarities with Plumwood’s 
philosophy, to return to Houghton’s three attitudes, it can be seen as reminiscent of the 
‘back to nature’ solution. Further, Plumwood (1993) is wary of the problem of 
incorporation, that is ‘the definition of the other in terms of the self’s realm of agency’ 
(p. 155). Treating other, human or non-human, as part of the self is part of the same logic 
of domination, only with the denial of agency through incorporation, rather than 
exclusion. It is also of a similar logic to that of assimilation, which I will return to in 
Chapter Four.  
 
Conversely, the classic liberal notion of the political individual is one of exclusion in 
which the ‘self-interested individual employs a conception of reason as the use of both 
other humans and the world generally as a means to their satisfaction, which is assumed 
to be the satisfaction of interests in which others play no essential role’ (p. 151). Rather 
than Naess’ insistence on the development of self, unified with nature, which subtly 
extends human centrism and abolishes difference, or a liberal self, hyper-separated from 
86 
 
the Other, as in the dominant conception of self, Plumwood argues for a third way, which 
incorporates both difference and unity. She suggests the development of ‘traitorous 
identities’ that ‘involve a revised conception of the self and its relation to the non-human 
other, opposition to oppressive practices, and the abandonment and critique of cultural 
allegiances to the dominance of the human species and its bonding against non-humans’ 
(p. 205) and human Others alike. A traitorous identity is characterised as having a 
relational identity and existing within a framework that does not separate the private from 
the public spheres in the ways liberalism does. Such a person would consider the need for 
the recognition of the Other, both human and non-human, take responsibility for the 
impact of their actions on others, and show generosity, respect, empathy and inclusion (p. 
159). She argues that such an ecologically democratic identity, or citizen for our purposes, 
is brought about by breaking down the divisions of liberal-democracy and instantiating 
democratic practices into every sphere of life from the workplace to the home, so that 
those in the best position to make ecologically rational choices have the systematic ability 
to be able to effect change. Plumwood (2002) argues that an ideal ecologically rational 
‘liberal public sphere is taken to represent a deliberative arena where everyone, despite 
other inequalities, has an equal opportunity to speak’ (p. 92). However, under an 
ecologically irrational liberal-democracy there are a great many blocks that prevent those 
who suffer inequalities from speaking, as I have demonstrated. An ecologically rational 
democracy, therefore, is one that actively works to remove such blocks, and stops future 
blocks from accumulating. Towards this end, Plumwood offers a proposition she calls an 
‘ethico-epistemological proposition’, which states that ‘knowledges that involve injustice 
to those who are known do not provide accurate or ethically acceptable forms of 
knowledge’ (p. 44). Such a proposition provides an epistemic guideline for regulating 
dominance and can perhaps be used to dismantle dualisms and increase intellectual 
freedoms, which are ‘compromised by the domination of instrumental rationality that sees 
all as a means to the furtherance of our currently-accepted economic and political 
structures’ (Hyde, 2016, p. 2). I will raise Plumwood’s proposition again in Chapter 
Seven. 
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Conclusion 
 
The attitude that the planet is here for our use can be traced back in Western philosophical 
history to the split between the soul and the earth that is present in Plato and has 
influenced attitudes for centuries, influencing a logic of domination that Plumwood 
argues is complicit in the destruction of global ecology. The range of proposed solutions 
to the problem of climate change covered in this chapter, all, as I have argued, extending 
on the work of Houghton, have underlying attitudes which are problematic in one way or 
another. Houghton argues these attitudes can be summed up as exploitation, back to 
nature, and the technical fix. Plumwood argues if we extend the technical fix attitude 
forward into an even bleaker environmental future, we can see it used to instantiate a 
military state, the beginning of which can be seen in the climate conflict literature. I have 
incorporated studies in climate change, arranged in historical order, to demonstrate a 
growing ecological and ethical awareness and concern about the ways in which we have 
and are utilising the planet’s resources. In addition, liberal-democracy’s inability to 
respond to the environmental crisis, that is, to provide democratic mechanisms for 
correctiveness, has been well argued for by Plumwood. In later chapters, I argue that 
schools structured as institutions for the education of democratic citizens are, given 
Plumwood’s assessment of liberal-democracy, inherently problematic, especially in 
addressing the educational task of identity formation. If liberal-democracy is unable to 
respond adequately to climate change, the remit of schools should not be the creation of 
more liberal individuals, but rather ecologically aware citizens, which stem from an 
ontological shift away from rugged individualism inherent in the logic of liberal identity, 
a logic that is even more excessive in current neo-liberal politics. Such a shift, I contend, 
can provide the kind of correctiveness Plumwood seeks. But first, in the next chapter, I 
will examine the ‘myth of reversal’ as part of the mechanism which perpetuates dominant 
rationality and in turn drives both climate change denial and a denial of prior presences.   
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Chapter Three 
The Myth of Reversal 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I ask the question: ‘Is it possible ‘we’ are involved in a war ‘we’ don’t 
even recognise, in which ‘we’ are the aggressors, and ‘we’ are both the inciters and 
benefactors of an ongoing violence done to a marginalised Other, imagined as less than 
human? This question becomes important in light of the ecological failure of liberal-
democracy and the attendant social injustice wrought by it, as covered in the previous 
chapter; an injustice that I argue is best understood as the ontological instantiation of a 
dominant rationality, a philosophically suicidal form of reasoning. By ‘we’ I mean non-
indigenous peoples. As Genevieve Lloyd (2000) argues, even those deemed outsiders in 
other areas – such as feminists in academic philosophy – in regards to thinking about the 
land and the complex social and cultural structures in Australia, non-indigenous people  
have ‘to confront the fact that, whatever their sense of "outsideness" in relation to their 
own intellectual tradition, they are undeniably "inside" that tradition in relation to 
indigenous women and men’ (p. 30). She further argues that there is a need ‘to come to 
terms also with being, in some sense, responsible for a history that is emerging ever more 
clearly as a history of dispossession and oppression of the original inhabitants’ (p. 30). I 
wish to extend upon Lloyd’s last point to include present and future oppression, by 
arguing that colonisation is, following Wolfe (2006), an ongoing structure rather than an 
historical event.  
 
The structural nature of colonisation means that the ‘Australian identity’ retains a colonial 
aspect, and that many if not all non-indigenous people live with prejudice, even if it is 
largely unknown, and rarely questioned.50 These prejudices govern the limits of our own 
                                                 
50 It is all too common, for instance, to hear people opine at the suggestion of the integration of Aboriginal 
knowledge that ‘we can’t go back’, which I take them to mean back in time to a simpler or ‘tribal’ life. 
Such statements reveal a prejudicial notion of Aboriginal knowledge as somehow inferior and stuck in the 
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colonial lives, enslaving us, even as we enslave others.51 That a destructive way of 
thinking underlies such prejudices has been argued not only by Camus and Plumwood, 
but by a host of other thinkers, including Moreton-Robinson, Spivak, and Wolfe, to name 
but a few. As I have already argued, Plumwood calls this way of thinking a logic of 
domination, while Camus (1977a) points to philosophical suicide as the choice that leads 
one down either of ‘the opposite paths of humiliated reason and triumphal reason’ (p. 48). 
Moreton-Robinson (2015) speaks of the concept of ‘possessive logics’. Whilst I do not 
mean to say all these are one and the same, and by doing so collapse any differences, I do 
wish to suggest that the different concepts are complementary and when explored together 
can increase our understanding of the societal forces at work in creating and maintaining 
oppressive structures. I do this not to paint the Other as victim, as powerless, as 
Aboriginal peoples in Australia were and are active and successful in many ways at 
resisting colonisation and mediating their relationships with those outside their 
communities (Martin, 2008), but to make the case for present day colonial peoples to 
reflect on their own involvement and become ‘traitorous identities’.52 I will focus on the 
colonisation of Australia as a glaring example of the myths that have and are propelling 
colonisation and by extension liberal-democracy. These are myths that we need to be able 
to recognise to challenge. In Chapter Seven, I return to Plumwood’s concept of traitorous 
identities and argue that given the damage done by liberal-democracy, education needs to 
turn away from the production of liberal citizens to develop, instead, ecologically rational 
peoples able to hear and better respond to injustice and ecological problems such as 
climate change. I argue that to achieve this under the conditions of existing institutions of 
liberal-democracy, such as schools, teachers need to turn traitorous toward dominant 
logic.   
 
The concept of ‘possessive logics’ is particularly instructive as a starting point for 
analysing how patriarchal colonial sovereignty is operationalised. As Moreton-Robinson 
(2015) points out, possessive logics indicate a ‘mode of rationalisation’, 
 
                                                 
past, even though it is a much older culture than Western culture. The thought of learning from Aboriginal 
knowledge is rarely entertained and often meet with immediate scepticism.  
51 I will return to the limitations on intellectual freedom caused by dominant rationality in Chapter Seven.  
52 An argument I later extend to the classroom. 
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rather than a set of positions that produce a more or less inevitable answer, 
that is underpinned by an excessive desire to invest in reproducing and 
reaffirming the nation-state’s ownership, control, and domination. As 
such, white possessive logics are operationalized within discourses to 
circulate sets of meanings about ownership of the nation, as part of 
commonsense knowledge, decision making, and socially produced 
conventions. (p. xii) 
 
Hidden in plain sight, so to speak, possessive logics have helped to create and continue 
to perpetuate colonial culture, inculcating at all levels of social organisation a myth of 
reversal that casts First Nations peoples along with indigenous flora and fauna (prior 
presences) as villains. A myth of reversal is a story that uses the suffering of Other as a 
weapon against them. The epistemic story creates a lived ontology, one that often results 
in communal suffering, including the loss of both life and meaning. It comes attendant 
with a belief in the inferiority of Other to which no contradictory evidence is admitted. A 
reversal of a situation is created to advance the platform of the powerful, Terra Nullius 
and climate change denial are two examples. Myths of reversal are often used to justify 
the excesses of history’s past which, nonetheless, extend into the present and future. It is 
not just the story that is reversed, but often our sense of what is right and wrong. These 
myths of reversal limit not only the Other, but also differently, the oppressor’s self-
identity. This way of thinking is ‘normalised’ through a process of Othering.  
 
While the death penalty is now abolished in Australia, during settlement, myths of 
reversal too often resulted in Aboriginal people literally ‘hung for the temerity of using 
their own land’ (Plumwood, 2007, p. 63). Many of the same misguided arguments for the 
use of the death penalty, raised by Camus, were also used in Australia, with one addition. 
A primary justification for capital punishment was its use as a teaching tool for a people 
that were thought to be of inferior intellect. Well over ‘100 Aborigines were judicially 
executed in the 19th century … [hanging] was perceived by colonizers as the ultimate 
instrument in educating “untutored savages” in the rule of law’ (Finnane & McGuire, 
2001, p. 281). What they were supposedly being taught was to respect the thieves that 
stole their land, although this, of course, was never explicitly admitted to. The widespread 
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theft of Aboriginal land has never ceased, and, indeed, as Plumwood (2007) contends, is 
rarely discussed, and actively denied; the ‘insistence that it is the prior, not the colonizing, 
presence that is illegitimate, shows that what is involved here is not ignorance but a 
complex mythologizing of conquest’ (p. 63). It is a myth of reversal that keeps the theft 
alive: Terra Nullius. Under international law, a country could be settled if it were 
uninhabited, or Terra Nullius meaning no-one’s land. As Aboriginal peoples had already 
inhabited the continent for tens of thousands of years, claiming Australia to be Terra 
Nullius was a myth used to justify invasion.53 Lloyd (2000) states that the ‘idea of terra 
nullius allowed thought of the sovereignty of Australia to be organized around reassuring 
ideas of discovery and settlement, rather than more disturbing notions of invasion and 
conquest’ (pp. 31–32).  
 
For the rest of this chapter I will take the case of the colonisation/invasion of Australia as 
instructive, while at the same time recognising it to be one among many colonised 
countries, each with a unique history of both violence and resistance (see Martin, 2008; 
Brown, 1991). In the first and second sections I examine in detail the laws that were used 
to justify the genocide of Australian colonisation. I then turn to the notion of epistemic 
violence and argue that the myths are a violent tool of the logic of domination. Using 
Plumwood’s article, ‘Cemetery Wars’, I show how it is possible for such a destructive 
attitude toward the Other to become normalised and implicit in everyday acts and how 
the logic protects itself from detection, by turning the harm caused to the Other into a 
harm done by the Other; a myth of reversal.  
 
We 
 
Moreton-Robinson (2015) describes another ‘we’, namely, Aboriginal, Indigenous, and 
First Nations peoples worldwide. The ‘we’ to which Moreton-Robinson belongs is the 
‘we’ that ‘we’ present day colonial peoples have made Other. In her words, ‘Indigenous 
peoples have been sociohistorically constructed through first world Western knowledge 
                                                 
53 I say invasion as settlement is appropriate for settled land, that is, land that was previously vacant, as this 
was not the case in Australia, as many battles were fought over the land, invasion is the fitting term (for 
further information on the ‘frontier wars’ see Barritt-Eyles, 2018). As explained earlier, I will use the term 
coloniser or colonial identity in place of the usual ‘settler’ nomenclature. I do this to create consistency and 
maintain a link to our shared colonial past, lest we forget the pain and suffering caused.   
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systems that are ontologically and epistemologically grounded in differentiation’ (xvii). 
‘We’ as colonial identities fail to recognise the Aboriginal ‘we’ as prior presences, 
constructing them as Other, as less than human. That is to say, the way ‘we’ see the Other 
is inextricably bound with the way ‘we’ see the world. Too often, like the case of the 
penguins discussed in the previous chapter, the way ‘we’ see the world is reduced to 
economic rationality; an instrumental rationality that recognises the world only for the 
use to which it can be put, a world reduced to tools of progress,54 with all actions justified 
accordingly. According to Plumwood (2007), colonisers are ‘those who annexed [the 
land] and instituted “progress” as the work of eliminating everything not seen as of 
economic or other human use’ (p. 63). Tied to economic rationality are the raw materials 
that can be liberated from the earth, those to be farmed, mined and milled, but also human 
labour, those who can be forced to reshape the earth into the coloniser’s image, according 
to the coloniser’s will. Behind it all lies ‘the driving engine of international market forces’ 
(Wolfe, 2006, p. 394).  
 
To achieve the aims of the market, the colonisers, above all, required land. But the 
colonisers were faced with a problem: how to reconcile English law, which was largely 
written in service to those who have land, with the taking of land by those who have none 
and no rightful stake in anyone else’s. That is, how were the colonisers to obtain land 
already occupied by Aboriginal peoples that they had no claim to under their own English 
law? Their answer? Legal theft: create a myth of reversal by denying the presence of 
Aboriginal people, where possible, making them less than human and declaring their land 
empty – Terra Nullius. The result was systemic genocide (Roache-Turner, 2001; Rogers 
& Bain, 2016; Shipway, 2017; Short, 2010; Tatz, 1991, 2016).  
 
Writing in 1987, the historian, Henry Reynolds, expressed his surprise at the complexity 
of the issue of sovereignty in Australia: 
  
It was only after a great deal of research into the legal aspects of settlement 
that I began to appreciate the complexity of the issues involved, the 
ramification, the overlapping. But it gradually became clear that the 
                                                 
54 Progress, in this sense of the word, is a tool of colonisation. 
93 
 
conventional view was in need of major correction. I realized that I had 
gone on for years accepting at face value ideas and interpretations that 
were wrong, that I had taught them over and over to students, never 
doubting their accuracy. My conviction strengthened as my research 
progressed and […] I believed that the conventional view of Australian 
settlement, seen from both a legal and a historical view, had to be 
significantly reassessed. This in turn had important implications for the 
way Australians see their past, the way they assess present problems, the 
way they plan for the future. (p. xii) 
 
Reynolds is an eminent Australian historian who, in more than ten books (see especially: 
1972, 1981, 1989, 2001, 2013) and numerous academic articles, focuses on the frontier 
conflicts between European colonisers and Indigenous people in Australia. I will rely here 
on Reynolds’ (1987) findings as they relate to the myth of reversal, with some additions.  
 
Even before the myth of Terra Nullius, to which I will return, there was the myth of 
discovery, also known as the doctrine of discovery that has a long and varied history. 
Colonial history books tell how Captain James Cook ‘discovered’ Australia in 1770, and 
laid claim to its Eastern coast in the name of the Crown, on the 22 August of that year. 
On the 21 April, Cook (2005) committed to his log the following words: ‘In the P.M. we 
saw the smoke of fire in several places; a Certain sign that the Country is inhabited’ (p. 
897). In the following pages, representing the days after the first sighting of smoke, he 
details his numerous encounters with Aboriginal peoples, including his brief exploration 
of their civilisation; their huts, the cuts they made in trees, ‘steps of about 3 or 4 feet 
asunder for the conveniency of Climbing them’ (p. 917), the mussels boiling over an open 
fire, which he takes the liberty of tasting after scaring off the owners, the darts, he assumes 
are used for fishing, and the canoes that he sees being used to fish. But none of this 
mattered to the English. 
 
The myth of discovery was endowed with many positive values, the kind that made for a 
riveting and acceptable story for the English imaginary at the time, and later for the 
Australian colonialists. According to Reynolds (1987), these values included ‘heroism, 
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endurance and skill’ (p. 9). Cook was valorised in newspapers, speeches, statues, and 
songs, held up as a model for Australian youth to imitate, and the myth of his grand 
endeavour was taught as history by misty-eyed teachers and politicians for centuries. 
Unsurprisingly, James Baldwin (1985) describes a similar situation in the USA:  
 
What passes for identity in America is a series of myths about one’s heroic 
ancestors. It’s astounding to me, for example, that so many people really 
appear to believe that the country was founded by a band of heroes who 
wanted to be free. That happens not to be true. What happened was that 
some people left Europe because they couldn’t stay there any longer and 
had to go someplace else to make it. That’s all. They were hungry, they 
were poor, they were convicts. Those who were making it in England, for 
example, did not get on the Mayflower. That’s how the country was 
settled. (p. 3) 
 
I say unsurprisingly as America shares many similarities in terms of colonisation, taking 
for its justification the same doctrine as Australia does: the doctrine of discovery. To find 
out what Cook’s discovery meant from a colonial legal standpoint we must turn to the 
roots of the doctrine of discovery, which stretch back to the fifth century: 
 
The Roman Catholic Church and various popes began establishing the idea 
of a worldwide papal jurisdiction that placed responsibility on the Church 
to work for a universal Christian commonwealth. This papal 
responsibility, and especially the Crusades to recover the Holy Lands in 
1096–1271, led to the idea of justified holy war by Christians against 
infidels to enforce the Church’s vision of truth on all peoples. (Miller, 
Ruru, Behrendt & Lindberg, 2010, p. 9) 
 
 The ‘Church’s vision of truth on all people’ translated in Australia to a war on all peoples 
with different conceptions of truth, different ways of knowing. It was a war of 
epistemological origin that has left a legacy of epistemic violence. I will have more to say 
about this in the next section.   
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Under the doctrine of discovery, Cook’s claim of ‘first discovery’ of Australia effectively 
prevented other European powers from doing similar; however, according to Reynolds 
(1987), this form of ‘discovery alone did not amount to much’ (p. 10), as occupation was 
required to gain sovereignty. In the 1500s, ‘Elizabeth I and her advisers added an element 
to the definition of Discovery that a European country had to actually occupy and possess 
newly found lands to turn a first discovery claim into a claim of complete title’ (Miller, 
et al., 2010, p. 7). In the case of Australia, occupation did not occur for 18 years after first 
discovery, and even then, the ‘area claimed could only stretch inland as far as the crest of 
the watershed of rivers flowing into the ocean on the line of coast actually occupied’ 
(Miller, et al., 2010, p. 11). The colonisers, therefore, were not acting in accord with 
international law in declaring ownership over all of Australia, when at the time they only 
physically occupied a tiny portion, as they did in 1788, and later in a 1913 High Court 
decision, which back dated ownership to 1786 (Miller, et al., 2010, p. 7). How were such 
claims justified? Land lacking sovereignty or ownership are the two conditions of Terra 
Nullius, neither of which applied in Australia. Yet, Terra Nullius has been used as a long-
standing reason for occupation. Terra Nullius is but a small part of the doctrine of 
discovery, but a destructive one. There are many components to the myth of Terra 
Nullius, some of which still survive. In the next section, I explore the most common of 
these.  
 
The Myth of Terra Nullius 
 
Justifications abounded for what Reynolds (1987) calls a ‘land grab’ (p. 13); a prominent 
one being that Aboriginal peoples never owned the land (p. 13). But how could that be? 
It was obvious from Cook’s (2005) first encounters that they used the land: 
 
On the sand and Mud banks are Oysters, Muscles, Cockles, etc., which I 
believe are the Chief support of the inhabitants, who go into Shoald Water 
with their little Canoes and peck them out of the sand and Mud with their 
hands, and sometimes roast and Eat them in the Canoe, having often a fire 
for that purpose, as I suppose, for I know no other it can be for. The Natives 
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do not appear to be numerous, neither do they seem to live in large bodies, 
but dispers'd in small parties along by the Water side. Those I saw were 
about as tall as Europeans, of a very dark brown Colour, but not black, nor 
had they woolly, frizled hair, but black and lank like ours. No sort of 
Cloathing or Ornaments were ever seen by any of us upon any one of them, 
or in or about any of their Hutts; from which I conclude that they never 
wear any. Some that we saw had their faces and bodies painted with a sort 
of White Paint or Pigment. Altho' I have said that shell fish is their Chief 
support, yet they catch other sorts of fish, some of which we found roasting 
on the fire the first time we landed; some of these they strike with Gigs,* 
(* A fishing implement like a trident.) and others they catch with hook and 
line; we have seen them strike fish with gigs, and hooks and lines are found 
in their Hutts. (pp. 928–929) 
 
Use is important, for as Reynolds (1987) explains, intentionality played a large role in the 
international law of the time in establishing ownership; an intention to occupy and use or 
enjoy the land, even if only intermittently, was all that was required for ownership (p. 
15). Certainly, there was ample evidence, as Cook’s account suggests, that this 
requirement was satisfied. Further, there was provision for the recognition of ownership 
either individually or communally, the communal use of land, still being used. An early 
text by Christian Wolff goes so far as to say that ‘the intention of wandering, which is 
governed by that intended use, gives sufficient evidence of the occupation of the lands 
subject to that use, although they have not established a permanent abode on them’ (Wolff 
in Reynolds, 1987, p. 16). It would have been possible to make a case for Aboriginal 
sovereignty at the time of colonisation, easy even. Aboriginal peoples had sufficient 
grounds under international law for their occupation to be recognised had the colonisers 
(invaders) been so inclined, in which case the history of Australia would no doubt differ 
greatly from the one I here outline.  
 
Reynolds goes on to recount the sentiment behind the work of Wolff’s disciple, Vattel, a 
writer, who, over a period of 200 years, has been quoted ‘in parliament, from the bench, 
the pulpit and the rostrum’ as providing legal grounds for occupation, but who when read 
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in context, ‘provides nothing of the sort’ (p. 18). His work was used to fuel the myth of 
reversal. He does provide support for a shared occupation of sorts, but one that is 
acceptable only ‘if the native were not reduced to want land’ (p. 18). In other words, total 
occupation and establishment of a built environment was impermissible. My use of the 
term ‘built environment’ refers to ‘an environment that has undergone large scale 
changes’, creating a habitat that is almost exclusive to one way of knowing, being and 
doing, such that all other cultures and species, must adapt to the created dominant 
environment to survive, ‘rather than a mutual adaptation of diverse habits and habitats, 
allowing space for continual reconstruction’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2017b, pp. 13‒14).55 A 
built environment was instantiated upon settlement (invasion). To use Patrick Wolfe’s 
(2006) words, invasion ‘erects a new colonial society on the expropriated land base […], 
settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event’ (p. 388, italics added). 
In this sense, ‘settler colonialism’ in Australia was a form of structural invasion, 
accompanied by an epistemically and ontologically violent, ‘logic of elimination’, which 
uprooted more than 50,000 years of bioculture and transplanted British law, institutions 
and environment (right down to the introduction of cottage gardens) in its stead.  
 
Recent work by Bruce Pascoe (2014) has exposed the extent to which this transplantation 
was carried out, and in doing so has demystified another common justification for 
colonisation, another myth of reversal, that of the purported lack of Aboriginal 
‘civilisation’, ‘development’ or ‘agriculture’.  
 
Europe was convinced that its superiority in science, economy and religion 
directed its destiny. In particular the British considered their successes in 
industry accorded their colonial ambition a natural authority, that it was 
their duty to spread their version of civilisation and the word of God to 
heathens. In return they would capture the wealth of the colonised lands. 
(p. 14) 
 
Capture it from the nomadic savage, thought the colonisers, as ‘innate superiority was the 
[epistemically violent] prism through which their new world was seen’ (p. 12). In reading 
                                                 
55 Built environment is a term I will return to periodically throughout the thesis.  
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the journals of the early colonisers, Pascoe ‘came across repeated references to 
[Aboriginal] people building dams and wells, planting, irrigating and harvesting seed, 
preserving the surplus and storing it in houses, sheds or secure vessels, creating elaborate 
cemeteries and manipulating the landscape — none of which fitted the definition of 
hunter-gatherer’ (p. 12). Noting the discrepancy between these early accounts of 
Aboriginal life and the dominant story told by colonisers of Aboriginal peoples’ hapless, 
hunter-gatherer lifestyle, Pascoe produced the book Dark Emu: Black Seeds agriculture 
or accident? He explicates the lengths to which colonisers went to preserve their supposed 
superiority:   
 
Colonial Australia sought to forget the advanced nature of the Aboriginal 
society and economy, and this amnesia was entrenched when settlers who 
arrived after the depopulation of whole districts found no structure more 
substantial than a windbreak and no population that was not humiliated, 
debased and diseased. This is understandable because, as is evidenced by 
the earlier first-hand reports, villages were burnt, the foundations stolen 
for other buildings, the occupants killed by warfare, murder and disease, 
and the country usurped. It is no wonder that after 1860 most people saw 
no evidence of any prior complex civilisation. Moreover, the perishable 
nature of materials used in Aboriginal storage devices ensured they would 
not be seen by archaeologists and the ferocity of the war meant such large 
stores of food could never be compiled again. The attacks by settlers on 
Aboriginals engaged in harvesting are much under-rated as one of the tools 
of war. Nutrition and morale plummeted as the croplands were mown 
down by sheep and cattle and people were prevented from protecting and 
utilising their crops. No better device, short of murder, could ensure the 
weakening of the enemy. (pp. 17‒18, italics added). 
 
With the decree of Terra Nullius came the imperative to ignore prior presences; life 
existing before the arrival of the English, and as Pascoe points out, it was an imperative 
designed to make people forget the extent of Aboriginal civilisation. Terra Nullius was/is 
an act of philosophical suicide; it was a leap from grounded reason, from the evidence of 
99 
 
Aboriginal occupation which was plainly in front of them. To use Camus’ (1963) words, 
it was a leap towards an ‘obscenity hidden under the verbal cloak’ (p. 133); the verbal 
cloak being Terra Nullius which led to the obscenities of murder, displacement, abuse 
and replacement of social structure. It was/is a destructive myth of reversal created by a 
dominant logic attendant with the characteristic surety of belief in its own superiority; a 
belief to which no contradictory evidence was/is allowed to be admitted. But the belief in 
Western superiority over the southern land existed long before Cook even set sail. To 
look for the impetus of this belief I turn to early European literature.  
 
Early European Literature’s Influence on Invasion 
 
Effectively, at the time of invasion, available legal recognition for Aboriginal ownership 
was ignored or reinterpreted to perpetuate the myth of Terra Nullius. Land was required 
and illegally land was taken, and as Reynolds (1987) notes, all the while Aboriginal 
‘occupation, their possession, was overlooked for two distinct reasons – European 
ignorance and European philosophical and political ideas’ (p. 22). Aboriginal land was 
never ceded, nor was Aboriginal sovereignty ever recognised. Once it was discovered that 
people existed on the continent, ‘European powers adopted the view that countries 
without political organization, recognizable systems of authority or legal codes could 
legitimately be annexed’ (p. 12), hence the need to do away with forms of civilisation as 
discussed above. As Plumwood (2007) puts it,  
 
empty land imposes no legitimate constraints on those who would annex it. Herein 
lies its signal service to the colonial project. Where the other is seen as a nullity 
commanding no consideration or recognition, projects can be formulated freely, 
without reference to or consideration of the claims or needs of prior inhabitants. 
(p. 64) 
 
Long before Europeans reached Australian shores, the differences that allowed them to 
nullify the Other were already cemented in their philosophical imaginary. The idea of the 
philosophical imaginary was initially set out by Michèle Le Doeuff (2014) in her book, 
first published in French in 1980, L’Imaginaire Philosophique: 
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Whether one looks for a characterization of philosophical discourse to 
Plato, to Hegel or to Bréhier, one always meets with a reference to the 
rational, the concept, the argued, the logical, the abstract. Even when a 
certain coyness leads some authorities to pretend that they do not know 
what philosophy is, no agnosticism remains about what philosophy is not. 
Philosophy is not a story, not a pictorial description, not a work of pure 
literature. Philosophical discourse is inscribed and declares its status as 
philosophy through a break with myth, fable, the poetic, the domain of the 
image. (p. 1) 
 
Yet she says if we search through the history of philosophy what we find are texts replete 
with images, without which ‘nothing would have been accomplished’ (p. 2). Her assertion 
that imagery ‘occupies the place of theories impossible’ (p. 5) is particularly interesting 
when thinking about the history of colonialism in Australia. According to Jacqueline 
Dutton (2016), early accounts of pre-colonised Australia consisted almost entirely of 
imagery of the farfetched, imaginative sort; in place of knowledge there was no shortage 
of images. Indeed, speculation first began around 150 CE with Ptolemy’s Geographia (p. 
85) and continued for centuries to come: 
 
Figures of Antipodean monstrosity already populated Hartmann Schedel’s 
Nuremberg Chronicle (1493), ranging from upside-down people, who 
used a single huge foot as a sunshade to protect them from the blazing 
heat, to humans with animal heads, or their head sunk into their chest. The 
“mutants” that were called “Australians” for the first time in Gabriel de 
Foigny’s La Terre australe connue (The Southern Land Known) (1676) 
are all hermaphrodites, and Rétif de la Bretonne’s La Découverte australe 
par un homme volant (The Austral Discovery by a Flying Man) (1784) 
depicts not only winged men, but also hybrid horse-men, dog-men, 
elephant-men, frog-men and all manner of other combinations. (p. 85)  
 
Thinking of the antipode of Europe proved fertile ground for the colonial imagination. It 
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was also fertile ground for epistemic violence to thrive and multiply, which was to 
translate into physical violence not long after first arrival. Unfortunately, European 
writing, and the imagination behind it, improved little on contact with Aboriginal peoples 
in Australia. As Dutton illustrates, even Jules Verne insulted Aboriginal peoples, 
‘likening them to monkeys, and describing their looks and behaviour as ugly and 
animalistic’ (p. 91), while at the same time taking note of their slaughter in Tasmania. 
The murders, he wrote, ‘were organised on a grand scale and entire tribes disappeared. 
For example, in Van Diemen’s Land, [now Tasmania] which counted 500,000 indigenous 
people at the beginning of the century, whose inhabitants, in 1863, were reduced to 7!’ 
(Verne in Dutton, 2016, p. 91).  
 
Not only were mutants, monsters and sub-humans thought to inhabit Australia, but tall 
tales of cannibalism were used to increase fear of the Other and justify slaughter. 
Katherine Biber (2005) notes: ‘The discourse of cannibalism is a repeated and powerful 
trope in colonial contact and conflict. Fascination with – and accusations of – 
anthropophagy, ritual sacrifice and survival cannibalism disclose the fear of the native 
‘Other’’ (p. 626). Fear stimulated an overactive imagination in the colonial invaders, 
creating myths used to create difference, co-opt power, extend and maintain control, 
assert moral superiority and later to ‘deflect the guilt of invasion and genocide’ (p. 626). 
 
Drawing on Le Doeuff’s ideas, Lloyd (2000), in relation to Terra Nullius, makes the 
following claim: 
 
Fictions of this kind are not illusions, set over against reality. They are 
constitutive of our collective construction of a social world, affecting how 
we see our past and how we take, or fail to take, responsibilities in our 
present. These are fictions that have a way of making beliefs true. In a 
similar way, philosophers of the western tradition could be regarded as 
expressing "truthful" observations of female lesser rationality. But beliefs 
are formed in a context of collective imaginings, and attitudes that might 
otherwise seem inexplicable are shaped by the patterns of images that 
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organize affects and make things seem obvious for which there is no real 
evidence. (p. 32) 
 
In the next section, I return to Plumwood to help make clear the epistemic ramifications 
of such myths and how they came to instantiate a colonial utopia of sorts, a utopia that 
was for all intents and purposes, a dystopia for those who came before, that is, Indigenous 
peoples. Indeed, Thomas Moore’s 1516 book Utopia—the second half being a travel log 
of a journey to a mythical colonised island—stimulated, as Dutton (2016) put it, 
‘speculation as to the wondrous lands that might exist beyond the European horizon’ (p. 
85). Understanding Australia as a utopia/dystopia shows the complex ways in which myth 
and action interact to create social and cultural realities that shape the environment and 
the people it grows, or as Bill Neidjie (1996) put it, ‘this earth, this ground, this piece of 
ground e grow you’ (p. 30).56 The complex interactions between mythology and ontology 
betray the lie at the heart of our colonial notion of truth57 and call for a radical rethink of 
who we are in relation to the land and Other.  
 
Epistemic Violence 
 
I am one among many (see also: Dotson, 2011; Spivak, 1987; Vazquez, 2011) who wish 
to acknowledge the wider definition of violence beyond the physical act of harming.58 
The myth of Terra Nullius and the subsequent myths that perpetuate it are forms of 
epistemic violence, responsible for the reordering of an entire social structure; 
relationships with country (including meaning, housing, food production), and between 
people. Gayatri Spivak used the term ‘epistemic violence’ to argue that, as Kristine 
Dotson (2011) interprets it, the ‘epistemic side of colonialism is the devastating effect of 
the “disappearing” of knowledge, where local or provincial knowledge is dismissed due 
to privileging alternative, often Western, epistemic practices’ (p. 236). Further, Spivak 
(1987) speaks of ‘the epistemic violence of the universalising global market’ (p. 234, 
italics added). It could be said then that epistemic violence comes from the privileging of 
a single dominant epistemic position or totalising of knowledge, which, consequently 
                                                 
56 I return to the idea of Utopia in the chapters that follow.  
57 Explored further in the next chapter.  
58 In Chapter Seven I return to the topic of epistemic violence, and its counterpart epistemic injustice. I 
explain the differences I find between them and why I favour the use of the term violence over injustice.  
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dominates the normative and ontological landscapes of the built environment and its 
emerging institutional structures—family, religion, economics, law, governance and so 
forth.   
 
In Australia, English law has proven to be a particularly destructive instance of epistemic 
violence. In 1937, the legal scholar R.T. Latham wrote of the first European colonisers 
that the ‘invisible and inescapable cargo of English law fell from their shoulders and 
attached itself to the soil on which they stood. Their personal law became the territorial 
law of the Colony’ (Latham in Reynolds, 1987, p. 1). Those who argue for the inevitable 
and exceptional nature of the law that governs Australia must ignore the history of how 
the law was imported and ultimately became the prime justification for the displacement 
of Aboriginal law; they must ignore the genocidal nature of Terra Nullius. Put another 
way, Latham’s observation exposes the view of Australian law as inevitable and 
exceptional as the ‘law of the land’, as a view that can only be upheld if we ignore the 
history of how English law was imported and became a ‘prime justification and 
instrument of Imperialism’ (Fitzpatrick, 1992, p. 107). Latham’s use of the term 
‘invisible’ is telling. The law that dispossessed and caused the death of countless 
Aboriginal people was built on dominant Western rationality and ‘attached itself’ to the 
land, via the invisible realm of epistemic practices (habits) and infrastructures that 
continue to dominate and control the social and political landscape and shape the cultural 
identity of Australia. As Moreton-Robinson (2015) put it, ‘[r]ace indelibly marks the 
law’s possessiveness’ (p. xii). 
 
Terra Nullius is an extreme form of epistemic violence that made Western colonial 
domination and cultural genocide possible. From the imported Western legal standpoint, 
Terra Nullius extinguished, rather than expressly or implicitly relinquished, previous 
sovereignty, clearing the way for British law and the subsequent enactment of the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, the results of which continue to have 
repercussions today. As Plumwood (2007) puts it, in its ‘philosophical form, Terra 
Nullius is by no means gone, confined to dusty legal archives. We keep re-enacting it, not 
only in our treatment of Indigenous humans, but in our treatment of indigenous flora and 
fauna’ (p. 63). Terra Nullius sought to nullify indigenous cultural and agricultural 
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practices, ontologies, epistemic practices, and methodologies that have developed 
through connections with the land for more than 60,000 years. Moreover, the destruction 
of these practices is far from over. To reiterate Wolfe’s (2006) words, ‘invasion is a 
structure, not an event’ (p. 388). Doing away with prior presences, or the ‘logic of 
elimination’, as he calls it, ‘is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society’ (p. 388); 
ever present in current societal structures and practices. As Plumwood (2007) notes: 
 
[T]he Empty Land assumption of terra nullius remains deeply embedded 
in our culture and our treatment of what is (classed as) native or prior in 
it. The original terra nullius crime is the failure to recognize and respect 
prior presences. Nullification involves failing to recognize that there is 
something or someone else there, a prior presence which must constrain 
and limit our actions and expectations. (p. 63)  
 
Nullification often comes attendant with an active process of replacement; a reordering. 
Colonisation, as Wolfe (2006) puts it, ‘destroys to replace’ (p. 388).59 
 
To give an example of how the logic of elimination is operational today, I turn to 
Plumwood’s (2007) article, ‘The Cemetery Wars: Cemeteries, Biodiversity and the 
Sacred’, in which she recounts her experience fighting for a remnant of native ecology, a 
sliver of grassland that was populated with rare orchids endemic to the area. The area 
happened to be a cemetery in which she was later to bury her son. In her attempt to 
preserve the orchids, in 1994, she wrote to the local council and to the local committee 
charged with the cemetery’s upkeep, aptly named the Progress Association, ‘urging them 
to develop a management plan’ (p. 59). She had thought the knowledge would be 
welcomed and valued. The orchids, after all, were an important part of the area’s history, 
of its ecology, and two of the species were listed as endangered. Furthermore, they were 
beautiful. She writes of her reaction upon discovering them, ‘never anywhere had I seen 
anything like this purple glory. It was unforgettable, thrilling the heart and taking the 
breath away’ (p. 57).   
                                                 
59 Examples of nullification at work can be found all over the world. These are often intentional acts, other 
times they are ‘failures to recognise’ a site as anything but ‘untidy’, for example the case of the Spanish 
workers who ‘fixed’ a 6,000-year-old Neolithic tomb: https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/08/27/435203455/ancient-tomb-in-spain-destroyed-and-replaced-with-a-picnic-table 
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The Progress Association was, however, deeply entrenched in its ideals of tidiness, and 
deeply committed to its program of pesticide use, lawns and lawn mowing, and rosemary 
and rose plantings. In other words, it was committed to the instantiation of the colonial 
landscape and the nullification of the native. The response Plumwood received from the 
Council and the Progress Association was less than she had hoped. In fact, it was 
‘unexpectedly hostile and negative’ (p. 60). Subsequently, the Progress Association 
responded with ‘personal vilification in their newsletter’ (p. 61) and Plumwood found 
herself accused of neglecting her son’s grave. She was judged and found wanting, 
ironically on the evidence of her lack of commitment to their program of cemetery 
upkeep, her lack of conformity to their ideals of ‘tidiness’. By not tidying her son’s grave, 
she was deemed to be in the wrong, and, subsequently, a myth of her inadequacy was 
perpetuated. Recognising the value of the existing ecology—the pre-colonial landscape—
she chose to respect rather than tidy her son’s grave, that is, she chose not to kill the 
orchids, the life existing before her arrival. Plumwood’s (1993a) concern can be traced 
back to her views on wilderness in her book Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.  
 
Wilderness is not a place where there is no interaction between self and 
other, but one where self does not impose itself. It is a place to be visited 
on its own terms and not on ours. Here it is the visitor who is the taught 
and not the teacher, the transformed and not the transformer, visitors who 
must see themselves through the other’s eyes, must bend themselves, as is 
appropriate for visitors, to the other’s ways. (p. 164) 
 
The committee’s response was not an equally considered opposition, but a swift and 
prejudicial one that sought to nullify, to obliterate wilderness and the perspective of those 
who would stand with it, rather than ‘bend themselves’ to ‘other’s ways’. Their response 
gave no voice to her concerns, made no attempt at understanding, and failed to listen or 
acknowledge another perspective that did not fit their dominant rationality. The only 
effort made was an attempt to use judgment to silence; the force of colonial normativity 
was brought against her. We have, Plumwood (2007) claimed, normalised a ‘severely 
depleted landscape, that the economic system is steadily grinding down’ (p. 63), and 
anything else is deemed unacceptable.  
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Plumwood argues that ideals of tidiness, such as those enforced by the Progress 
Association, are used to maintain order, control, domination, and to justify measures such 
as the killing of indigeneity, in this case plants and animals. Such ideals are underpinned 
by the same dominant Western conception of rationality that was operational in the 
declaration of Terra Nullius. It is a war against prior presences, including nature. Her 
definition of wilderness is important; to visit the wild without imposition, to learn from 
it, first we must acknowledge its existence, and respect rather than fear it. But respect 
requires an acknowledgement of the Other’s limitations, and unfortunately, all too often, 
‘order is the overriding virtue’ (p. 64); order which must be imposed, and the wild, which 
stands in opposition, is placed outside of moral consideration. Just as the native orchids 
must be tidied, the Other must be brought to order, must be subsumed, consumed by the 
law. To do so, as noted in the previous section, the Other is often made an object of fear. 
As Biber (2005) aptly noted:  
 
Law always constructs an Other. It draws boundaries around itself. 
Everything within the boundary is within law’s jurisdiction. Everything 
outside the boundary is lawless. It is the intention of the law to bring 
everything within its own boundaries; there should be nothing that is 
outside.  (p. 625) 
 
The act of involuntarily restructuring a life is violent, and the act of restructuring an entire 
culture is genocidal. The failure to recognise and respect prior presences in the case of 
the orchids extends to the grasslands, the soil content, and the ecosystem that sustains 
them. In the case of Aboriginal peoples, both the land and the law that structured their 
society were taken away through a failure to recognise their legal status as humans. As 
Siegfried Wiessner (1999) put it: ‘Since indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony had no 
recognized sovereign, they were considered to be without laws, and the English common 
law was imposed’ (p. 72). By bringing Aboriginal people under common law, the law 
became a weapon of colonialism; another process of dehumanisation. Chesterman and 
Galligan (1997) note that the early 1800s were marked by out-and-out violence: 
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Indiscriminate killings of Aborigines accompanied their forced removal 
from any lands considered useful to settlers. In the absence of the rule of 
law, settlers largely determined the manner in which they would deal with 
Aborigines. Often this perceived freedom was attended by the belief that 
Aborigines simply had no rights, and were free to be treated as sub-
humans. (p. 33) 
 
Just as the taking of land by the colonisers under English law was theft, the killing of 
Aboriginal peoples was murder and ‘made their killers legally liable to be hanged’ (p. 
34). However, the force of the law was rarely if ever brought to bear on those responsible 
for such atrocities due to many reasons; justifications based on the belief in Aboriginal 
people’s inferiority, ‘the general silence of those whites at the 'frontier' […] the use of 
euphemisms such as “disperse” rather than “kill” when reference in public was 
occasionally made to conflicts with Aborigines, and the adoption of the metaphor of war 
to cover indisputable acts of violence’ (p. 34). In response, the rhetoric of ‘protection’, 
another myth of reversal, was introduced in the mid-1800s and used as means to further 
control the lives of Aboriginal peoples, this time through legislation. The difference in 
the treatment of Aboriginal peoples due to location is significant and linked to the 
formation of Australia as a federation, with initial colonies becoming the states and 
territories of Australia. The policies ‘to deal with’ Aboriginal peoples, instantiated by the 
colonies were then translated into state legislation, resulting in each state having different 
laws regarding Aboriginal peoples. ‘Central to the use of broad legislation was the belief 
that Aborigines needed to be placed under heavily regulated government control in each 
State. What had been done in the previous century by force would now be done by law’ 
(p. 122). The myth of Terra Nullius morphed into a myth of protection.  
 
Reserves, stations and missions were created in Victoria as early as 1838 and in 1869 An 
Act to Provide for the Protection and Management of the Aboriginal Natives of Victoria 
was passed. Queensland followed suit with the Aboriginals’ Protection and Restriction 
of the Sale of Opium Act 1897, and eight years later Western Australia passed the 
Aborigines Act 1905. This was followed five years later with the passing of the Northern 
Territory Aboriginals Act 1910 and shortly after South Australia passed its Aborigines 
Act 1911.  
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Although Aborigines were, by virtue of birth in one of the King's 
dominions, British subjects who were subject to the law, they were not 
entitled to the benefits of citizenship. Aborigines, according to this 
philosophy, needed to be protected from the evils of settlement. This 
philosophy informed the establishment of reserves and stations, and it also 
justified other measures, such as the passing of laws preventing the sale of 
alcohol to Aborigines. (p. 16) 
 
The devastating effect of these laws cannot be overstated. All aspects of Aboriginal lives 
were brought under the control of the state, from where they could eat to who they could 
marry and everything in between. The mass abduction, or in official speak, the ‘forced 
removal’ of children also emerged as a result of these laws. But it is evident in the diaries 
of the early explorer and polymath Ludwig Leichhardt (2013) that these laws were the 
result of a certain Western logic. Speaking of Aboriginal people, he summarised the 
‘protectionist’ logic operational during early settlement and foreshadowed the future 
when he wrote: 
 
There is a means to preserve them […] this means is slavery. I should say 
compulsion, but compulsion on a large scale is slavery, because the latter 
just involves somewhat brutal compulsion by unprincipled gentlemen too. 
We must take the young generations by force, educate them, compel them 
to work and so get them used to work […] because without compulsion, 
this Black, left to himself, will be irretrievably lost as soon as he comes 
into contact with civilisation and its vices. (p. 325) 
 
Note that the open brutality that would result in Aboriginal lives being ‘lost’ (as opposed 
to taken, stolen, violently and illegally ended), while an indictment of the coloniser’s 
‘vices’ (acts of murder by murderers) is not called into question; rather, paternalistic laws 
were introduced which regulated the victim and not the perpetrator, as a solution to 
violence. The logic employed is the same as that of paternalistic laws that regulate 
women’s behaviours and bodies. It should be noted that Leichhardt was not an advocate 
of this course of action, as in a footnote to the above he expresses the following opinion: 
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‘[a]lthough slavery seems the only means to preserve these tribes and in the course of 
generations to civilise them, I would prefer to see them die in freedom than be civilised 
in slavery. That is my opinion on 15 February 1844 and it will probably remain forever’ 
(p. 325). As Chesterman and Galligan (1997) note: 
 
The emphasis in Aboriginal policy shifted from protecting the last 
members of an ancient people to confining and regulating what white 
society considered to be an undesirable racial minority. Powers to remove 
Aboriginal people to reserves and keep them there under tight controls 
were increased. There was also more concern with merging or absorbing 
'half-castes' into white society, as procedures for taking children from their 
mothers and communities were refined. (p. 8) 
 
The move Chesterman and Galligan outline, the ‘taking of children’, was, I will argue in 
the next chapter, a strategic evolution of dominant logic, and as we shall see shortly, this 
paternalistic, epistemically violent, colonial philosophy is still very much alive and well 
in Australia. It is comfortable and convenient to see the violence of the past as in the past; 
however, as I will argue, the logic has not changed, and the mistreatment, confinement 
and legalised theft of Aboriginal peoples and lands continues today.  
 
While the initial imposition of colonial law recognised Aboriginal peoples as subjects it 
did not afford them the right to rule, merely the right to be ruled (p. 3), and in many states 
from the late 1800s to the early 1900s legislation was brought in to prevent Aboriginal 
people from voting, largely out of fear of their numbers influencing the election outcomes 
(p. 13). In Victoria, where this legislation was lacking mainly due to the vastly diminished 
numbers of Aboriginal people left after early settlement, active discouragement and a 
requirement of proof that they were not receiving ‘charitable relief’ prevented most from 
voting, as they were considered ‘“inmates” of charitable institutions’ (p. 14), and inmates 
were considered ineligible to vote. Charitable relief was quite different from the basic 
benefits of citizenship in the late 1800s to early 1900s, ‘such as the maternity allowance 
and invalid and old-age pensions’ (p. 12) – the receipt of which was limited to 
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colonisers.60 ‘This exclusionary regime’, as Chesterman and Galligan (1997) point out, 
‘was meticulously enforced to keep Aboriginal people as non-citizens for more than half 
a century’ (p. 12).  
 
Constraints ‘on Aboriginal voters were not removed until 1962 at the Commonwealth 
level, in Western Australia, and in the Northern Territory, whereas Queensland 
Aborigines did not get the vote until 1965’ (p. 15). In other states, this was accomplished 
piecemeal at different times through the repealing of racist policies, laws and regulations. 
Contrary to popular belief, it was not the 1967 referendum that finally conferred 
citizenship rights on Aboriginal peoples. The referendum was a vote to alter the 
constitution to remove the government restriction upon making laws regarding Aboriginal 
peoples and to allow Aboriginal peoples to be counted as part of the Australian 
population. The establishment of the Office of Aboriginal Affairs was a notable result, 
with the first Minister for Aboriginal Affairs appointed in 1968. However, it would take 
another four years before a dedicated department was created. In the years that followed, 
many new acts where passed, including one of the most influential passed in 1993, The 
Native Title Act. 
 
The fight for The Native Title Act began eleven years prior to it being passed. In 1982 
Eddie Koiki Mabo, along with four other Merian people, challenged the lack of 
recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty by Australian law. Earlier challenges were made 
such as the 1963 Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. Case, in which the Yolngu people of 
Yirrkala in Arnhem Land ‘asserted that their occupation of the Gove Peninsula predated 
the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over Australia’ (Hill, 1995, p. 306). Although 
unsuccessful, ‘publicity from this case’ (p. 306) led to the release of two reports in the 
1970s that were subsequently ‘used in the development of the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act of 1976’ (p. 306). This early act paved the way for the Mabo 
decision, which, although begun in 1982, was not decided until 3 June 1992 when ‘the 
High Court rewrote the legal as well as social and political history of Australia in Mabo 
v. Queensland’ (p. 306). This historic decision effectively overturned Terra Nullius and 
                                                 
60 I use the word ‘citizenship’ for clarity, however, technically prior to 1948 the term used was ‘British 
Subjects’. In 1948 ‘Australian citizenship’ was first created as a legal category (see Chesterman, 2005).  
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resulted in the 1993 Native Title Act which recognised the rights and interests of some 
Aboriginal peoples to some of their traditional lands in the form of native title. As Lloyd 
(2000) put it: 
 
In June 1992, the High Court accepted the argument of a Torres Strait 
islander, Eddie Koiki Mabo, that his people could trace an unbroken line 
of communally established ownership to land they still regarded as theirs. 
Although the area of land explicitly at issue was tiny, the significance of 
the judgment was profound. (p. 30) 
 
However, the 1976 Act was, in at least one respect, more significant; it gave Aboriginal 
peoples the right to veto developments on their land rather than only the right to negotiate, 
which was granted under the 1993 Act. According to Damien Short (2010), given this 
shortcoming, the primary purpose of the 1993 Native Title Act 
 
was the validation of existing commercial titles and the provision of 
guarantees that future land negotiations would be conducted within the 
parameters set by existing colonial power inequalities, thus ensuring that 
the native title regime would offer indigenous peoples no protection from 
settler colonial expansionist pressures powered by the engine of global 
capitalism. (p. 55) 
 
Subsequently, both the 1993 and the 1976 Acts have been subjected to further limitations 
by government ‘reforms’, which Short calls a ‘a process of erosion’ and deems ‘a modern 
day example of what Patrick Wolfe has termed the “logic of elimination”’ (p. 54). 
Continuing this process of erosion, in 2007, in the heavily contested Northern Territory, 
a region that contains approximately ‘30% of the world’s currently identified uranium 
reserves’ (p. 59), the Howard Government brought in what is often referred to as ‘the 
Intervention’, officially the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act, 
following a report entitled the Little Children are Scared. As Moreton-Robinson (2015) 
observed, the federal government intervention ‘sent military and police into Indigenous 
communities of the Northern Territory on the premise that the sexual abuse of children 
was rampant and a national crisis. This “crisis” was constructed as something 
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extraordinary and aberrant, requiring new governmental measures’ (p. 153). Moreton-
Robinson’s words provide an account of the Intervention as a new form of colonisation 
in an old package, with Aboriginal people once again construed as 
 
primitive people, nomadic, sexually promiscuous, illogical, 
superstitious, irrational, emotive, deceitful, simpleminded, violent, and 
uncivilized. We were perceived as living in a state of nature that was in 
opposition to the discourse of white civility. This racist discourse enabled 
patriarchal white sovereignty to deny Indigenous people their sovereign 
rights while regulating and disciplining their behavior through legislative 
and political mechanisms and physical and social measures. (p. 157, italics 
added) 
 
Anyone wishing to inhabit a space outside of the dominant logic, is deemed illogical, yet 
another myth of reversal. To instantiate the Intervention, the 1975 Racial Discrimination 
Act needed to be suspended. This requirement alone should have been a stop sign for a 
respectful government that recognised its citizen’s rights to self-determination. However, 
dehumanising Aboriginal peoples, as above, allowed the government to once again 
‘intervene in the lives of Indigenous people to let them live and to make them live as 
welfare-dependent citizens, not as property-owning subjects with sovereign resource 
rights’ (p. 172). The Intervention sought to restore governmental control over Aboriginal 
bodies, once again banning alcohol consumption, once again stealing land, this time under 
the guise of the ‘the compulsory acquisition of Aboriginal townships through five year 
leases’ (Short, 2010, p. 56), once again controlling benefits and using citizenship and the 
law as weapons. Because of the ‘Intervention’s compulsory acquisition measures 
indigenous peoples will have no effective means to resist the now “inevitable” increase 
in uranium mining in Australia, resulting in yet further culturally genocidal pressures on 
some indigenous groups’ (p. 59).  
 
What of the children, the initial justification for the intervention? Mandatory health 
checks were brought in along with the above measures, but as Moreton-Robinson (2015) 
notes: ‘[t]he Federal Department of Health’s analysis of the mandatory child health 
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checks revealed that out of the 7,433 mandatory health checks of Indigenous children in 
the Northern Territory, only 39 were considered at risk of neglect or abuse, and only 4 
children were identified as being sexually abused’ (p. 171). She also points out the gaping 
discrepancy in treatment of Indigenous and non-indigenous people that is the 
Intervention: 
 
The government deals with child sexual abuse in white homes as though 
it is something aberrant that requires intervention only on a case- by-case 
basis. There is no intervention into the whole community where the 
perpetrators reside; instead, the civil rights of perpetrators are respected. 
In contrast, child sexual abuse is treated as being normative within 
Indigenous communities, requiring everyone to be placed under 
surveillance, scrutinized, and punished. In this way, the receipt of welfare 
payments, which is a social right, allows the government to discipline 
Indigenous people at the margins of Australian society. (p. 165, italics 
added) 
 
Once again, the receipt of welfare payments is used to control the Other, just as at the 
time of early colonisation payments were used to prevent Indigenous peoples from voting. 
Time has moved on, but the methods of colonisation have changed little. The colonial 
practices of the past remain active in the Australian politics, bolstered by a racist socio-
cultural philosophical imaginary. Even though Terra Nullius was eventually overturned, 
it 
 
allowed non-indigenous Australians to think that there was no need to 
adapt to the presence of the people who were already there, and no need 
to acknowledge their customs or law. It encouraged the idea that 
adaptation only needed to go in one direction, and that this enforced 
adaptation, rather than being an imposition of something alien, was a gift 
and the promise of a fullness of humanity that could never have been 
attained if the Europeans had not come. (Lloyd, 2000, p. 32) 
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Lloyd describes the positive spin that is still all too commonly placed on dehumanisation.  
‘The ‘fullness of humanity’ is an ongoing belief in Plato’s assertion of reason as the 
benchmark for being human, as we saw in the last chapter. Likewise, the Intervention is 
an extension of the punishment Plato ascribed to those deemed lacking in rationality. In 
this respect, the Intervention has been very successful; as of 27 June 2018, 100% of 
children in detention in the Northern Territory are Indigenous.61  
 
Conclusion 
 
Whilst the devastating effects of colonial logic and the ongoing violence toward 
Aboriginal peoples in Australia would take many a thesis to document, in this chapter, I 
have highlighted some points of significance to demonstrate that colonisation, 
conceptualised as a war against a marginalised Other, both nature and human, has used 
myths of reversal to create and perpetuate epistemic violence of genocidal proportions in 
Australia and elsewhere. To this end, I reiterated Moreton-Robinson’s (2015) point that 
‘Indigenous peoples have been sociohistorically constructed through first world Western 
knowledge systems that are ontologically and epistemologically grounded in 
differentiation’ (xvii); the dominant logic of liberal individualism and principles of 
classical liberalism that culminated in the current parliamentary system in Australia, 
together with its institutional practices, including education. I stressed that colonial 
culture not only backgrounds Indigenous presences and ways of knowing, as well as ways 
of being and doing, but it actively dehumanises and instrumentalises them. This is 
important as our conceptualisation of the Other is bound to our conceptualisation of the 
world, a point I elaborate upon in the next chapter. I have argued that the failure to 
recognise prior presences is a systematic failure of shared socio-political epistemic 
frameworks; a failure to see the world without first committing philosophical suicide. 
Philosophical suicide lies at the centre of myths of reversal; Moreton-Robinson’s 
reference to sociohistorical constructs recognises the long and continuing history of 
epistemic failure that is a hallmark of colonisation.  
 
                                                 
61https://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/nitv-news/article/2018/06/26/australia-aboriginal-detention-northern-
territory 
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The failure of liberal-democracy, discussed in the previous chapter, is a failure to 
recognise prior environmental presences, of which the orchids in Plumwood’s local 
cemetery are an example. I contend that this failure of liberal-democracy extends to 
education, in which the state and national curricula and the teaching and learning practices 
of schooling itself replicate the colonisation of Australia by failing to recognise the prior 
epistemic presences in the classroom, in favour of liberal ways of knowing, being and 
doing. In order to reach this conclusion, which will be the topic of Chapter Seven, I will 
first need to set out the landscape of human exceptionalism and link this to education, 
which I will turn to in Chapter Five. However, before I do so, in the next chapter I wish 
to expand on the link between philosophical suicide, the logic of domination, epistemic 
violence, heavenism, and the myth of reversal a little further by tying them together with 
a Western conception of Truth as absolute.  
  
116 
 
Chapter Four 
Death in an Anthropomorphised Landscape 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I will now expand upon and draw together some of the themes of the last three chapters: 
philosophical suicide, the logic of domination, epistemic violence, heavenism, and the 
myth of reversal. A robust understanding of these concepts together can begin to point 
toward the ways in which the Western concept of Truth was/is operationalised in the 
colonial war against place and the Other, so conceived in the last chapter. The logic of 
domination creates an athropomorphised landscape, by carving up the common ground 
on which we all stand and turning it into an economic product – real estate. In this chapter 
I trace some of the ways in which dominant logic is hewn upon the earth and earth Others, 
from Plato’s stark separations to history’s Amphitheatre. I concur with Plumwood (1993) 
that 
 
[w]e need a common, integrated framework for the critique of both human 
domination and the domination of nature – integrating nature as a fourth 
category of analysis into the framework of an extended feminist theory 
which employs a race, class and gender analysis. (pp. 1–2)62 
 
Plumwood (1990) also notes that while what we would generally consider to be 
environmental philosophy is relatively new, concepts of nature have always been 
prevalent in the ‘rationalist tradition’. The traditional view, however, has been marked 
primarily by exclusions and assumptions or as Plumwood put it, dualisms. In Chapter 
Two, following Plumwood, I located a major theory of the Othering of nature in the work 
of Plato and a concept she calls ‘heavenism’. Here, I revisit heavenism, arguing that it 
creates an Othering not only of nature but of self, before tracing heavenism’s influence 
                                                 
62 I also follow Murris (2016a) in adding age to this list.  
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on Western conceptions of death, history and (capital ‘T’) Truth ‒ all of which have a 
bearing on education. 
 
Due to Plato’s theory of Forms, his argument that non-physical but substantial forms or 
ideas represent the most accurate reality, and consequently his insistence on the corporeal 
as corrupt, Plumwood (1990) argues that Plato’s philosophy is a philosophy of death: 
‘Platonic philosophy not only devalues nature but is profoundly anti-ecological and anti-
life; it is truly a philosophy of death’ (p. 534). According to Plumwood, Plato’s 
philosophy embodies the logic of domination that lies at the heart of the Western tradition 
and is responsible for ‘its view of the human as discontinuous from the inferior sphere of 
nature and its intertwined ideal of control and domination of nature’ (p. 534). The 
devaluation of the earth and the proposed separation of the ‘true self’, from both the 
biological earth and biological self-body, is an integral part of the logic of domination. I 
follow Plumwood’s use of anthropomorphism as a continuation of the human/nature 
dualism. As humans we cannot help but anthropomorphise the world; we see it through 
no other eyes than the human. Historically, we, followers of Western liberal philosophy, 
set the limits of our protection around that which we create in our own image; the human 
world. Our property, our kin, our pets, another human who acts and looks similar, all else 
we ‘dehumanise’, that is, what we do not anthropomorphise, we Other. The boundary of 
the anthropomorphised world then can be thought of as a boundary of moral concern; 
outside we no longer care what or who exists in any meaningful way. The charge of 
anthropomorphism leveled against attributing human characteristics to the non-human is 
what I would argue to be a myth of reversal. As Plumwood (2002) asks, ‘should we insist 
on retaining monological methodologies and sophistries like the myth of 
anthropomorphism that were designed to facilitate exploitation? (p. 61). 
 
Camus (1964), as I discussed in Chapter One, was also concerned with philosophies of 
death; those which cut short or limit potential for the creation, preservation or renewal of 
life. Recall that he argued all such philosophies are preceded by an epistemic act of 
philosophical suicide; an attempt to transcend the earth. He further divided these attempts 
into two camps; the martyr and the lion: ‘history’s amphitheatre has always contained the 
martyr and the lion. The former relied on eternal consolations and the latter on raw 
118 
 
historical meat’ (p. 4). In other words, the two camps are history and heaven. Throughout 
this chapter, I find the commonalities between Plumwood’s heavenism and Camus’ take 
on history and heaven.  
 
The next section details how the conception of a life after death reinforces the stark 
separation Plato created, and how doing away with such a stark separation opens a space 
for the notion of an embedded self, something I talk more about in Chapter Seven. The 
separation of self from Others is furthered through modern-day institutional practices, not 
the least of which are slaughterhouses, which Marc Trabsky argues have fundamentally 
altered human relations with animals. The alteration of relationships in a different way is 
taken up again in the section entitled ‘History’s Amphitheatre’, where I argue Camus’ 
and Michel Foucault’s use of the plague is analogous to Plumwood’s use of dominant 
logic. ‘Plague power’ as Camus called it, and ‘disciplinary power’ as Foucault named it 
are, like dominant logic, unseen forces that result in the ordering of a society in a way 
which seeks to remove the Other from moral consideration and control their behaviour, 
examples of which we saw in the last chapter. The rejection of heavenism also opens the 
way toward a rejection of transcendental Truth. I argue that Camus’ concept of truth as 
plural is a rejection of an absolute Truth. As Plumwood (2002) says, it is ‘important to 
demonstrate the imprudence of anthropocentrism, for example by showing the extent of 
uncertainty and the limits of our knowledge’ (p. 113). I conclude with broad implications 
for education, to be elaborated upon in the final two chapters.  
 
Death as Transcendence: The myth of heavenism 
 
Plumwood (1990) claimed that Plato posited death as a breaking free from the ‘corrupt 
state of the world of nature’ (p. 525), a release of human essence from that which binds 
and limits it; the body. In the case of many of the world’s major religions, the starting 
point is the same; the view is that this biology is not me, that this body is not my true 
house. The story continues, it is but temporary accommodation whist I live out this life, 
which is no more than a real-estate application to the big man above, the guy with the 
rubber stamp that judges who gets eternal digs, upstairs or downstairs. This existence, 
everything I’ve ever known, is not my ‘true’ self; the essence of me resides or is destined 
to reside, upon my death, upon my true self’s freedom from my body, from the biological, 
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from the ‘wretched earth’, elsewhere. There are many beliefs as to where elsewhere might 
be. As Plumwood reminds us, the issue remains that, historically, this argument, this 
othering of self, from self, has dominated Western philosophy since at least the time of 
Plato. She argued that his conception of ‘true knowledge and purity can be achieved only 
if we have what he called the “least possible intercourse or communion with the body” 
and “its foolishness”’ (p. 525). True knowledge, like our true self, is to be found 
elsewhere, in another ‘world, which of course lies above our world’ (p. 525). Belief in 
this kind of self, discredits the value of life and my knowledge of it; what I see, what I 
feel, what I experience, accordingly, is all corrupt. The earth, our body, our very biology 
is not to be trusted. For Plato, true knowledge is to be found in the incorruptible, 
unchanging realm of the Forms; ‘biological change and decay are viewed with disgust’ 
(p. 525). Both the biological self and the earth from whence it springs are Othered. With 
this Othering comes the instantiation of dualisms that have been used as justification for 
the maltreatment of earth, and body; our own and others, both human and non-human 
(Plumwood, 1993, 2002). Notions of corrupt and sacred earth can be seen in rituals around 
death and last resting places.  
 
Plumwood (2007), as we have seen, used a cemetery as an example of the way in which 
our belief-habits shape our environment. In many countries, cemeteries are increasingly 
becoming recognised as outposts of biodiversity. In urban areas they are often the last 
bastions of the pre-urban environment. Cordoned off from the sprawling built 
environment, or, as in Plumwood’s example, from the ever-roaming cattle, they preserve 
a kind of wilderness; a system of life existing within our systems of rational expansion. 
The Australian government describes cemeteries as ‘life-saving refuges for some of the 
nation's most endangered native plants; even for entire native ecosystems’.63 But this is 
not, as Plumwood (2007) points out, ‘due to human care’, but rather due to ‘human 
neglect’ (p. 8) and cemeteries are far from exempt from the rationalist war on nature, 
indeed in many ways they embody it. She says: 
 
For what theologian Norman Habel calls heavenism, the earth is at best a 
temporary lodging; the true human home is beyond the earth, in heaven. 
                                                 
63 From: http://155.187.2.69/biodiversity/publications/articles/cemetary.html 
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Buried six-feet down, the strong wooden or steel coffin aims to keep the 
heaven-bound body apart from the earth and other life forms for as long 
as possible and to preserve it for departure to its higher home. For this 
transcendental solution to the problem of death and continuity, we are split 
into an embodied and perishable part belonging to earth, and a thinking 
imperishable ‘spirit’ part belonging to heaven. Bodies must perish, but the 
soul has eternal life. (p. 56) 
 
The hyper-separation of the human body from earth Other in death is a continuation of 
the hyper-separation of humans from nature in life. ‘Such transcendental solutions to the 
problem of identity and continuity depend on denying our kinship to other life forms and 
our shared end as food for others’ (p. 56). The all too common horror experienced at the 
thought of humans being eaten, either by worms in death or crocodiles in life, stands in 
stark contrast to the lack of horror we experience at the death of Other. According to 
Plumwood (2008): ‘Horror movies, stories and jokes reflect our deep-seated dread of 
becoming food for other forms of life: horror is the wormy corpse, vampires sucking 
blood and sci-fi monsters trying to eat humans’ (p. 324). The refusal to nourish earth 
Others, even in death, is a part of the type of ‘hyper-separation that propels the 
environmental crisis’ (p. 324). Such hyper-separation, she insists, ‘remains an important 
force in our culture, and has profoundly shaped dominant practices of self, commodity, 
materiality and death – especially death. For an ecological culture, major rethinking is 
required’ (p. 325). Such rethinking requires an acceptance of death, one to be found in 
Camus.  
 
‘“Ah!” he said before dying, “so this world is not made for me and this house is not mine”’ 
(Camus, 2010, p. 46). If one were religiously inclined, this would not be the epiphany one 
would hope to have on their death bed. For Camus, however, there is no spirit that 
transcends the earth, no heavenly thereafter, no preservation of conscience or essence of 
human such as a soul, at least none of which we can be certain of, and, therefore, such an 
epiphany is consistent with his philosophy. Moreover, it points to the absence of absolute 
ownership in the face of an ephemeral life. We understand that our ownership of our 
house is contingent and at least in most Western countries if we don’t sell it before we 
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die, ownership is bequeathed, usually to our relations, but regardless, ownership passes 
on to others still breathing. If we reject, as Camus did, the eternal ownership of self, of 
soul, we can see as Plumwood (2008) came to see that death ends our ownership of house, 
earth, body and self. Such concepts are contingent on life as we are contingent on life. 
Plumwood (2012) further argued that ‘[i]n the complex biological exchange which 
sustains all our lives, we must all gain sustenance at the expense of the other’ (p. 60). Our 
lives are dependent on nutrients from others, and in death the nutrients from our bodies, 
like our houses, pass on to others still breathing. ‘I can’, Plumwood (2008) says, 
 
discern a kind of fairness and sharing in all this, justice, and even a kind 
of democracy. As I see it now, on the earth community model, life is like 
a book, but not the kind of book you can own or buy. Itʼs much more like 
a library book. You donʼt own it – itʼs borrowed from the earth community 
circulating library. Like a library book, you can only have it for so long, 
and exceptions to this rule are never made. Like a library book, itʼs subject 
to immediate recall by another borrower – and you havenʼt even finished 
reading/writing it! Attempts to excessively prolong or immortalise human 
life are attempts to steal the library book and cheat the earth community, 
to take nurturance from others but not to give it back. (p. 325, italics 
added) 
 
But neither does Plumwood think that the book disappears upon return to the library. 
Atheism or the ‘finality thesis depends on a covert continuation of the heavenist 
identification of self with spirit, and on a thoroughly reductionist and denarrativised 
understanding of the body and of materiality that results from spirit/matter dualism’ (p. 
328). Rejecting both the concept of a soul and the finality thesis opens the possibility of 
an explanation of death as a contingent continuity of life, as a renewal of life writ large 
rather than a continuation of individual life. ‘A more fluid and embodied concept of self 
and its boundaries can be employed here to suggest a complex narrative of continuities, 
in which the story goes on, although no longer mainly a story about human subjects’ (p. 
328). Letting go of the idea of transcendental continuity of self opens a space for the 
concept of an embedded self which will become important in following chapters, but it 
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also calls into question another aspect of our anthropocentric view of the world: 
instrumentalism.  
 
Instrumentalism involves the assumption that all other species are 
available for unrestricted human use, although it is unlikely that many of 
those steeped in the ideology of human supremacy will see humans as 
mutually and reciprocally available for non-human use (for example, as 
food). Instrumentalism in this form is a clear expression of 
anthropocentrism and of an arrogant attitude to the other which sees it in 
the guise of a servant of the self. (Plumwood, 2002, p. 113) 
 
Instrumentalism has ramifications for a range of areas of human activity, not the least of 
which is the meat industry, but also, perhaps a little less intuitively so, for education, a 
point to which I will shortly return. A thorough break down of the first is unfortunately 
beyond the scope of this thesis; however, in so far as the meat industry is a large 
contributor to climate change and, as I will show, an early vehicle for colonisation, a brief 
exploration of how the meat industry connects to the themes in this thesis is relevant, even 
though it may initially appear not to be so. According to Smith, et al. (2014): ‘The 
AFOLU [Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use] sector is responsible for just under 
a quarter (~10 – 12 GtCO2eq / yr) of anthropogenic GHG emissions mainly from 
deforestation and agricultural emissions from livestock, soil and nutrient management’ 
(p. 24). Such a substantial contribution to emissions means that changing human habits 
of meat consumption is a point of possible mitigation of greenhouse gases (GHG). 
Chapter Eleven on the Fifth IPCC Mitigation of Climate Change report notes that the 
modelling of ‘[c]hanged diets resulted in GHG emission savings of 34 – 64% compared 
to the “business-as-usual” scenario’ (p. 840). Included in this range is the ‘adoption of a 
“healthy diet” recommended by the Harvard Medical School’ (p. 840), which highlights 
that even a decrease in meat consumption to a ‘healthy’ level would have a substantive 
impact on emissions reduction and aid humanity in staying below the ‘450ppm CO2eq 
concentration target’ (p. 840).  
 
The large quantity of meat that is consumed is linked to the industrialisation of animals, 
which, in turn, is linked to the process of colonisation. Marc Trabsky (2014) observed 
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that the institutionalisation of the slaughter house in Australia was used as ‘a tool for 
justifying the segregation and quarantine, but also importantly the regulation, of the 
“outcasts” of British colonial society’ (p. 177), including Aboriginal peoples. Trabsky 
takes Melbourne as a case study in the ways in which the industrialisation of the meat 
industry has affected human relationships with animals. Early colonial Melbournians, he 
explains, saw their ability to keep and kill animals in their backyards as a fundamental 
right (p. 180). However, in 1850 the Melbourne Abattoirs Act was passed, and citizens 
were no longer allowed to house and kill animals for their own consumption. The Act 
‘confined the slaughtering of animals to prescribed public abattoirs, while at the same 
time prohibiting the killing of sheep, lamb, pigs or goats at any other place within the city 
limits’ (p. 180). Such restrictions fundamentally changed the human to animal 
relationship and allowed for increased ‘marketability’ of ‘animal production’. In other 
words, such laws turned animals into objects and into industry. ‘The slaughtering of 
animals could now be named, placed and ordered by and through regulations and 
legislation. It could become a technical object in a routinised industrial process’ (p. 181); 
another case of the pen ordering the sword and a once visual and understood practice 
being hidden from public view and largely from public knowledge. Although the 
Melbourne city council created the industry and by extension the profession of butcher, 
it also disavowed them, as noted, to gain greater control over them, and to aid in moving 
the practice away from the eyes of the public and, particularly, children: this was a 
practice that predated Melbourne, having its origins in London. 
 
The practice of slaughtering animals was believed to desensitise butchers 
to violence between humans, which led the committee to imply that they 
were strangely similar in disposition to the animals with which they shared 
their space. Proposed regulations banning children from visiting 
slaughterhouses and prohibiting slaughterers from joining the ranks of 
teachers were several consequences of the committee’s report. In some 
cases British municipal authorities enforced such regulations, particularly 
given the presupposition that slaughterhouses had an ‘immoral influence’ 
on children who frequented them to ‘witness the death-struggles of the 
butcher’s victims’. (p. 174, italics added) 
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The shielding of children from the realities of the meat industry is a practice that continues 
to this day, albeit lately there have been calls for children to once again witness where 
their food comes from, a call that is not without precedent in countries where killing is 
still part of cultural practice.64 The practice of hiding animal death from view, Plumwood 
(2012) claims, ‘denies kinship and generates a conceptual distance or boundary between 
humanity and its “meat”’ (p. 61). She points to Native American cultural practices 
surrounding the killing of animals as a successful way of both maintaining kin with 
animals while at the same time acknowledging their role as food. ‘It is’, she says, ‘this 
refusal to deny the dilemma in which we are implicated in this life, a refusal to take the 
way of bad faith, moral supremacy, or self-deception which constitutes a radical challenge 
to our relationships to our food’ (p. 61, italics added). Plumwood reminds us of the 
importance of acknowledging moral dilemmas rather than explaining them away, a point 
I will return to in the next section. Part of refusing justifications for either side of the 
moral dilemma is the refusal to see ourselves as separate from animals and earth, and 
instead as part of a diverse, complex and connected ‘nature’. However, Plumwood (2012) 
also notes the vast difference between ‘the huge pig “slaughter facilities”’ in the USA and 
the cultural practices that predate them. The former being so terrible as to need to rely on 
exploited labourers. 
 
The work of those who labour on the killing floor of these massive 
facilities slaughtering up to 15,000 pigs a day is so terrible and poorly paid 
that only the slave-like workforce of the carceral system, or those coerced 
by other forms of desperation such as indentured immigrants, are available 
as workers. (p. 57) 
 
Not only were slaughterhouses brought into being through colonial laws, Maneesha 
Deckha (2017) argues that the instrumentalisation of animals was used as a justification 
for the need to ‘civilise’ ‘colonial subjects’. She writes:  
                                                 
64 See: https://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/tv/should-children-visit-slaughter-houses-14863219 and 
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-primary-school-teaching-about-pig-rearing-is-right-
children-must-understand-meat-production-8529524.html. A school in Norway that took kindergarteners 
‘on a trip to a reindeer slaughterhouse, part of a program to teach them about the ways of the Sami, an 
indigenous people in Scandinavia who herd the animals’ was met with outrage: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/world/europe/norway-school-trip-reindeer-slaughterhouse.html 
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The ‘truth’ that Western cultures are more animal-friendly than non- 
Western ones may be traced to classical and modern European 
epistemologies and, in particular, their expression through colonial laws. 
British seeking to ‘civilize’ colonized peoples, for example, through 
colonial regulation targeted a range of practices that were thought to 
constitute colonial backwardness. These practices included those 
involving animals. The violence towards animals observed by British 
colonial agents in their colonies served to justify the colonial ideology that 
colonial subjects were subhuman wards who required legal rehabilitation 
through anti-cruelty laws and other morals-directed legal regulation to 
cultivate their humanity (p. 65).  
 
Decka (2017) goes on to echo Moreton-Robinson’s point regarding the unequal, 
prejudicial and paternalistic nature of the Intervention discussed in the last chapter. She 
writes: 
 
This association between cruelty to animals and racialized subhumanity 
prevailed in colonial governance despite the astonishing levels of violence 
towards animals in Britain among the propertied classes whose practices 
of animal consumption or hunting, for example, never led the British to 
question their own humanity. (p. 66) 
 
Once again, we find the discourse of dehumanisation operationalised through invented 
norms of civilisation that the inventors themselves fail to meet; ‘social problems are 
considered to be any forms of behavior that violate the norms of white civility’ (Moreton-
Robinson, 2015, p. 160). Such failures usually come attendant with judgments of 
immorality on the part of those who meet the norm against those who do not and form 
the bedrock of judgement upon which laws are inscribed and punitive measures are laid. 
Deckha (2017) argues, that the charge of immorality, in the case of animal violence, was 
directed at the ‘uncivilised’ and used as a way of regulating and bringing them into 
‘civilised’ society on the basis of their ‘bad behaviour’, that is, as a process of 
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assimilation, a narrative which should now be familiar given the ground covered in the 
previous chapter (the Stolen Generations, the Little Children are Sacred report and 
following intervention). Conversely, Trabsky (2014) argues that the charge of immorality 
was not levelled at the ‘uncivilised’ but at the less than ‘civilised’, those already within 
British colonial society whose full inclusion was, nevertheless, made undesirable for 
means of regulation and control, namely, the butchers. Morality was used as a tool to 
ostracise the butchers and move the industry further away from ‘civilised’ society. 
Discourses of morality, then, were used to both create and ‘civilise’ outsiders.  
 
In the next section, I look at Camus’ interpretation of history. He argues that history as a 
concept has played into the separation of humans from earth and furthered the denial of 
an interconnected conception of nature. The denial of kinship Plumwood speaks of takes 
on further ethical significance when seen as a rejection of the moral limit of the life of the 
Other. I will argue that in the absence of absolute ethics we must preserve the recognition 
of such moral limits to arrest the perpetuation of epistemic violence in a colonial system 
that routinely obscures, mystifies, hides or normalises its own moral transgressions.  
 
History’s Amphitheatre  
 
Camus (1970) recalls: 
 
To correct a natural indifference, I was placed halfway between poverty 
and the sun. Poverty kept me from thinking all was well under the sun and 
in history; the sun taught me that history was not everything. I wanted to 
change lives, yes, but not the world which I worshipped as divine [...]. It 
was not poverty that got in my way: in Africa, the sun and the sea cost 
nothing. The obstacle lay rather in prejudices or stupidity. (p. 7, italics 
added) 
 
For Camus, poverty alone was not insufferable, not an evil in itself; one could do much 
with very little. Indeed, Camus clung ‘like a miser to the freedom that disappears as soon 
as there is an excess of things’ (p. 9). What was insufferable, what was a gross injustice 
was ‘the double humiliation of poverty and ugliness’ (p. 8). He writes, ‘though born poor 
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in a working class neighborhood, I never knew what real misfortune was until I saw our 
chilling suburbs’ (p. 8), in which there was to be found an injustice of ‘climate’ that could 
also be read as environment, specifically the built environment, or the anthropomorphised 
landscape.  
 
‘Only the modern city’, Hegel dares write, ‘offers the mind a field in which 
it can become aware of itself’. We are thus living in the period of big cities. 
Deliberately, the world has been amputated of all that constitutes its 
permanence: nature, the sea, hilltops, evening mediation. Consciousness 
is to be found only in the streets, because history is to be found only in the 
streets – this is the edict […]. History explains neither the natural universe 
that existed before it nor the beauty that exists above it. Hence it chose to 
be ignorant of them’. (Camus, 1977a, p. 169, italics added) 
 
The amputation of nature is a form of solitary confinement, a punishment, the human 
removed from other life forms. Camus placed the beauty of the natural world above a 
form of reason that professed to transcend and at the same time order it through 
domination; a form of reason that could be read as congruent with Plumwood’s concept 
of eco-irrationality or dominant logic. Camus’ use of the word ‘above’ is not accidental, 
it speaks to one of the central themes of his philosophy; his criticism of all thought that 
seeks to transcend the limits of our existence; the arrogance of a mind that professes to 
know better, to leave the world below and behind as if there were somewhere else to go 
and denies the moral limit of the life of the Other. ‘A culture that views the natural sphere 
as a mere instrument to its own ends, defined as separate from it, and as a field upon 
which to display human mastery and control, cannot treat it with care and respect’ 
(Plumwood, 1990, p. 534). Western history as a myth of reversal, seeks to elevate 
dominant logics beyond the limits of earth’s capacity to sustain life; locally, as in the case 
of built environments, and globally, as in the case of world governments, or 
unintentionally, as in the case of climate change. Myths of reversal are used to justify the 
excesses of history’s past, and present, as well as future. Such reversals not only act as 
justifications, but also confuse our sense of what is right and wrong, the problematic 
importance of which will be explored further in the next chapter.   
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Like the lion devouring raw historical meat, Camus’ (1977b) idea of the martyr, the 
erasure of people to usher in a prophecy, a future utopian ideal, idealisation, or ideology, 
such as communism, is also a justification for murder. The future as well as the past can, 
thus, be weaponised.65 And although martyrs do not require transcendence, they function 
in the same way: ‘Prophecy functions on a very long-term basis and has, as one of its 
properties, a characteristic which is the very source of strength of all religions: the 
impossibility of proof’ (p. 157).  History, religion and ideologies such as communism are 
shown to share a common narrative, the march of progress: ‘The Christians were the first 
to consider human life and the course of events as a history of which man gains his 
salvation or earns his punishment’ (p. 157). Both the martyr and the lion explain away 
the horror of extinguishing life. Camus clarifies this further using an example of the 
character Heathcliff in the Emily Brontë novel Wuthering Heights:  
 
Heathcliff, in Wuthering Heights, would kill everybody on earth in order 
to gain Cathie, but he would never think of saying that murder is 
reasonable or theoretically defensible. He would commit it; there his 
theory comes to a halt. This implies powerful love and it implies character. 
Since intense love is rare, such murders are uncommon, and they retain an 
air of waywardness. But as soon as a man, through lack of character, takes 
refuge in a doctrine, as soon as he makes his crime reasonable, it multiplies 
like Reason herself and assumes all the figures of the syllogism. It was 
unique like a cry; now it is universal like science. Yesterday, it was put on 
trial; today it is the law. (p. 11) 
 
An identifying characteristic of the narratives Camus criticised is the desire to do away 
with the pre-existing order of things and replace it with a universalised narrative, often 
hidden under the guise of morality, no matter the cost. The doctrine of discovery, Terra 
Nullius, the consequent assimilation of Indigenous children, cemeteries, and the slaughter 
                                                 
65 ‘Both the Soviet and the German totalitarian regimes destroyed the freedom of historical inquiry by 
imposing political restrictions upon research and prescribing in minute detail a politically acceptable 
version of the past. History became a political weapon, the historian a warrior at “the historical front”’ 
(Pokrovsky, Frank, & Von Müller, in Stern, 1970, p. 329). 
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house are all examples of reason razing the Other and multiplying itself. It is not 
surprising then, that like Plumwood, Camus locates the impetus for oppression in certain 
definitions of reason; for both philosophers the problematic forms of reasoning are any 
that can be used to justify atrocities. ‘[O]ur criminals’, Camus writes, ‘are no longer those 
helpless children who pleaded love as their excuse. On the contrary, they are adults, and 
they have a perfect alibi: philosophy, which can be used for anything, even for 
transforming murderers into judges’ (p. 11). The justification of murder built into certain 
philosophies,66 Camus thought, negated those philosophies, or as Judt (1998) put it: 
 
[I]f Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx have forged a world in which the Terror 
and its successor terrors can be justified, then it is they who must answer 
for it − we cannot defend the history of the past centuries by reference to 
the claims such thinkers have made about the process of which it is but a 
part. The application of ethical criteria to regicide, terror, torture 
disqualifies the regimes and theories that depend upon these means, 
whatever story they tell of themselves and whatever Heavenly City they 
promise in the earthly hereafter. (p. 95, italics added) 
 
Due to firsthand experience and much reflection, Camus staunchly rejected any theory, 
philosophy, religion, ideology, logic, morality, or narrative that justifies the loss of lives. 
The value of life, Camus argued, should not be transgressed, and if transgressed, never 
justified. Yet there are major moral theories such as utilitarianism that claim otherwise. 
A common practice is to cite moral dilemmas as proof of the failure of a set ethical limit 
against killing. Richard Routley (1984) argues against this practice in his defense of 
pacifism. He notes that in the case of moral dilemmas, pacifism is charged with moral 
inadequacy by consequentialist ethics, as it cannot, so the objection goes, both act in a 
way that is consistent with its principles and prevent a greater violence from occurring. 
Take his example of ‘Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing squad 
about to shoot several captives if Jim shoots one of them’ (p. 124). According to utilitarian 
ethics, Jim ought to shoot one to save the rest, but according to pacifism Jim ought not to 
                                                 
66 Camus (1977a) lists the following philosophers in The Myth of Sisyphus, a list he expands considerably 
in The Rebel: ‘From Jaspers to Heidegger, from Kierkegaard to Chestov, from the phenomenologists to 
Scheler’ (pp. 27–28) 
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commit violence. The charge, Routley argues, fails, and does so I claim, on similar 
grounds to those argued by Camus, namely, that the transgression of a moral principle 
does not call for the abandonment of the principle. According to Routley, ‘[w]hat a 
comprehensive pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to take the 
inadequate utilitarian line of trying to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they never 
occurred […], as if all obligations were prima facie, negotiable, etc. No, the conflicting 
obligations stand’ (p. 124). This echoes Plumwood’s point about our relationship with 
animals/food. For Camus67 (1977b), either action is impermissible; we must still act, but 
in doing so we have a responsibility to maintain awareness of our transgressions, of our 
‘human weaknesses and of [our] injustices’ (p. 171). Once we explain these away by 
recourse to a theory or doctrine we are in danger of multiplying them. On this point, 
Plumwood (2002) concurs. She says, one ‘has to concede injustice in order to effect a 
sufficient change to provide any guarantee that the same approach will not immediately 
be repeated […] That’s why it’s so important to be able to say “Sorry”’ (p. 116). Sorry 
does not have to be seen always as an admission of guilt, but can also be a recognition of 
suffering, which is a necessary first step toward actions aimed at decreasing suffering. 
Given the example outlined, even if it is preferable to act in a certain way (for example, 
Jim shoots a captive), it does not follow that one ought to (for example, it remains the 
case that Jim ought not to act violently). As Routley (1984) says, ‘utilitarianism, and 
consequentialist approaches more generally, have made it seem as if no deontic principle 
were firm, but all are provisional. This is entirely mistaken’ (p. 123). What is at stake is 
our very ability to comprehend moral transgression. 
 
The Stolen Generations epitomises the necessity of saying sorry, as well as the 
responsibility of recognising and respecting limits and making sure that they are not 
transgressed again. However, the policies responsible for the Stolen Generations also 
ushered in a new evolution of dominant logic in Australia, which I will come to shortly. 
But first, I will briefly describe the Stolen Generations and discuss the importance of 
saying sorry. A common practice, according to Wilson (1997), ‘was simply to remove the 
                                                 
67 Camus’ philosophical thoughts were also informed by his experience as a journalist. Speaking of the French use of 
torture in his birthplace of Algeria, Camus (2013) stresses that ‘we must refuse to justify these methods [torture] on 
any ground whatsoever, including effectiveness. Once one begins to justify them, even indirectly, no rules or values 
remain’ (p. 26).  
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child forcibly, often in the absence of the parent but sometimes even by taking the child 
from the mother’s arms’ (p. 5). This nationwide practice was undertaken mainly for 
reasons of assimilation:  
 
The Inquiry’s process of consultation and research has revealed that the 
predominant aim of Indigenous child removals was the absorption or 
assimilation of the children into the wider, non-Indigenous, community so 
that their unique cultural values and ethnic identities would disappear, 
giving way to models of Western culture. (p. 237) 
 
The 1997 Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families gave nine 
recommendations; part of number three was ‘acknowledgement and apology’ (p. 254). 
The Australian government’s apology, delivered by then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd on 
13 February 2008, speaks to the heart of the matter: ‘We today take this first step by 
acknowledging the past and laying claim to a future that embraces all Australians. A 
future where this Parliament resolves that the injustices of the past must never, never 
happen again’ (n.p).68  However, not once does Rudd directly acknowledge assimilation, 
and as detailed in the previous chapter, in the case of ‘the Intervention’, Australia is failing 
to prevent the reoccurrence of, as Rudd promised, ‘laws and policies of successive 
Parliaments and governments that have inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss on 
these our fellow Australians’ (n.p). In addition, the rate of Indigenous children in out-of-
home care (OOHC) in Australia is increasing, with Indigenous children placed in OOHC 
at a much higher rate than non-Indigenous children: ‘while the number per 1000 of the 
non-Indigenous population in care has remained relatively constant over the last five 
years (now 5.5 per 1,000), the rate for Indigenous children and young people has 
increased steadily since 2006 from 24.1 to 52.5 per 1,000 children’ (McDowall, 2016, p. 
6). An apology requires a halt to transgressions, otherwise it is simply another myth of 
reversal. For example, for you to believe I am sorry for hitting you, I need to first stop 
hitting you.  
 
                                                 
68 https://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-country/our-people/apology-to-australias-indigenous-peoples 
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To return to Routley, now named Sylvan (1986), I do not wish to paint him as a firm 
believer in deontology. In fact, his view is much more nuanced; the positioning of concern 
in consequentialist ethics in consequences is, he thinks, to the neglect of intent. Vice 
versa, the focus of concern in deontological ethics being on intentions is to the neglect of 
consequences. A satisfactory ethic to him must take adequate account of both: ‘Ethical 
theories which move away from common-sense positions and erroneously try to 
concentrate the badness of the process-product whole in one of the components, have a 
difficult time explaining the ordinary contrast between attempted and successful violence’ 
(p. 34). Epistemic violence, although certainly inherent in the process part of the equation, 
is recognised through the product. In the case of the Stolen Generations, the violent intent 
– assimilation – can be recognised in the Bringing Them Home report through the acts or 
outcomes, that is, the creation of legislation and the outcome of such legislation, namely, 
the forced removal of children and the resulting pain and suffering. Camus’ rejection of 
both heavenism and history can be read in a similar fashion. However, to get to the core 
of epistemic violence, a greater understanding of the ways in which it reproduces itself, 
as I have argued both Camus and Plumwood provide, is necessary. To help bring this out 
further I also enlist the aid of Foucault.  
 
Camus, Foucault, Plague and Disciplinary Power 
 
The insidiousness of epistemic violence is akin to what Camus called plague power, and 
is, I think, what drove Camus to write both the State of Siege and The Plague. Sharpe 
(2016) points out that Camus, especially in The Plague and his play State of Siege, 
predates, in a way, Foucault’s notion of ‘disciplinary power’. Disciplinary power, 
Foucault (1979) wrote, ‘does not link forces together in order to reduce them; it seeks to 
bind them together in such a way as to multiply and use them’ (p. 170). Sharpe (2016) 
offers a summary of the role of one of Camus’ characters in the play, who is a 
personification of a concept ‘Death’. 
 
Death meanwhile carries out an exacting administrative census, animated 
by her happy scientistic conviction that ‘everything can be expressed in 
terms of figures, formulas’ (Camus, 1948: 206). ‘[W]e’re not against 
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slaughterhouses – quite the contrary’, she explains: ‘Only we apply to 
them the latest methods of accounting’ (Camus, 1948: 175). Every aspect 
of life in Cadiz is soon subject to these ‘latest methods’. All citizens are 
listed, numbered and badged by the authorities, moved by their hatred of 
‘untidiness and irrationality’. (p. 63) 
 
We see shades of Plumwood in Camus’ reference to ‘untidiness’. The character ‘Death’ 
unmasks the disciplinary power involved in the concept of tidiness in ways akin to 
dominant logic; the objectification and instrumentalisation of citizens. The insidiousness 
of disciplinary power is that its totalising effect is individual. This is not a paradox, as 
such power seeks to make of every individual a collective instrument through the very 
process of making them an individual: ‘Discipline “makes” individuals; it is the specific 
technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its 
exercise’ (Foucault, 1979, p. 170). Individuals in this way are made to perpetuate 
dominant logic, made to feel it their duty ‘to “tidy up”, enforce order, make progress’ 
(Plumwood, 2007, p. 64). The hatred of untidiness is also a hatred of self, especially of 
the messy biological, germ-ridden body, as Plumwood would say; an extension of Plato’s 
stark separation of mind and body. Camus’ use of the plague demonstrates well the 
multiplication and spread of dominant logic, but it also captures the emotional denigration 
inherent in the process.  
 
Camus (1972) writes of those suffering under the order imposed by the ‘authorities’ in 
response to the outbreak of the plague: ‘they were wasting away emotionally as well as 
physically’ (p. 148). Why? The duration of isolation ‒ ‘by the end of their long sundering 
they had also lost the power of imagining the intimacy that once was theirs, or 
understanding what it can be to live with someone whose life is wrapped up in yours’ (p. 
149). This is the disintegration of relationships with others, including non-human animals. 
This is also the mechanistic, unescapable time that we saw Camus speak of in Chapter 
One: the horrible certainty of a life structured by powers greater than your own power to 
rebel. This terrible duration is exemplified in the power of the state to name the time of 
your death and make you count the seconds until its occurrence: capital punishment. 
Thought of the future turns to despair with the removal of the possibilities for life that it 
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would hold under other circumstances, that is, with the removal of the unknown. 
Imposition of the knowledge of the time and place of your execution, Camus thought, 
was one of the worst crimes imaginable due to the location of the suffering inflicted ‒ our 
conscious self. Consciousness plays a large role in his philosophy for it is consciousness 
that makes the absurd possible; the meeting of consciousness with the world. Were we 
not conscious and relational beings, the absurd would not exist. Were we not conscious 
and relational beings, the suffering of confinement and an understanding of the surety of 
our death would not exist. The judge’s sentence of death, rather than the executioner’s 
blade, is the more terrible of the two precisely because of the duration of isolation, that 
is, because of the awareness of the end of possibilities. It is a disembodiment of the 
human, or as Foucault said, the making of the individual, only taken to the extreme.  
 
When one wants to unify the whole world in the name of an ideology, 
there is no other way but to make this world as fleshless, as blind, and as 
deaf as the ideology itself. There is no other way but to cut the roots which 
bind man to life and nature. (Camus, 1949, p. 536).  
 
In the next chapter, I look to the use of isolation as punishment in prisons, through the 
work of Lisa Guenther, and what this can tell us about the conditions of personhood; 
namely, that we are relational beings. Camus understood the relational nature of humans, 
and in answer to ideology he posited unity and diversity. Foucault (1979) describes how 
the opposite evolved, that is, division and homogeneity, of how the individual became an 
instrument of disciplinary power. He talks of the movement from a society based on 
exclusion to one based on discipline. He draws on the difference between the way the 
leper and the plague were historically treated: ‘The exile of the leper and the arrest of the 
plague do not bring with them the same political dream’ (p. 198). Leprosy was contained 
by excluding the affected, by creating divisions between communities, whereas the 
response to the plague was a restructuring of society.  
 
The first [lepers] is that of a pure community, the second [the plague] that 
of a disciplined society. Two ways of exercising power over men, of 
controlling their relations, of separating out their dangerous mixtures. The 
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plague-stricken town traversed throughout with hierarchy, surveillance, 
observation, writing; the town immobilized by the functioning of an 
extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all individual bodies – 
this is the utopia of the perfectly governed city. (p. 198).  
 
They are different means of control, but not incompatible, he thinks. Unlike Plumwood, 
Foucault argues dualisms arose not from philosophy proper but from the philosophy 
spawned by the plague or leprosy. He lists these dualisms as: ‘mad/sane; 
dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal’ (p. 199) and thinks that all ‘the mechanisms of 
power which, even today, are disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him and 
to alter him, are composed of those two forms [leprosy and the plague] from which they 
distantly derive’ (p. 199). Regardless of the starting point, each author’s conception of 
dualisms is not incompatible, and, taken together, can help us understand the force of the 
logic behind epistemic violence. I contend that disciplinary power works alongside the 
logic of domination. Normalising, too, is a way of bringing in and casting out, with both 
the normal and the abnormal defined by what it is not, that is, defined by each other. For 
the normal to exist, the abnormal must be brought into existence. The butcher becomes 
abnormal and the slaughterhouse is moved beyond the bounds of human concern; it is 
pushed outside of the confines of anthropomorphism, in the same way the leper is. In the 
case of the orchids, Plumwood’s instance on protecting the orchids is labelled irrational, 
untidy and immoral, for questioning the norm of tidiness.  
 
In the next section, I search for epistemic violence in another concept, namely, Truth ‒ 
for in looking at the concept of Truth (as absolute) through the absurd, we peel back 
another guise of dominant logic, a form Foucault (1979) takes as a source of disciplinary 
power ‒ the examination. ‘The success of disciplinary power’, he says, ‘derives no doubt 
from the use of simple instruments; hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and 
their combination in a procedure that is specific to it, the examination’ (p. 170). The 
examination combines ‘the ceremony of power and the form of the experiment, the 
deployment of force and the establishment of truth’ (p. 184).  
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Not Truth but truths 
 
Camus (1977a) rejected the title of existentialist, which, he said, went beyond ‘lucid 
reason noting its limits’ (p. 49), nevertheless, when he said ‘[t]here is but one truly serious 
philosophical problem, and that is suicide’ (p. 11), he posed one of the twentieth century’s 
best-known existentialist problems, namely: ‘Judging whether life is or is not worth 
living’ (p. 11). But it was also an epistemic and moral problem. Because of the severity 
of the consequences the answer to this question entailed, Camus was determined to follow 
the logic that led from the recognition of the absurd (the theorised gap between our 
epistemology and ontology) to the act of taking one’s own life. ‘Dying voluntarily’, he 
said, ‘implies that you have recognized, even instinctively, the ridiculous character of that 
habit, the absence of profound reason for living, the insane character of that daily agitation 
and the uselessness of suffering’ (p. 13). In his novel, The Rebel, the ‘uselessness of 
suffering’ is embodied in a passage Camus (1977b) quotes from Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 
novel The Brothers Karamazov: ‘If the suffering of children […] serves to complete the 
sum of suffering necessary for the acquisition of truth, I affirm from now onward that 
truth is not worth such a price’ (p. 51, italics added). To Camus and Dostoevsky, the idea 
of an afterlife and Christianity’s requirement of faith in the goodness of God to obtain 
entrance to that afterlife, even in the face of the world’s evils, exemplified by the suffering 
of children, implicitly requires ‘the acceptance of mystery and of evil and resignation to 
injustice’ (p. 51). Neither Camus nor Dostoevsky will allow the problem of evil, in this 
case, the suffering of children, to be so easily explained away by the story of God’s will. 
Theirs is a very personal rejection of universal or absolute morality, justified by a belief 
in something greater, and along with it a rejection of absolute Truth. Camus asserted the 
need to revolt against such Truth and those who teach them, along with the laws, social 
institutions and practices they instantiate in order to stand by those who are suffering, for 
‘suffering exhausts hope and faith and then is left alone and unexplained. The toiling 
masses, worn out with suffering and death, are masses without God. Our place is 
henceforth at their side, far from teachers, old and new’ (p. 267). Hence, we see the depth 
of importance the multifaceted concept of revolt held for Camus. In this case, revolt is 
revolt against another’s beliefs construed as Truth, if those beliefs do little to help ease 
suffering or worse, cause, promote or prolong it. The myth of Terra Nullius is a prime 
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example of the kind of belief taken as Truth that Camus spoke of the need to revolt 
against. A revolt, in this sense, is against the rationalisation of horror and a restoration of 
the emotional response commensurate with it. Yet, just as Camus does not wish to do 
away with all reason, revolt does not call for the abandonment of all truths.  
 
According to Camus, ‘[t]he unfortunate thing is that we are in the age of ideologies and 
of ideologies which are totalitarian − that is, which are sufficiently sure of themselves, of 
their imbecilic reason or of their short-lived truth, to see the world’s salvation in their 
own domination’ (p. 535, italics added). To return to Chapter One, the concept of truths 
as human constructs echoes through The Myth of Sisyphus, in which Camus (1977a) says: 
‘This heart within me I can feel, and I judge that it exists. This world I can touch, and I 
likewise judge that it exists. There ends all my knowledge, and the rest is construction’ 
(p. 24). To Camus, truths are constructed, which, rather than meaning made up, I take 
him to mean, contingent on time and context. Take the infamous black swans as example. 
While it might be true that all swans in England are white, it is not absolutely True that 
all swans are white as black swans are found in the south-east and south-west regions of 
Australia, and, therefore, the claim is false; swans can be both black and white. Thanks 
to Hume this now seems self-evident; however, there is another dimension to Camus’ 
(1977a) truths, one decidedly more human. He writes: ‘Galileo, who held a scientific 
truth of great importance, abjured it with the greatest ease as soon as it endangered his 
life. In a certain sense, he did right. That truth was not worth the stake’ (p. 11). In other 
words, the authority of Truth should not supersede the limit of life.  
 
The concept of truths as human constructs dismisses what they cannot ever possibly 
understand, which is ‘everything’, the absolute Truth. To quote Camus: ‘That universal 
reason, practical or ethical, that determinism, those categories that explain everything are 
enough to make a decent man laugh. They have nothing to do with the mind. They 
negate its profound truth, which is to be enchained’ (p. 26). Philosophical suicide is the 
result of transgressing human epistemic limits. We all know that limits can be crossed, 
but he is not suggesting limits are or could ever be impervious to trespass; rather, if there 
were no fear of trespass there would be no need for a limit in the first place. The very 
possibility of violence, epistemic or otherwise, is what calls forth the limit. There would 
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be no laws against murder if murder were not an option. These are truisms, but ones that 
are often obscured in the same way moral limits are.  
 
Speaking of science but sharing tones with Le Doeuff’s (2014) assertion that imagery 
‘occupies the place of theories impossible’ (p. 5), in The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus (1977a) 
says ‘you tell me of an invisible planetary system in which electrons gravitate around a 
nucleus. You explain this world to me with an image. I realize then that you have been 
reduced to poetry: I shall never know’ (p .25). For Camus, images populate our theories, 
filling in the gaps of our uncertainty. To recognise these for what they are, not to destroy 
or do away with them, but to better appreciate them as limits to knowledge, as questions 
unanswered, and perhaps, needing no answer, to recognise them as philosophy, is an act 
of creative revolt. Lucidity, is, in part, making the uncomfortable thought of the unknown 
comfortable. Each of us constructs our own universes, but on this view, there are no strict 
boundaries between them besides the ones we ourselves enforce. To quote Camus again: 
 
It is clear that in this way I am defining a method. But it is also evident 
that that method is one of analysis and not of knowledge. For methods 
imply metaphysics; unconsciously they disclose conclusions that they 
often claim not to know yet. Similarly, the last pages of a book are already 
contained in the first pages. Such a link is inevitable. The method defined 
here acknowledges the feeling that all true knowledge is impossible. 
Solely appearances can be enumerated and the climate make itself felt. (p. 
18) 
 
For Routley (2010), the embedded nature of the inquirer as a limited part of a greater 
whole means truth is limited as the ‘universe is vast; knowledge-acquiring creatures 
inevitably constitute only a small and bounded part of it; so inevitably the knowledge they 
can pool is partial, is always incomplete’ (p. 116). Moreover, ‘[t]ruth always exceeds 
what is ascertained by limited means, including epistemic means. There is no (epistemic) 
method’ (p. 122).  
 
Both Routley and Camus contrast the moderation of the Greeks, and their respect for 
limits, to the modern Western philosophical obsession with knowledge that knows no 
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bounds, that can penetrate any mystery it chooses to turn its gaze upon. In the case of 
Camus’ method of lucidity, it brings forth an understanding of limits. Both philosophers, 
however, decry the oft touted ability of a method to yield universality. Further, Routley 
explains how the view of Truth as unbounded has led to the view of nature as also without 
limit, that is, the view of nature as a limitless resource open to unrestricted human 
consumption, devoid of moral consideration. In doing so, he problematises the 
 
modern view of unrestricted progress, of unlimited opportunities for 
humans, and of unimpeded domination of nature. Impressive advances in 
science and technology encouraged the (erroneous) idea that limits could 
be removed, an idea reinforced by theoretical presumptions as to the 
solvability of every problem, and the availability of a method—‘the’ 
scientific method—by which everything could be known. (p. 108) 
 
Camus locates the source of our environmental troubles in that mode of thinking for 
which the question of life is not open-ended. Life is not a repeatable experiment; the aim 
is not certainty. What it is to live is not something to be defined; life is the only answer 
to life, knowledge holds no certainties, and the natural world is beyond the limits of our 
complete understanding of it. This is the state of affairs described by Camus’ notion of 
the absurd. To attempt to transgress the limits of life by means of theories of absolute 
certainty is an imposition of order. The finite cannot hope to know the infinite, and the 
hope to know leads to the desire to unify the infinite into a finite concept, that is, to 
anthropomorphise the world. ‘Understanding the world for a human’, he says, ‘is 
reducing it to the human, stamping it with his seal. The cat’s universe is not the universe 
of the anthill. The truism “All thought is anthropomorphic” has no other meaning’ (p. 
23).  
 
If we think of Plumwood’s dominant logic as systemic transgression of limits, then it is 
difficult not to recognise philosophical suicide at most levels of human organisation. 
Plumwood argues that if we wish to avoid species suicide it is necessary to instantiate 
ecological rationality. Deborah Bird Rose (2004) reaches a similar conclusion. Drawing 
from Gregory Bateson’s concept of ecology, she argues that the ‘unit of survival is not 
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the individual or the species, but it is the organism-and-its-environment in relationship. It 
follows from this that an organism that deteriorates its environment commits suicide’ (p. 
188). Our belief in our independence from the land is indeed suicidal. As Plumwood 
(2007) put it, the ‘idea that land recognition is an inessential component of Australian 
identity does not disturb the dominant culture’s illusions of independence from the land 
and corresponding sense that it is incidental to its life’ (p. 63). Conversely, recognition of 
the dependence of human life on a complex, living, changing environment, with humans 
as part of, rather than separate from, the earth Other, signals a shift away from ‘the 
concept of a universal knowledge’, for if ‘one is a part of the system the whole remains 
outside the possibility of one’s comprehension’ (p. 188).  
 
The development of the ability to recognise certain limits, I will argue, is necessary for 
all ethical, educational frameworks and ways of knowing. That there are different ways 
of knowing, different epistemologies, is self-evident; that some vie for supremacy should 
not tax the imagination greatly given the content so far covered. As I pointed out in 
Chapter Two, a basis for regulating those who seek a privileged and, hence, dominant and 
dominating position, is given by Plumwood’s (2002) ‘ethico-epistemological 
proposition’, a position that claims that ‘knowledges that involve injustice to those who 
are known do not provide accurate or ethically acceptable forms of knowledge’ (p. 44). 
The classroom, too, is susceptible to unethical ways of knowing, and, therefore, equally 
in need of such a regulative principle, a topic to which I will return in Chapter Seven. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I discussed how Camus’ plague power reduces the human down to an 
individual and then to a number for ease of control, a power Foucault deemed disciplinary 
power. Although a different name to Camus’, the locus of Foucault’s power was still 
disease, namely, also the plague and, in addition, leprosy. Although Camus did not, to my 
knowledge, propose dualisms as an epistemic structure of oppression, I have argued here, 
and in Chapter One, that through looking at his concepts, such as philosophical suicide, 
the martyr and the lion, humiliated and triumphal reason, and plague power that 
Plumwood’s use of dominant logic with her focus on dualisms is congruent with that of 
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Camus’ view of oppression. Foucault, too, took dualisms to be a structuring feature of 
disciplinary power, a way to create the norm and exclude certain people from it. 
Plumwood’s views of tidiness echo Foucault here; these views spill out of the bounds of 
society to create an anthropomorphised landscape by excluding the ‘wild’ and the ‘native’ 
from the norm. I questioned the dominant narrative as it runs through morality, history, 
Truth, institutions and industries, particularly tying the slaughterhouse to the same sort of 
separating and objectifying power as Camus and Foucault present.  
 
Camus was both a moral and a political philosopher, arguing that the political should 
always be in service to the moral, but not the morality of ideology, of received religion 
or utilitarian ethics. These transgress life’s value, justifying their means by reference to 
their own ends, using their own stories to excuse their actions. The martyr and the lion, 
history and heaven, transgress Plumwood’s ethico-epistemological proposition, as both 
cause violence to other existing epistemological positions. Both are a form of what she 
called heavenism, concepts that go beyond the bounds of ecological reason, and enforce 
on consciousness and the earth, stark separations, which form the basis of justifications 
of ecological irrationality. We heard from Sylvan that in the search for unbounded Truth, 
the view that all can be known without limit − ‘unrestricted progress’ driven by humans 
as masters of the earth − has been ushered in, and along with it, environmental 
degradation. Indeed, Rose went so far as to say that such views are environmentally 
suicidal. Conversely, understanding ourselves to be situated, embedded within nature, is 
understanding that truth, too, has its limits, a necessary step in developing our ecological 
rationalities.  
 
In the next chapter, I extend on Camus’ critique of history by bringing in Rose’s critique 
of time and the part it plays in our notions of progress. I trace the logic of domination 
through the narrative of progress, mentioned in this chapter by Sylvan, into schools where 
it has largely shaped the way we look at education in the West. I also look at some of the 
ways epistemic violence is present in notions of childhood. If undoing the logic of 
domination is an important part of creating ecologically rational people, as I have argued, 
then, undoing it in schools becomes vital to creating an ecologically rational society.   
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Chapter Five 
Time, Identity and Punishment 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Recall that Camus thought the lies of history are the source of strength for religion, as he 
thought controlling the narrative past shapes the meaning of the present and paves the 
path of domination into the future. Rose (2004) emphasises the importance of linear time 
in this recipe of domination. She argues that the past-present-future linear conception of 
time ‘provides a template for a great deal of colonising thought’ (p. 151). Discussing the 
time orientation of the Yarralin People,69 Rose demonstrates that there are multiple ways 
of thinking about such a fundamental concept as time:  
 
We here now come after or are behind our ancestors who came before us. 
Our descendants are the ‘behind mob’ relative to us. We precede them, 
they follow along behind. And the whole of ordinary life can be 
understood collectively as a ‘behind mob’ – we all follow along behind 
the Dreamings. This is a temporal orientation that is based on sequence. 
(p. 152) 
 
Contrariwise, Rose further argues that the Western conception of time is ‘set within a 
Christian pattern: it is teleological, this present is imperfect, the future will be better. And 
the relative evaluation of the future as better necessarily implies that now is worse, and 
that the past is even worse than now’ (p. 152). For Camus (1977b) the future becomes a 
utopian vision that does not bear the burden of proof, but instead requires a leap of faith 
to realise it. The Western conception of time moves away from the realities of the past, 
                                                 
69 ‘Yarralin is 382km south west of Katherine in the Northern Territory, situated within the Victoria River 
Downs cattle station on the traditional lands of the Ngaringman people. Over 300 people call Yarralin 
home, including those from the Ngarinyman, Mudbarra, Bilinara and Gurinji tribes.’ See: 
https://www.yunmi.com.au/pages/yarralin-creative 
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creating a stark break between it and the present, and in doing so, disallows the movement 
of past realities into the now and the future. Relegating wrongs to history, denies their 
present-day realities,70 in a sense finalising them while at the same time, creating a 
fictitious future, or as Rose writes, ‘the fantasised utopia of the future is a key narrative 
for a certain type of triumphal history’ (p. 152). A linear progression is evident also in 
our conception of childhood and by extension the development of self, which is education. 
The progression of linear accounts of personhood are marked through exclusions, or put 
another way, are premised on what they are not, creating dualisms, such as child/adult, 
savage/civilised, and are accordingly part of the logic of domination. I explore a different 
concept of self-formation in Chapter Seven. Traditional formal education, especially 
schooling, could be said to have as its primary purpose identity formation, indeed, this is 
so in Western liberal-democracies that value rational individualism and autonomy, which 
underpin the principles of classic liberalism.  
 
I start this chapter by drawing on a speech Baldwin gave to educators on the topic of 
structural racism. He outlines how the system has been created by and rests on the 
dehumanisation of Other. Following Baldwin, I concur that it is not the Other that must 
change, but the system that Others. With the help of Guenther and building on Foucault’s 
disciplinary power, I outline the role punishment plays in structuring both society and 
self. I conclude by responding to the ‘utopia’ objection, a reason given for maintaining 
rather than disrupting education. Next, in the section entitled ‘To the Classroom’, I offer 
a brief account of the ways in which violence has traditionally been thought of and dealt 
with in the classroom, before expanding the concept to include epistemic violence. 
Epistemic violence is at the core of Othering and, therefore, impacts the student’s abilities 
to learn, that is, both the student who is Othering and the one being Othered. As such, the 
onus for preventing such violence largely falls on the teacher, who must be equipped to 
first recognise it. Ideally this would be accomplished through teacher preparation 
programs and professional development to equip teachers with requisite skills and 
knowledge, but, as I will argue in Chapter Seven. can also be accomplished through the 
development of ‘traitorous identities’. 
                                                 
70 The relegation of colonisation to the past by many is an attempt to deny its current day occurrences. The 
Stolen Generations, for example, is taken to be a past wrong, even though the rate of Aboriginal children 
in ‘care’ is increasing.  
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Punishment, Personhood, Dehumanisation and Decolonialisation 
 
Jean-François Lyotard (2013) argues that 
 
beneath the name “reality,” the unquestioned assumption is made that 
something is first given, in whatever complexified modes of apprehension 
and explanation it may be construed. If there is not that Other that gives 
the given, how can the construct be tested or verified, even provisionally? 
(p. 119). 
 
Unfortunately, our constructed ‘reality’ is too often verified not on the basis of that which 
gives the given, but on the basis of the distance between our ‘reality’ and the Other. The 
terms of our reality are to a large extent defined by who they exclude, by who lies outside 
cultural citizenship, by an absence that is created and made necessary by definition, a 
definition which brings the Other into half being in the eyes of those defining reality. 
Those who society and the law care about are granted personhood, and belong to ‘reality’, 
those who are not, ‘the civil and social dead are excluded from full participation in life, 
like ghosts who can still speak and act but whose speech and actions no longer make an 
impact on the world’ (Guenther, 2013, p. xxvii). Those who are busy defining reality thus 
create a problem for and of the Other—a myth of reversal. However, the Other is not the 
problem, the goal is not to ‘help’ the Other, or to turn the Other into the one Othering, the 
problem is those who define reality through exclusion, and, thus, the solution is to change 
the way reality is defined.  
 
Speaking of the structural racism of another colonised country – many of whose original 
inhabitants were also felled by the doctrine of discovery, that which was and is used to 
justify the colonisation of Australia, the USA and Canada, among others – Baldwin 
(1985) recounts his experience with the socio-political structures of the USA from the 
perspective of an African American: 
 
Every street boy – and I was a street boy, so I know – looking at the society 
which has produced him, looking at the standards of that society which are 
145 
 
not honored by anybody, looking at your churches and the government 
and the politicians, understands that this structure is operated for someone 
else’s benefit – not for his. And there’s no reason in it for him. If he is 
really cunning, really ruthless, really strong – and many of us are – he 
becomes a kind of criminal. He becomes a kind of criminal because that’s 
the only way he can live. Harlem and every ghetto in this city – every 
ghetto in this country – is full of people who live outside the law. They 
wouldn’t dream of calling a policeman. They wouldn’t, for a moment, 
listen to any of those professions of which we are so proud on the Fourth 
of July. They have turned away from this country forever and totally. They 
live by their wits and really long to see the day when the entire structure 
comes down. The point of all this is that black men were brought here as 
a source of cheap labor. They were indispensable to the economy. In order 
to justify the fact that men were treated as though they were animals, the 
white republic had to brainwash itself into believing that they were, 
indeed, animals and deserved to be treated like animals. Therefor it is 
almost impossible for any Negro child to discover anything about his 
actual history. The reason is that this “animal,” once he suspects his own 
worth, once he starts believing that he is a man, has begun to attack the 
entire power structure. This is why America has spent such a long time 
keeping the Negro in his place. What I am trying to suggest to you is that 
it was not an accident, it was not an act of God, it was not done by well-
meaning people muddling into something which they didn’t understand. It 
was a deliberate policy hammered into place in order to make money from 
black flesh. (p. 1, italics added) 
 
Baldwin uttered these words in an address to educators. He wanted them to understand 
that racism was indeed structural, in the same way that Wolfe wanted us to understand 
that colonisation is structural, and in the same way that Plumwood wanted us to 
understand that environmental degradation is structural and that all are intertwined. 
Baldwin wanted educators to understand that he is not the ‘problem’, rather their 
projections of what he is onto him are.  
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In order for me to live, I decided very early that some mistake had been 
made somewhere. I was not a “nigger” even though you called me one. 
But if I was a “nigger” in your eyes, there was something about you – there 
was something you needed. I had to realize when I was very young that I 
was none of those things I was told I was. (p. 3) 
 
The logic of domination is woven into our institutions, it shapes our social practices, and 
to a large extent it structures the way colonial identities see the world and everyone/thing 
in it. The racist individual living within the structure is taught to be epistemically violent 
toward Other, by internalising the logic of domination and myths of reversal; by 
committing philosophical suicide. These myths of reversal limit not only the Other, but 
also differently, the oppressor’s self-identity. 71 It is an identity wrapped up in a fictitious 
history, a history that simultaneously omits past violence against the Other, and the role 
played by the Other in shaping that history. To the denial of history, as prevalent in the 
USA as it is in Australia, Baldwin had this to say: 
 
It is not really a “Negro revolution” that is upsetting the country. What is 
upsetting the country is a sense of its own identity. If, for example, one 
managed to change the curriculum in all the schools so that Negroes 
learned more about themselves and their real contributions to this culture, 
you would be liberating not only Negroes, you’d be liberating white 
people who know nothing about their own history. And the reason is that 
if you are compelled to lie about one aspect of anybody’s history, you must 
lie about it all. If you have to lie about my real role here, if you have to 
pretend that I hoed all that cotton just because I loved you, then you have 
done something to yourself. You are mad. (p. 3, italics added) 
 
By insisting on the Othering as beyond the norm, Baldwin is reversing a myth of reversal, 
pushing back against the creation of the norm in the image of the coloniser. To turn back 
                                                 
71 Moreton-Robinson (2015) argues similarly, ‘that patriarchal white sovereignty as a regime of power 
deploys a discourse of pathology as a means to subjugate and discipline Indigenous people to be good 
citizens, and that the tactics and strategies deployed within this race war reveal its own pathology’ (p. 155). 
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to Australia, the ongoing controversy over the date of Australia Day/invasion day is an 
example of coloniser identity denying its own violent history. Australia day is currently 
held on 26 January, the anniversary of the arrival in 1788 of the first British fleet and the 
subsequent claiming of Australia in the name of the British crown by Governor Arthur 
Phillip. However, as detailed in Chapter Three, the legitimacy of such a claim has been 
called into question, and it is more apt to conceive of the event as the invasion of 
Australia; hence invasion day. Baldwin argues that just as racism is structural so too is 
colonial identity, understanding racism as structural should provoke us to try to 
understand our own identities as structural.72 To do so we need to look at the way identity 
is formed in the culture in which we find ourselves embedded. To this end, I turn to 
Guenther’s (2013) book, Solitary Confinement: Social death and its afterlives, which 
traces the development of solitary confinement and the multiple historical arguments 
given in its favour in the USA. The structures of prisons and the arguments for them have 
changed over time, for which Guenther provides a detailed and eye-opening history that 
is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this thesis. However, she poses a number of 
questions raised by the effects of solitary confinement that are valuable for understanding 
the links between dehumanisation, discipline, punishment, slavery, society and the self. 
How and why we punish Others is sometimes a reflection of societal values, and 
sometimes an influencing force, in a feedback loop, that Guenther holds, affects us all (p. 
253).73 It can also tell us something about the construction of self, and our processes of 
learning, by presenting us with the negation of learning; the destruction of self.  She 
defines both a societal and legal concept for those excluded from personhood; the socially 
dead, and the civilly dead.  
 
Social death is the effect of a (social) practice in which a person or group 
of people is excluded, dominated, or humiliated to the point of becoming 
                                                 
72 Plumwood (1993a) understands the problem as follows: ‘A dualism, I argue, should be understood as a 
particular way of dividing the world which results from a certain kind of denied dependency on a 
subordinated other. This relationship of denied dependency determines a certain kind of logical structure, 
as one in which the denial and the relation of domination/subordination shapes the identity of both the 
relata’ (p. 443). 
73 Guenther (2013) writes that ‘THE SOCIAL DEATH OF PRISONERS in solitary confinement does not 
just affect the individual or the family or the local community; it affects all of us who live in a society in 
which black, brown, and poor people of all races are criminalized and isolated in prisons for the stake of 
someone else’s security and prosperity’ (p. 253). 
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dead to the rest of society. Although such people are physically alive, their 
lives no longer bear a social meaning; they no longer count as lives that 
matter. (p. xx) 
 
The socially dead, do not matter, and it does not matter what is done to them, as is also 
the case of the civilly dead.  
 
Civil death is a legal ﬁction; it refers to someone who has been (legally) 
positioned as dead in law. Their body may be alive and their mind sharp, 
but they have been deprived of the legal status of a person with civil rights 
such as the rights to own or bequeath property, to vote, to bring a legal 
case to court, and so on. (p. xviii) 
 
Guenther argues that many prisoners are positioned as civilly and socially dead. The same 
can be argued of Aboriginal peoples in Australia, certainly prior to being granted 
citizenship, and to an extent through the ongoing denial of sovereignty and obstinate 
forms of dehumanisation. As previously covered, during the early settlement of Australia, 
Indigenous peoples were, as Russell Hogg (2001) describes, often thought of as ‘by nature 
inferior, uncultivated, slave to their passions and must be subject to forms of disciplinary 
control appropriate to their condition and level of understanding, namely physical 
punishments that could be promptly administered’ (p. 360). Punishment, and by extension 
the judicial system, plays an important role in colonisation. Like Guenther, Hogg argues 
that punishment ‘is a means of marking the cultural limits of membership of a civilized 
community and the entitlements to civic recognition, citizenship and rights (including 
rights to land) that follow from it’ (p. 361).  
 
From the early 1900s to the 1960s, the abduction, or ‘the forced removal’, of Aboriginal 
children, was a widespread policy (p. 364). Indigenous peoples were not only denied 
rights of citizenship but also rights to their own children; the right to raise them and the 
right to cultural reproduction were forcibly taken in an act of premeditated cultural 
genocide (or ethnocide). According to the Australian Human Rights Commission, during 
this period, an estimate of one in three or one in ten Aboriginal children were taken from 
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their families. These figures are in stark contrast to the one in three hundred removals of 
white children during the same period (p. 365). Hogg notes that the ‘forcible taking of a 
child from its parent has generally been regarded with such moral repugnance as to be 
unthinkable’ (p. 365), and yet in the case of Aboriginal children, a moral myth of reversal 
took place, turning an unthinkable act, perpetrated toward a few humans, into an almost 
moral duty to civilise a people dehumanised and turned into a savage, reductionist, 
animalistic subject, ‘bereft of the “normal” (white, European) structures of psychological 
affects and refined sensibilities’ (p. 365). Here we see normalising, moralising and 
Othering as different sides of the same coin, that is, the same systems of oppression. 
Attuning our moral sensibilities to some and not to others is a feature of colonisation and 
a form of epistemic violence.  
 
Guenther (2013) argues that means of control, such as social and civil death and, 
particularly, solitary confinement, are aimed at the very thing that makes us human but 
also animal – our relationships to earth, others, family and the future. Were we not 
relational beings, such means of control would fail. Considering the consistently observed 
effects of solitary confinement on inmates over a period of multiple centuries, Guenther 
asks an important question in relation to identity: ‘Who are we, such that we can become 
unhinged from ourselves by being separated from others?’ (p. 3). She speaks of the 
extreme disentanglement of identity from environment that is solitary confinement. This 
disentanglement amounts to a disassembly and eventual disintegration of self. If the 
absence of connection equals the absence of self-identity, then connection is at the least 
a necessary condition for the coherent existence of self. Yet, such an understanding of 
self is largely denied by the theory of the atomistic liberal individual. Such a notion of 
self is ‘idealist and abstract – a category conceived as free of all constraints on action and 
endowed by nature with certain inalienable rights’ (Hall in Donald & Hall, 1986, p. 39). 
Camus’ notion of self, by contrast, is more in line with Guenther’s. 
 
Speaking of an actor on the stage, Camus (1977a) invites us to imagine ourselves as part 
of the audience. After watching a hundred plays, the same actor in a hundred different 
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roles, we are asked to question whether we think we know something about him.74 The 
answer Camus thinks is yes: ‘a man defines himself by his make-believe as well as by his 
sincere impulses’ (p. 10). The act, too, is part of the actor’s life. Whether we mean them 
or not, our actions, our habits, our relationship with the world around us becomes us. On 
stage delivering his lines we may be reluctant to say that the actor is being himself; we 
would more likely think of him as removed from his authentic self, as acting, playing a 
part, indulging in make believe, or pretending. We may be tempted to slice this portion 
of reality out and call it fiction, but can a person ever be removed from themselves? Can 
we view the person’s life as if controlled by a stopwatch that can be stopped and started 
based on our definition of fiction and non-fiction? The notion that fiction is somehow 
cordoned off from reality reveals something of the absurd. To Camus, there is no such 
thing as an authentic self, or if there is, it is ever changing. A self that progresses in a 
linear fashion is another fiction, albeit an influential one; it is a fiction that starts with 
Western conceptions of childhood and follows along the same lines as societal notions of 
‘progress’. Just as progress75 is measured as a movement away from nature, so, too, is 
adulthood. Murris (2014) notes that teachers’ attitudes toward childhood largely still 
follow a theory of developmental progression which claims that 
 
for “healthy” intellectual development children need to control their 
emotions and other “natural,” “animalistic” impulses through catharsis in 
order to mature and grow up into rational individuals. This still prevalent 
recapitulation theory presupposes that the development of the individual 
(universal) child mirrors the development of the species from “savage” to 
“civilised”. (p. 158) 
 
Under this theory of development, the control of emotions is seen to be a mark of the 
civilised, fully human. Those who fail to exercise ‘self-control’ are labelled irrational, 
and uncivilised; definitions are used to justify the domination and discipline of children 
in the same way they are used to instrumentalise the environment and adults who do not 
                                                 
74 I will use a male example to be consistent with Camus; however, I acknowledge that his and, by extension, 
my use of the male subject is problematic, as it perpetuates the dominance of the masculine voice in 
literature. 
75 A very different notion of progress is active in the community of inquiry, one that is concerned with a 
progress (see footnote 39). 
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fit the dominant paradigm. Indeed, when adult behaviour falls outside the realm of 
societal normalcy, the adult is often said to be ‘irrational’, or interchangeably, they are 
labelled as acting like a child.  
 
We commonly see childhood in much the same way that we see the actor, as a preliminary 
stage to adulthood, a preparation of sorts, for life, one to be overcome in order to be 
deemed ‘fully human’. We view children and even our own childhood that way; I was 
never that young, that dumb, that little, that dependent. We view it as something that we 
go through to emerge fully grown, the finished adult product, independent and individual, 
rather than as a continuity of self, of existence. The belief that we can step out from our 
lives, from the development of self, equates with the belief that some things do not count, 
that some actions are important, and others are not. The time I graduated from college 
was important, the time I saw a butterfly, perhaps not. We all value different events in 
our lives differently, and to some perhaps seeing a butterfly was a seminal moment; 
however, collectively, the events which count, which must be valued, and must be 
recorded, are dictated to us by our socio-political systems beginning with education, both 
informally through family and formally through schooling. A written history of our lives 
must be created for us to apply for citizenship, to enter the work force, for our taxes, to 
be granted entrance to university, for the census, and so on. As it stands, the recording of 
our lives is an integral part of democracy; it is a requirement of citizenship and of 
personhood in ‘civilised’ societies.  
 
It takes a whole network of interconnected obligations, both in the present 
and extending into the past and future, to create and sustain social 
personhood, and it takes a whole network of exclusions, interruptions, and 
violations, not only against individuals but against the social and temporal 
horizons of their lives, to destroy that personhood. (Guenther, 2013, pp. 
xx–xxi) 
 
I read Guenther’s focus on solitary confinement as a search for what constitutes a human, 
not a human ‘nature’ so to speak, but rather the conditions under which a human thrives. 
Her conception of what constitutes death (social and civil) speaks to her conception of 
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life as relational. A human with severed relationships (not just to other humans but also 
the environment) is a human suffering, and if relationships are what constitutes life, then 
the severance of these, when severe enough, constitutes a living death. An attack on a 
human’s relationship with other humans, their history or the non-human world, is an 
attack on the human, on the self, and not just on an individual but a communal self. 
Resistance to such attacks, to such forms of violence, becomes of upmost importance to 
the survival and flourishing of both notions of self. To the ongoing violence against 
indigenous peoples, the ongoing dehumanisation, and denial of history perpetrated by 
colonisers in multiple countries, Smith (2012) argues that to ‘acquiesce is to lose 
ourselves entirely and implicitly agree with all that has been said about us’ (p. 4). The 
acquiescence Smith describes is tantamount to relinquishing the capacity for self-
development, which, educationally, amounts to losing the ability to learn, insofar as 
identity is shaped by all that has been said about us. For Camus, this is philosophical 
suicide. 
 
To the Classroom 
 
According to Denton (1968), ‘philosophers of education are required to concern 
themselves with questions of particularly human concern, questions having to do with the 
development of specific human beings’ (p. 97).  Attending to ‘the development of specific 
human beings’, for educators, entails having an idea, notion, belief or assumption of the 
content of the terms ‘development’ and ‘human’. As I argued previously, historically both 
terms have proven contentious. The notion of the fully human has been defined in 
opposition to those it excluded, those closest to the state of nature, or as Foucault would 
have it, the lepers of society. So, too, development has been defined as progress away 
from the state of nature, as the movement from ‘savage’ to ‘civilised’. The terms human 
and development mean different things to different people working in education (for 
example, teachers, principals, curriculum designers, policy-makers, philosophers of 
education); sometimes the differences are minimal, other times radical. These differences 
often reflect the institutional, political, societal and cultural narratives in which the 
teacher is embedded. Norman Denzin, Yvonna Lincoln and Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2008) 
argue there is no separation between education and politics, ‘that all inquiry is both 
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political and moral’ (p. 2). Dewey (2001) said something similar when speaking of the 
difficulties he witnessed in trying to bring about educational reform. 
  
The conservative was still there. He was there not only as a teacher in the 
schoolroom, but he was there in the board of education; he was there 
because he was still in the heart and mind of the parent; because he still 
possessed and controlled the intellectual and moral standards and 
expectations of the community. We began to learn that an educational 
reform is but one phase of a general social modification. (p. 390)  
 
The notions held by teachers, educators, parents and the wider community, that is, all of 
us, influence education. Broadly speaking, they create the climate in which education 
takes place and in which the educator, along with the educational structure, is created. As 
Denton (1963) notes, the push to create a value neutral, skills-based educational system 
is lost the moment decisions of content and methodology, of what and how we teach, are 
made, as ‘norms constitute the nature of those decisions’ (p. 2). Although the classroom 
is sometimes thought to be immune to larger community concerns, and ‘in some ways, 
society has expected a protective bubble to exist between the problems of our 
communities and the spillover into the school setting’ (Furlong & Morrison, 2000, p. 74), 
as Dewey, Denton, Furlong and Morrison, and others attest, this is not the case. Society 
creates children and children grow to create society, and education becomes complicit in 
the perpetuation of this identity formation.  
 
Dewey’s (2010) insistence on the need for a philosophy of education grew out of his 
recognition that an ‘environment in which some are limited will always in reaction create 
conditions that prevent the full development even of those who fancy they enjoy complete 
freedom for unhindered growth’ (p. 244). Imagine, if you will, a world in which when 
you sit down to relax you do not have to shut out any chaos, you do not have to assume a 
state of temporary ignorance as to the suffering of others. Imagine if you could sit quietly 
in the knowledge that everything in the world was fine, truly and completely fine. 
Imagine, also, if this knowledge was lasting and not simply a fleeting moment of false 
certitude. I cannot imagine what that would feel like because I have never experienced it. 
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Sure, I’ve had moments of contentment when I’ve felt everything in my life to be under 
control, heading in the direction I desired, when I knew where my next meal was coming 
from and I didn’t have anything to fear when I shut my eyes at night. But whilst my own 
sphere of existence might be relatively stable, a large percentage of the earth’s population 
is not, and I can never completely shut out the knowledge of the Other. I am reminded 
constantly, and with this reminder comes the memory of instability, of the possibility of 
suffering and the certainty of a hopefully far off death. It is, then, to hope that I often turn. 
I hope that it will never happen to me, that I will never suffer, that I will never die; I know 
death is inevitable, but still I hope in vain. I can minimise suffering, and I can, with the 
help of clean water, good food, shelter, sanitation, the medical profession, and access to 
scientific studies, and so forth, perhaps, extend my time on earth, but I cannot do so 
indefinitely. This knowledge saddens and scares me, and so I shut it out, and along with 
it the suffering of all the Others that remind me of my own fragility, and I blame them for 
their situation, for by so doing I reinforce my delusion that life’s hardships cannot touch 
me; I am not so lazy, so poor, so stupid, and so on. I am not them. However, adopting this 
attitude limits me. It draws a line around my conception of self and channels my efforts 
into enforcing this line and, thereby, enforcing the Otherness of Others. In this way, I add 
to the oppression of Others.  Many people also hope that there will be a part of them that 
continues after death, and that all the wrongs of the world, if not justified, can, at least, 
be excused as God’s plan with those who have transgressed to be judged in the afterlife. 
Such hope is an evasion, it is philosophical suicide; a vain hope meant to bring comfort 
at the expense of action—as death marks the end of all lives and only humans acting 
together can minimise suffering. 
 
In 1934 Dewey invited us to imagine a world in which ‘the spirit of inhumanity bred by 
economic competition and exploitation’ gives way to ‘cooperation and the spirit which 
sees in every other individual an equal right to share in the cultural and material fruits of 
collective human invention, industry, skill and knowledge’ (p. 245). While such a world 
is likely impossible, it is, he stresses, the only ‘ideal worthy of the name of education’ (p. 
245). We might be tempted to criticise such idealistic appeals. However, considering 
World War II was a mere five short years away from the time of his writing and, as he 
emphasised, the urgency of his point was the prevention of violence, his assertion that 
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‘unless hearts and minds are prepared by education, [the society of the next generation] 
is likely to come attended with all the evils of social changes by violence’ (p. 245) carries 
a certain empirical weight. Dewey (2012) also wrote that if we choose ‘force as a method 
of settling social issues’, then ‘somehow we too have a belief that force, physical and 
brute force, after all is the best final reliance’ (p. 99). Most of us, however, would agree 
that the goal of education should be aimed elsewhere, perhaps at the creation of a world 
that really is fine.  
 
That force exists as a method of settling social issues is self-evident; we do not have to 
look much further than the local newspaper headlines. That peace is something that can 
be taught also seems intuitive; that violence, including Othering, can be taught is, perhaps, 
a little less so. However, if peace can be taught, so too can violence, and if we are not 
actively engaged in peace education, then we fail in preventing violence education. If 
teachers ignore 
 
school violence, the name-calling, the shoving, the fighting, the 
harassment, they are condoning it. Children see teachers walking by, 
pretending not to notice, and they learn that the way we treat others, the 
way we interact on the street or in the playground, is nobody's business 
but our own. (Epp & Watkinson in Furlong & Morrison, 2000, p. 193)  
 
As Furlong and Morrison (2000) note, traditionally, the responsibility for dealing with 
violence in the classroom has fallen outside of the realm of teacher responsibility, to the 
principal, educational administrators, security contractors, or the law. However, ‘the 
threat and reality of physical harm has consequences that suppress the maximal 
educational growth and development of students. Such a threat lands the issue squarely 
on the educator's plate of concern’ (p.74). The same is true of epistemic violence as it, 
too, prevents learning, and should, therefore, be of equal concern.  
 
If it is the case that ‘in some areas, the community norms and behaviors regarding 
violence have thoroughly invaded the school’ (p. 74), then we, as a part of community, 
as a part of society, are also implicated. If society creates the child and the child grows to 
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create society, then critiques of forms of societal violence, both physical and epistemic, 
become relevant for education. Both Plumwood and Camus help advance our 
understanding of the ways in which societal violence is transmitted and perpetuated by 
going to the source of much of it; philosophical suicide and the logic of domination. 
Plumwood’s (2012) attack by a crocodile  
 
revealed [to her] that it was possible for people—as individuals, groups, 
perhaps whole cultures that subscribe to a particular dominant story—to 
be completely and systematically wrong about quite simple and basic 
things—our relationship to food,76 to one another, the intertwining of life 
and death, the fleshly, embodied character of human existence—and be 
quite unaware of it. A few people [traitorous identities] may come to see 
the illusion for what it is because they stumble across certain clues, 
experiences that do not fit the dominant story. (pp. 12–13, italics added) 
 
The permeating quality of dominant rationality shifts the traditional onus of recognising 
and responding to epistemic violence from the principal, administrators and law 
enforcement, onto teachers. Embedded in a society structured in such a way as to 
perpetuate epistemic violence, as I have argued we are, by retelling stories that ‘do not fit 
the dominant story’, we must re-learn first (including how to recognise epistemic 
violence) and teach second. We must re-learn through an attempt to understand the 
perspective of the Outsider, those who are uniquely positioned to understand the hidden 
premises of our social structures, the hidden values woven into our societal fabric and by 
so doing become traitorous identities (an idea I expand on in Chapter Seven). However, 
a common objection is that school is no place for the questioning of values; rather, its role 
is simply to transmit the values of the culture in which it is embedded. Thomas Colwell 
(1970) explains this attitude and the objections to it as follows.  
 
The philosophy of the schools is a kind of positivistic pragmatism, which 
is to say a bastardized pragmatism, which defines its purposes solely out 
                                                 
76 In the last chapter I looked at the slaughterhouse as a way in which Australia’s relationship with food 
could be said to be ‘systematically wrong' at a national level. 
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of response to the here and now, the immediate problems before it. As in 
the larger society, there is much planning, but it is particularistic, confined 
to the moment. We are fearful to define broader purposes, because to do 
so would involve questioning the values that underlie present 
arrangements, and this would detract from keeping school, would be 
“utopian,” or even subversive. Hence the expedient quality of education 
today. What is “good” educationally follows from the growth trends of 
society. If society is proliferating in population, building ever bigger cities, 
producing more and more for a seemingly endless consumption, 
despoiling its environment, and conducting tragically senseless war, it is 
not education’s job to reason why, but to accept the inevitability of this 
growth (“progress”) and to fashion its activities in a manner best suited to 
realize it. (pp. 113‒114, italics added) 
 
In Chapter Three I set out colonisation as a form of colonial utopia, which created a 
dystopia for Others. The objection to utopian ideals that Colwell notes is a familiar but 
curious one that I will now challenge. The utopian objection to questioning values speaks 
to something unattainable in an ideal, and, indeed, it aligns with the definition of utopia 
as ‘no-place’. The charge of utopia is made as if to say that the idea in question is too 
fanciful to be even entertained. However, Hyde (2014) points out that in the preface to 
More’s book, there is an  
 
ambiguity inherent in talk of ‘utopias’ […] Once ‘No-Place’ – deriving 
from the Greek ou- (‘no’), topos (‘place’), outopia – it was now ‘The Good 
Place’ – eu – (‘well’ or ‘good’), topos, eutopia. Utopia is seemingly 
ambiguous between an impossibly ideal place that is consequently 
nowhere to be found and a place that is good enough and consequently can 
be found. (p. 140) 
 
The ideal, once no-place, is made flesh through the acts of people and the creation of laws 
(p. 140). But whether, once inscribed upon the earth, a utopia becomes a eutopia or 
dystopia depends on your position within the newly created social order, for a utopia is 
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just that, a blueprint for a new society, the epistemic which precedes the ontological. 
Plato’s state is, according to More (1684), another planned utopia, yet to be inscribed or 
as he put it, ‘empty words’ (p. 140). To dismiss something as ‘utopian’ is to 
misunderstand More’s meaning as, to ‘aim for something better was clearly separable 
from aiming for the impossibly remote’ (Hyde, 2014, p. 140). Utopias can be created; 
however, there is nothing magical in the idea that guarantees the result will be eutopian 
rather than dystopian. Consequently, ‘utopia’ is neither an objection to or an argument 
for, ‘questioning the values that underlie present arrangements’ in education, as Colwell 
put it. However, as I have argued previously following Plumwood, infinite growth on a 
finite planet is not only untenable and irrational, it is downright suicidal and dystopian 
for all. If ‘keeping school’ aids in keeping ‘progress’, disrupting ‘school’ becomes a 
rational course of action. If the ‘growth trends’ of society are those set upon their present 
course through colonisation, it is, as Colwell puts it, time for education to ‘reason why’ 
and to ‘question the values that underlie present arrangements’. The questioning of values 
cannot easily be dismissed as a utopian fantasy. Indeed, given that racism is structural, 
and education is an integral part of perpetuating societal structures, then education is 
integral to racism. Safeguarding an ever-perpetual present or ‘keeping school’, as Colwell 
put it, also becomes implicated in perpetuating racism, and questioning values becomes 
integral to undoing epistemic violence and restructuring education. 
 
 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have followed on from Camus’ critique of history, with Rose’s critique 
of time as a colonising force, explaining how it links to the creation of utopia as a 
colonising goal and eventually how it is tied to the notion of childhood as a stage of 
development on the straight road to adulthood. Such linear notions of time and 
development also play a role in keeping school, in maintaining dominant social structures. 
Baldwin’s powerful explanation of structural racism revealed some of the ways in which 
epistemic violence is structured into the socio-political landscape and shapes not only 
how the colonial ‘individual’ relates to the Other but also to self. I then turned to the 
classroom to examine the ways violence is usually thought of and dealt with, before 
arguing that the role of the teacher is integral in mitigating classroom violence. I sought 
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to expand the scope of what is considered classroom violence to include the epistemic 
and argued against a common objection to the classroom as a site of values reconstruction, 
namely, the charge of utopia. By examining the root of the word and More’s original 
meaning, I argued that refusing or failing to question societal values reinforces structural 
racism.  
 
In the next chapter, I turn to a pedagogy that can be adapted to both elucidate and respond 
to structural epistemic violence; an educational philosophy developed by Lipman and 
Sharp in which students engage in collaborative philosophical inquiry to develop and 
improve thinking. As an existing approach to education, in which philosophy functions 
educationally, I argue that the community of inquiry pedagogy holds potential as a child-
centred pragmatic approach to education, which focuses on collaborative philosophical 
dialogue as a method for developing inter-subjective, self-correcting learning 
communities. Such communities recognise fallibilism over certitude as vital to 
knowledge construction and are, therefore, well placed to question values and structures. 
To demonstrate this point, I focus on avenues of inquiry that have the potential to disrupt 
certain aspects of school and society.  
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Chapter Six 
Philosophical Education 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Philosophical arguments come from life and are played out in life: in an individual’s 
choices, in policies and laws, in societal structures and institutions. In all these aspects, 
an awareness of the history of philosophical arguments can help our understanding of 
why things are the way they are and our imaginings of how they could be otherwise. If it 
is admitted that philosophy can help in our understanding of the world’s diversity, 
‘speaking not just of a diversity of people, but of a diversity of ideas’, then ‘philosophy 
has value to those learning about the world, especially those that are new to the world, 
i.e., children’ (Thornton & Burgh, 2019, p. 235). It follows that philosophy cannot be 
ignored as an educational methodology. This has already been recognised by UNESCO 
which, in its 2007 study, Philosophy, a School of Freedom, states: ‘If there is a message 
to be conveyed by this study, it would certainly [be] that of exhorting us to consider the 
teaching of philosophy to be necessary and something to be reckoned with’ (p. xii). A 
forerunner in the field of educational philosophy is Philosophy for Children: 
 
Philosophy for children (P4C) is recognised as an exemplary educational 
philosophy used in school classrooms around the world, comprising 
purpose written classroom materials and an educational method that 
develops thinking within the context of group dialogue about 
philosophical issues. Central to P4C is the community of inquiry (COI), 
which uses collaborative pedagogical methods based upon theories of 
socio-cognitive learning. It is a learning community which can be used to 
challenge the ontological, epistemological and axiological underpinnings 
of the cultural context within which the school, and the knowledge it 
transmits through established disciplines and allocated texts and resources, 
is embedded. (Thornton & Burgh, 2019, p. 235) 
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But whilst philosophy can be used to disrupt school, can we say that philosophy itself is 
without biases? Moreover, what can be said of the community of inquiry pedagogy? 
 
Philosophy is not epistemically or methodologically neutral but, rather, 
akin to other subjects, is a value laden cultural artefact and not separate 
from cultural discourse. However, philosophy as practice, such as in a 
COI, has the potential for self-critique. To maintain an attitude of 
falliblism toward our own biases and prejudices (those things we think not 
to question) is one of philosophy’s greatest strengths. In a COI this can be 
applied to facilitate students’ understanding of the world’s diversity of 
ideas. (Thornton & Burgh, 2019, p. 235) 
 
However, we must also be mindful of what we mean by ‘philosophy’, as philosophy can 
mean different things to different people, and many philosophical traditions are not only 
critical of themselves but of other traditions. A not uncommon view is that philosophy is 
an analytic pursuit in the mainstream Western tradition ‒ focusing on language and 
standards of conceptual clarity and careful and rigorous testing of philosophical 
hypothesis using argument and counterargument. San MacColl (1994) refers to this 
tradition as the dominant tradition of Anglo-American academic philosophy, epitomised 
by Oxbridge analytic philosophers. However, she is quick to point out that it would be a 
mistake to think of analytic philosophy as the only variety of philosophy. 
 
Philosophy is not unified as a single practice and it is inaccurate to speak 
about philosophy in general terms as if it were. To do so is to overlook the 
variety in philosophy that occurs with the European, Eastern or African 
traditions, or even the divergence within the Anglo-American world such 
as we find in the American pragmatist tradition. (p. 5) 
 
In an Australian context, we must include the philosophical traditions and contemporary 
voices of Australian Aboriginal peoples as an indigenous tradition not mentioned by 
MacColl. I will speak more of philosophy’s exclusion of indigenous philosophies later in 
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this chapter. For the moment, it is enough to say that Philosophy for Children offers a 
framework from which to develop inclusive pedagogical strategies. 
 
Matthew Lipman, together with Ann Margaret Sharp, developed Philosophy for Children, 
an educational philosophy comprising a curriculum that included a series of philosophical 
stories-as-text (novels) with accompanying teacher manuals, and a pedagogy they 
referred to as the community of inquiry, also known as the community of philosophical 
inquiry. They drew primarily on Peirce’s notion of a community of inquirers and Dewey’s 
educational theory and practice. Both Sharp and Lipman heralded P4C as an exemplar of 
democratic practice, due to its emphasis on dialogic inquiry as a form of communal self-
correction which they believed necessary for critical citizenship. Moreover, it fitted 
Dewey’s (1916) description of democracy as ‘primarily a form of associated living, a 
conjoint communicated experience’ (p. 93). In other words, ‘philosophy can promote 
democracy, insofar as philosophical inquiry is an exemplar of the kind of deliberative 
inquiry required for informed and active democratic decision-making’ (Burgh, 2018, p. 
39); or put another way, it is a potential candidate to facilitate democratic correctiveness. 
Thus, the philosophical content of P4C and its methodology is thought to be liberating, 
freeing the child from traditional dogmatic forms of education. However, the colonising 
effect of philosophy can itself be questioned. 
 
The participants in the great dialogue of western philosophy, which 
extends now some two and a half thousand years into the past, have been 
almost entirely male, white and drawn from the privileged sections of 
society. That they have not seen this as relevant to their philosophical 
pursuits indicates how much they have spoken of and for one another, and 
how incompletely they have, despite their pretensions as philosophers to 
press the ultimate questions, critically examined themselves and their 
political relationship to the world about them. (Plumwood, 1993a, p. viiii)   
 
It should be noted that Lipman and Sharp were not ignorant of such criticism of 
philosophy. Sharp wrote extensively on feminism (see de la Garza, 2017 for an overview), 
and Lipman (2008) was critical of reductive philosophy, writing in his autobiography A 
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Life Teaching Thinking: ‘trying to teach thinking by teaching a few individual cognitive 
skills is like teaching someone to play the piano by instructing the student in piano 
technique using a single key or a single finger’ (p. 149). Questions, however, have been 
raised as to the extent to which the dominant narratives of democracy have been critiqued, 
or at least seriously questioned by scholars of P4C. Hell Rainville (2001), for example, 
writes: ‘I have yet to read a paper in the growing body of Philosophy for Children 
literature which acknowledges the ways in which our so-called democratic institutions 
have arisen out of, and continue to perpetuate, the political, economic and ideological 
repression of Native North Americans’ (p. 66). Rainville’s objection is particularly 
relevant to my thesis and, thus I will return to it in greater detail in the next chapter. Others 
have questioned the role of the teacher in inquiry (see Burgh & Thornton, 2015, 2016a, 
2016b; Kohan, et al., 2017; Oliverio, 2017), still more have problematised the concept of 
childhood within education (see Kennedy & Kohan, 2017), and the unquestioned 
normativity of the materials used (see Murris, 2016; Chetty, 2014). Yet, it can be said that 
these critiques open new paths, to provide opportunities to develop diverse approaches to 
the community of inquiry pedagogy and inclusion of different traditions of philosophy in 
curriculum materials. Such critical work is a hallmark of philosophy, and the plurality of 
criticisms are signs of a healthy, engaged, and global philosophical community.  
 
This chapter introduces Philosophy for Children and the community of inquiry, 
considered by many to be an exemplary model of educational philosophy, that is, 
philosophy functioning educationally (Lipman, 2008; UNESCO, 1998). It also looks at 
the ways in which, in the Australian context, Philosophy for Children has broadened its 
approach to philosophy. In the section entitled ‘Philosophising with Children’ I provide 
an overview, on which I expand in the section ‘Modelling Inquiry’ to highlight its 
pragmatist underpinnings. I then, once more, focus on the history of Australia, this time 
to reflect on the implications that arise from practice and on the ways in which Australia 
has broadened discussions on philosophy in schools. I situate my discussion in 
contemporary global issues relevant to education and schooling: (1) feminism, gender 
stereotyping, bias and language, (2) Aboriginal philosophy (3) environmental philosophy 
and environmental education, and (4) sexuality, adolescence and discrimination. 
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Philosophising with Children 
 
The presence of philosophy in schools is centuries old, and the history of philosophy as 
an agent for social change is even older. Indeed, Socrates was, arguably, sentenced to 
death by hemlock for philosophy’s ability to disrupt established social and moral 
practices, seen at the time as corrupting the youth of ancient Athens. It was this aspect of 
philosophy that Lipman and Sharp sought to develop, as Gregory, Haynes & Murris, 
(2017) explain: 
 
Unlike others experimenting with ‘pre-college philosophy’ at the time, 
who saw schools as a place to do philosophy with young people, Lipman 
and Sharp saw doing philosophy as an ideal of the educational experience, 
even capable of transforming education more broadly. Toward that agenda 
they each wrote a number of philosophical novels for children and 
teenagers … (p. xxvi) 
 
Lipman and Sharp recognised both philosophy’s danger and its potential. Whilst their 
model for practicing philosophy with children in an educational setting is not the only 
one, it is unique in its emphasis on philosophy’s ability to reconstruct education, and 
hence, society. In 1969, Lipman wrote Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery, the first in a series 
of novels, or purpose-written philosophical stories-as-text, for the P4C curriculum, which 
also includes accompanying teacher instruction manuals with leading ideas, discussion 
plans, and exercises, to stimulate classroom discussion through an inquiry-based 
pedagogy grounded in dialogue on philosophical issues. I will discuss the relevance of 
the curriculum materials later, but for the moment, I will focus on the COI.  
 
The community of inquiry is founded on the claim that deliberative and collaborative 
communities are exceptional in their ability to foster critical, creative, and caring thinking, 
leading to sounder reasoning, understanding, and judgment. This claim is supported by a 
growing amount of empirical evidence (Lipman, 1998, p. 278; Millett, Scholl & Tapper, 
2019). Recently, some well-designed research studies have concentrated on cognitive 
benefits, for example, thinking skills, and social benefits (Millett & Tapper, 2012). An 
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analysis of eighteen studies by Garcia-Moriyon, Robello and Colom (2005) concluded 
that ‘the implementation of P4C led to an improvement in students’ reasoning skills of 
more than half a standard deviation’ (p. 19). Studies by Topping and Trickey concluded 
that the practice of philosophical inquiry in primary and secondary classrooms produces 
increases in measured IQ, sustained cognitive benefits, and clear performance gains in 
other school studies (Trickey & Topping 2004, 2006, 2007; Topping & Trickey 2007a, 
2007b, 2007c). Australian research has shown the potential for philosophical inquiry to 
foster pedagogical transformation (Scholl, Nichols & Burgh 2008, 2009, 2014), more 
effective learning in the science classroom (Burgh & Nichols 2012; Nichols, Burgh & 
Kennedy, 2017), and the reconstruction of thinking (Burgh, Thornton & Fynes-Clinton, 
2018). Further research is also currently being conducted though the UNESCO Chair 
‘Practice of Philosophy with Children’ project carried out by the University of Nantes, 
supported by the University of Angers’ research program EnJeu[x]’ (Chirouter & 
Vannier, 2017, p. 111). According to the goals of the UNESCO Chair, 
 
the practice of philosophy with children promotes the understanding of 
community: highlighting reasons as the link that unites humanity, beyond 
their individual differences, and allows intercultural dialogue. Philosophy 
allows children to see that everyone—even beyond their own 
communities—ask themselves the same questions, although the answers 
are multiple and plural. Teaching philosophy from an early age, bears not 
only pedagogical, but, more importantly, political implications to serve a 
democratic society. This is the reason for UNESCO’s support for the 
philosophical practices with children. (p. 114)  
 
In practice, the classroom community of inquiry usually begins with students gathered 
face-to-face in a circle, so that communication can be facilitated as the teacher and 
students can see and hear each other better. The students then read from a selected 
stimulus, traditionally philosophical story-as-text or, more recently, picture book or other 
children’s stories (although a range of approaches to stimulus materials is possible, as 
discussed later) which introduces a curious, puzzling or disagreeable situation to stimulate 
student’s thinking. The purpose is: 
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As a group the students identify problems through the generation of 
questions based on what each of the students find problematic. Following 
on they offer suggestions in response to a central question by expressing 
their opinions, exploring ideas, stating conjectures and generating 
hypotheses in order to find possible answers, solutions or explanations. 
This leads to the analysing of concepts and use of reasoning to develop 
arguments, in order to gain deeper understanding of the problems, issues 
or topics into which students are inquiring. (Burgh & Nichols, 2012, p. 
1050) 
 
The teacher’s role is that of facilitator and co-inquirer, rather than an all-knowing 
expert. 
 
The teacher’s role is to facilitate the substantive discussion through the use 
of open-ended questioning and the introduction of exercises, discussion 
plans and other classroom activities that compel students to inquiry further 
and to connect their questions with the philosophical questions of the 
tradition. Only after such a thorough investigation is the community of 
students ready to evaluate their thinking and to bring their deliberations to 
closure. (Burgh & Nichols, 2012, p. 1050) 
 
In the early 1970s, Lipman was invited to develop Philosophy for Children at Montclair 
State College (now Montclair State University) in New Jersey, USA, where he met Sharp, 
and soon thereafter, in 1974, founded the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for 
Children (IAPC). Sharp, who remained a lifelong collaborator with Lipman, was to have 
a great influence on the development of both the practical and theoretical aspects of the 
methodology.77 Lipman (2008) described Sharp’s arrival as ‘a blessing to both myself 
and the institute’ (p. 124). Indeed, it was Sharp who first proposed the idea of teacher 
instruction manuals to be used in conjunction with the novels. The novels are intended to 
be the child’s window into the philosophical tradition, and the manual, the teacher’s 
                                                 
77 For a recent look at Sharp’s contributions see Gregory & Laverty (2018). 
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equivalent—designed to aid teachers in facilitating philosophical discussion within the 
classroom. 
 
The novels embed philosophy into everyday conversations about issues familiar to 
children, and act as stimuli over which children, and not solely adults, have control: ‘it is 
their story and they use it to set an agenda for discussion and philosophical inquiry’ 
(Sharp, in Naji, 2017, p. 43) The inclusion of child characters engaged in philosophical 
dialogue with other children and adults, is said to allow the novels to act as models of 
philosophical practice. Just as Plato’s dialogues are considered by many to be the epitome 
of philosophical dialogue, in the philosophy in schools’ community Lipman’s novels are 
still considered by many to be ‘the gold standard for Philosophy for Children story 
materials’ (Cam in Naji, 2013, p.157). Indeed, ‘the complete IAPC curriculum has been 
translated into scores of different languages and dialects’ (Gregory, 2012a, p. 198). In 
tribute to Lipman, Philip Cam (2011) has this to say: 
 
Lipman’s philosophical novels for children, such as Elfie, Pixie, Kio and 
Gus and Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery have been seminal works, which 
have been translated into many languages and used in schools in many 
parts of the world. At the same time, they have inspired philosophers and 
educators in other parts of the world to write other materials. That the work 
he commenced is being continued by other hands, who continue to 
experiment within the paradigm that he created, shows that he has left us 
a living legacy. (p. 118). 
 
Lipman’s and Sharp’s legacies are expansive, as Gregory, Haynes and Murris (2017) 
note: ‘Today, Philosophy for Children is practiced, interpreted, debated, researched and 
recreated in more than 60 countries around the world’ (p. xxi). In his autobiography, 
Lipman (2008) proved cognisant of the desire for different countries to appropriate 
Philosophy for Children to reflect their own culture.  
 
Each nation is looking for an educational approach that reflects its own 
experience and is therefore in a sense autobiographical. They see 
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Philosophy for Children as an approach that welcomes their appropriation 
of it, so that in time it will come to be seen as indigenous78 and natural, as 
if it had sprung full-grown from the local culture and its component 
traditions. (p. 145) 
 
Historically, Australian teachers, however, have for the most part abandoned the novels 
in favour of their own stimulus materials, usually children’s picture books (Burgh & 
Thornton, 2016c, 2017). On the other hand, the teacher instruction manuals have proven 
to be the most popular and long lived in terms of continued usage. Susan Wilks (2019), 
who conducted one of the earliest studies on the effectiveness of the curriculum materials 
in Australian schools, writes; ‘Classroom trialing found that the exercises in the IAPC 
manuals provided a supportive structure for teachers using other stimulus materials to 
tease out philosophical issues together with helpful guidance for modeling questioning 
and discussion techniques’ (p. 98). Many of the existing picture books selected drew on 
aspects of the philosophical tradition, yet, regardless of the philosophical content, unlike 
the IAPC novels, there was no modelling of philosophical dialogue. Modelling, as we 
shall see in the next section, was thought by Lipman and Sharp to be a cornerstone of the 
program. 
 
Since 1991, a plethora of new and diverse materials have emerged in Australia, including 
purpose-written short stories, picture books and teacher instruction manuals (Burgh & 
Thornton, 2016c, 2017), and will likely continue to be produced (Burgh & Thornton, 
2017a). The move away from the story-as-text novels indicative of the IAPC curriculum 
materials, undertaken in Australia and other countries, was, however, questioned and 
cautioned by both Lipman and Sharp. 
 
Even though some might believe that approaching philosophical issues 
through traditional literature is easier than working from these purpose 
written novels and manuals, I suspect that it is more likely to be the other 
way around. In most countries, teachers are not prepared in the art and 
craft of philosophical inquiry. To explore the philosophical dimension of 
                                                 
78 The claim that it will one day be seen as indigenous is problematic. as I will later explain. 
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literature, and teaching children to do the same, requires an expertise that 
cannot be taken for granted, especially given the complexity of a good 
piece of literature. (Sharp in Naji, 2017, p. 46) 
 
Sharp’s words point to the over-riding question of how best to make philosophical 
progress in the classroom, a question that is still contentious and to which there are 
multiple answers. Her words issued in an ongoing debate about the need for adequate 
philosophical teacher training, and the criteria for the selection of stimulus material. As 
the history of philosophy in schools in Australia illustrates, what counts in the tradition 
of Philosophy for Children has broadened since Lipman wrote his first purpose written 
philosophy-as-text Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery.  
 
What was once called Philosophy with Children has developed into a sub-
discipline of philosophy with its own history, traditions and pedagogy and 
incorporates philosophical inquiry in the classroom, reflective education 
and Socratic dialogue through the use of the Community of Inquiry (CoI) 
methodology.79 
 
Although what is defined as ‘philosophy in schools’ in Australia is the use of 
collaborative philosophical inquiry as a classroom method for engaging students in 
philosophical dialogue, there is still much room for discussion regarding what constitutes 
a philosophy curriculum and what counts as a community of inquiry.  
 
Around the world, different ways of doing philosophy with children have been 
established. Diverse approaches have emerged from different educational needs and 
social, cultural and political contexts.  
 
Subsequently, the term ‘philosophy in schools’ is often used to capture 
these divergent approaches, stemming from P4C, also referred to as 
‘philosophy with children’, ‘philosophy with children and adolescents’, 
and ‘philosophy for young people’. In addition to P4C and the divergent 
                                                 
79 From: https://www.ojs.unisa.edu.au/index.php/jps/index 
170 
 
approaches and practices that have developed from it – such as the 
community of philosophical inquiry (CoPI) method developed by 
Catherine McCall that emphasises rigorous logical argumentation – 
alternatives which fall outside of the P4C umbrella include: Socratic 
Dialogue by Leonard Nelson which focuses on critical philosophy, 
following the thinking of Immanuel Kant and Jakob Fries; the Continental 
Community of Inquiry by Matthew Del Nevo  in which children 
concentrate on original philosophical texts; and Oscar Brenifier’s method 
of Socratic maieutics. (Burgh & Thornton, 2019b, p. 2).  
 
What is common to all these ‘school philosophy’ approaches to education ‘is that they 
aim to engage school students in philosophical dialogue’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2019b, p. 
2). The potential for different and diverse philosophical approaches to inform pedagogy 
or the design of Philosophy curricula has implications for teacher professional 
development and teacher training programs in philosophy; on how to use different ways 
to do philosophy with children, topics I will return to in greater detail later. 
 
In the next section, I provide an overview of Philosophy for Children’s pragmatist’s 
underpinnings, followed by Lipman’s and Sharp’s arguments as to the importance of the 
curriculum materials, arguments that are still being made by proponents of the philosophy 
in schools movement in Australia (see Burgh & Thornton, 2019a). 
 
What it means to inquire 
 
American Pragmatists, most notably Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, feature 
largely in the heritage of P4C. According to Lipman (2004), ‘Philosophy for Children is 
built unapologetically on Deweyan foundations’ (p. 8). However, Dewey, himself an 
educational philosopher did not think to adapt philosophy to pre-college classrooms. As 
Lipman (1988) put it:  
 
Not even Dewey, easily the most insightful of all philosophers of 
education, could bring himself to advocate philosophy as an elementary 
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school subject, but that was because he had already committed himself to 
rebuilding education along the lines of scientific inquiry. (p. 12) 
 
Like Dewey, Peirce’s notion of scientific inquiry is best explained as communities of 
discipline-based inquiry engaged in the construction of knowledge. Integral to his 
scientific logic of inquiry is the development of abilities to rigorously ‘engage in the 
theories and practices of discipline-based communities of inquiry so as to become 
informed by the norms of the disciplines’ in order to ‘aspire to competence within the 
disciplines’, but also ‘to develop habits of self-correction for reconstructing those same 
norms when faced with novel problems and solutions’ (Burgh & Nichols, 2011, pp. 1046‒
1047).  Indeed, it was Peirce who started Dewey on the path of extending Peirce’s original 
scientific logic of inquiry and applying it to a broader social context, to larger social 
concerns, and to education. As Pardales and Girod, (2006) point out, Peirce thought a 
community necessary to 
 
subject our thinking to standards that lie outside of our own interests, 
concerns, and reflections. In this way, thinking must continually be subject 
to a community whose standards allow us to correct and revise our ideas 
in the course of living our lives. (p. 302) 
 
Peirce’s influence on the development of Lipman’s educational theory and practice, 
especially his notion of converting the classroom into a community of inquiry, comes 
indirectly through Lipman’s reading of what he referred to as Dewey’s pedagogical 
criteria and his collaboration with Sharp who coined the term ‘community of inquiry’, 
which first appeared in an article the two co-authored in 1978 in the Oxford Review of 
Education (Burgh & Thornton, 2016b, p. 165). However, the impetus to adapt Philosophy 
for Children came from Lipman’s tenure as a professor at Columbia University in the city 
of New York, which he professed opened his eyes to his students’ lack of capacity for 
wonder and to grasp the basic tenets of critical reasoning.  
 
Many adults have ceased to wonder, because they feel that there is no time 
for wondering, or because they have come to the conclusion that it is simply 
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unprofitable and unproductive to engage in reflection about things that cannot 
be changed anyhow. Many adults have never had the experience of engaging 
in wondering and reflecting that somehow made a difference in their lives. 
The result is that such adults, having ceased to question and to reach for the 
meanings of their experience, eventually become examples of passive 
acceptance that children take to be models for their own conduct. (Lipman, 
Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. 31, italics added) 
 
Subsequently, embedded in the IAPC novels is a selection of philosophical ideas chosen 
for their propensity to provoke thinking and wonderment in children. Lipman (2014) 
contended that the dialogue in the novels would act as a model for philosophical inquiry.  
 
The modelling role of the text is of enormous importance. If our aim is to 
get children to do philosophy, then the text should provide a model of 
children doing philosophy. If our aim is to get children to reason together, 
explore concepts in an illuminating way, build on one another’s ideas and 
strengthen their judgment through thoughtful deliberation, then we must 
provide texts that depict children doing these very things. If we think it 
important that children’s opinions, values and enactments be well-
reasoned, then we should have them read and discuss stories in which 
fictional children aspire to and work towards precisely these outcomes. (p. 
11) 
 
If we extend Lipman’s concerns to classroom practice, to the teacher at the chalkface, 
then we can draw the conclusion that children’s interests, curiosity and sense of wonder 
are also dependent on the teacher’s ability to model philosophical wonder. The classroom 
and the children that inhabit it are a big part of the teacher’s habitat, their understanding 
of it can, therefore, also be problematised. To be a part of and a model for philosophical 
inquiry, teachers need to question their own understanding of the world so that they, 
themselves, are disposed to be perplexed or inquisitive about the stimulus material and 
the children’s dialogue. In this way, teachers become exemplars of wonder that children 
take to be models for their own conduct. The following is an example from an inquiry on 
the topic of best friends, lead and described by Sharp (1986):  
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At the end of the hour and 15 minutes, they gave me a big clap. 
'Who did all the work?' I asked. 
'We did', they answered. 
'But you gave us some help', Marion said. 
'Did I?' I asked. 
'You read us the story and let us talk about best friends', Marion said. 
'Yes. But who should get the hand-clapping?' 
'All of us', they answered in chorus. And they clapped again with 
enthusiasm, this time for themselves. (p. 191) 
 
The importance of the role of teacher cannot be overstated, and the move toward a more 
egalitarian relationship between teacher and students stands in contrast to the more 
traditional authoritarian role of the teacher. Underlying this shift is a shift in the 
understanding of knowledge production, that is, in the epistemology of educational 
theory. P4C’s pragmatist epistemological underpinnings contrast with authoritarian forms 
of knowledge as something fixed and static to be delivered and deposited into the child’s 
head, so aptly described by Freire’s (2009b) banking concept of education; under a 
banking model ‘knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves 
knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing. Projecting an absolute 
ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education 
and knowledge as processes of inquiry’ (p. 164).  
 
Pragmatist epistemology does away with the fixed and static, as Richard Rorty (2000) 
explains: ‘The image of human beings clearing away appearances so as to glimpse reality, 
thereby getting in touch with something fixed and determinate which has been there all 
the time, can be dispensed with’ (p. 819). A pragmatist teacher is, as Kohan (2017) puts 
it, ‘a teacher-as-improvising-philosopher’ (p. 259). For the ‘freedom of philosophizing is 
guaranteed by the improvisational nature of dialogue, which transforms the monologue 
of traditional teaching into an ex improvise polyphony, one which emerges without 
planning, and which does not delimit the direction and meaning of action in advance’ (p. 
258). It is Philosophy for Children’s pragmatic shift in epistemology that I argue is most 
significant and holds the most potential in terms of social justice. As Jennifer Glaser 
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(2018) explains, the very commitment to practice COI is a political one. Sharp writes: ‘In 
a real sense it is a commitment to freedom, open debate, pluralism, self-government and 
democracy’ (Sharp in Glaser, 2018, p. 217). However, like philosophy, democracy can 
have multiple meanings, and as Kohan (2018) points out, it is in need of elaboration (p. 
2).  
 
Bleazby (2007) attributes the ability of the community of inquiry to reject such traditional 
banking models of education to Dewey’s influence. She writes:  
 
Like psychologist Lev Vygotsky, and fellow pragmatist’s Charles Sanders 
Peirce and George Herbert Mead, Dewey argues that thinking is the 
internalization of social processes. Thus, in order to think for oneself, one 
must be a member of a community. However, for Dewey, only an open, 
pluralistic and inquiring community can provoke reflective thinking, 
autonomy and personal growth. Such communities are what Dewey calls 
democracies. (pp. 30–31) 
 
When such open, pluralistic, thinking is present, it is argued the classroom becomes a 
microcosm for democratic education, reflecting a deliberative community as an 
associated form of life (Burgh, 2010). For Lipman, following Dewey, the development 
of the capacities for creative, caring, critical, reflective and pluralistic thinking in children 
is important not only for educational aims but for the creation and maintenance of 
democracy; a self-correcting communal inquiry as an associated form of living. 
According to Burgh (2010), ‘[d]emocracy in its fully fledged form as a way of life c[an] 
only be obtained through a civil society comprised of citizens with the capacity for fully-
formed opinion’ (p. 66). He argues that the development of the capacities of critical, 
creative, and caring thinking through communities of inquiry, which leads to sound 
reasoning, understanding and judgment is, therefore, vital for creating democratic 
citizens.  
 
The community of inquiry is said to develop such citizens through an emphasis on 
experiential learning. By placing children in sight of problems designed to foster the 
exploration and examination of their own and each other’s reactions to them, they come 
to understand that a multiplicity of thinking is possible. This multiplicity is assumed and 
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said to allow the children the opportunity to construct, deconstruct and reconstruct their 
thinking and, in doing so, lessen resistance to difference. However, the assumption of 
multiplicity can easily be problematised and has been by numerous authors. As Darren 
Chetty (2014) argues: 
 
Whilst Lipman claims to have “neutralized” the “godlike power of the 
author” in his philosophical novels, this has been strongly questioned by 
Kohan (1995), and Rainville (2000), both of whom argue that it is not 
neutral to ignore the foundations of systematic discrimination and the 
ways institutions have arisen out of and continue to perpetuate the 
repression of minoritized groups. (p. 15) 
 
Murris (2016b) adds that the traditional ‘P4C curriculum is evaluative and prescriptive 
(in the sense of what counts as philosophy and what needs to be appropriated by the 
learners) and therefore normative’ (p. 67). Doing away with the characters in the purpose 
written stories-as-text, Murris argues, frees children from the normative pressures of 
aspiring to the ideal ‘adult philosopher’s child’ (p. 63). Further, Chetty (2014) notes that 
‘the selection of a text will itself steer a discussion, inasmuch that it will make some ideas 
more likely and others less likely to be explored’ (p. 25). I will return to these criticisms 
in the next chapter. It should be noted, however, that in the 1990s, feminists in Australia 
(as well as overseas) had foreseen the problem of bias in the P4C curriculum and what 
counts as philosophy, as well as other proponents of philosophy in schools noting related 
issues, such as stereotyping, bias in language, racism and indigenous education, sexuality, 
and discrimination, as well as environmental philosophy. It is to these issues that I turn to 
in the next section. 
 
Australian Critiques of P4C: A review80 
 
In this section, I briefly discuss Australian critiques of P4C, in the following areas: (1) 
feminism, gender stereotyping, bias and language, (2) Aboriginal philosophy (3) 
                                                 
80 The ideas in this section appear in slightly modified form in Thornton and Burgh (2019), and, have, 
therefore, not been cited. In some cases where passages have been cited (for example, above), this indicates 
the ideas were written specifically for the book chapter, and are included to contextualise the ideas presented 
here, which are attributable to either Burgh or both authors. 
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environmental philosophy and environmental education, and (4) sexuality, adolescence and 
discrimination.  
 
Gender and the Philosophy for Children Classroom 
 
MacColl was an early proponent of both feminist engagement with philosophy and with 
P4C. She was active in her promotion of women in the field and in 1982 she, along with 
Marion Tapper, Genevieve Lloyd, and Barbara Roxon, tabled an Australian Association 
of Philosophy (AAP) report, ‘[t]o investigate the special problems concerning women in 
the philosophy profession’, with a follow up report in 1991 she co-authored with Denise 
Russell. The report states: ‘As women begin to develop a presence in Philosophy, it is 
only to be expected that the maleness of Philosophy’s past, and with it the maleness of 
the ideals of Reason, should begin to come into focus’ (MacColl, et al. in Hutchinson & 
Jenkins 2013, p. 150).  
 
In the USA, Sharp had long made the connection between feminism and Philosophy for 
Children . In 1991 she wrote: ‘There is something wonderful, yet shocking, about waking 
up one morning and finding yourself in the midst of feminism in philosophy and 
Philosophy for Children’ (Sharp 1991, p. 42). The shock was due to the distance between 
one of her first experiences talking of philosophy and the reality she found herself living 
at the time of her writing. The first experience was a conversation with a nun, her math 
teacher: ‘“You're a woman and you teach math,” I said. (I had also thought I might want 
to become a math professor.) “I teach math. That's not the same thing as being a 
mathematician. And you might be able to teach philosophy, but women don't become 
philosophers”’ (p. 43). It would be desirable if such attitudes toward women had vanished 
and feminism were no longer needed, but this is not the case.  
 
In 1992, Sharp wrote to women involved in Philosophy for Children ‘asking if they would 
like to collaborate on a project that would speak to the issue of feminism and children’s 
philosophy’ (Sharp 1994, p. 2). The result was a special double issue, ‘Women, Feminism 
and Philosophy for Children’, in Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, which 
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she edited. There were twenty-two contributors from around the world,81 with six from 
Australia: San MacColl, Sarah Redshaw, Jennifer Glaser, Felicity Haynes, Christina 
Slade, and Megan Laverty. Later, in 1997, Sharp edited a second issue, which included 
Terri Field, among nine other international contributors.82 For Sharp, both volumes were 
opportunities to bring together women with strong interests in both children doing 
philosophy and women doing philosophy.  
 
Broadly speaking, the main concern for women was the relationship of Philosophy for 
Children to emerging theoretical issues in feminist philosophy, specifically feminist 
criticisms of philosophy’s putative neutrality. MacColl (1994) puts it succinctly: 
 
A way of putting the general problem about Philosophy for women is that 
it is deeply and thoroughly imbued with an implicitly male orientation 
masked in various ways as abstract, universal or neutral. This orientation 
infects its ideals, its argumentation, its issues, its methodology and its 
limitations. (p. 7) 
 
Relating this concern to Philosophy for Children and classroom practice, she asks ‘would 
you wish on women or small girls a practice of philosophy which you yourself have come 
to see as deeply imbued with disguised, gendered ideals and associations?’ (p. 6). 
MacColl’s question expresses well the concerns of feminists interested in the 
philosophical education of children. However, these concerns have affected each 
differently, raising different questions on different aspects of being a woman advocating 
P4C.  
 
Field (1995) noted a general lack of feminist analysis in Philosophy for Children. 
Expressing similar concerns to those of MacColl, Field asks: ‘What constitutes 
knowledge in the Philosophy for Children program?’ to which she responds with a 
feminist critique of reason, following Plumwood, to assess P4C and its goals of 
reasonableness. Traditional philosophy with its established dichotomies (for example, 
mind/body, reason/emotion, masculinity/femininity, subjectivity/objectivity) devalues 
                                                 
81 Contributors were from Australia, USA, Portugal, Argentina, Russia, Mexico, Bulgaria, Canada, Spain, 
Switzerland, The Netherlands, and Brazil. 
82 Contributions came from USA, Argentina, Singapore, and Israel. 
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and excludes the somatic, affective and imaginative from philosophical investigation, and 
constructs practical barriers for women to partake in philosophy so conceived. Like 
MacColl, Field stresses that P4C is not characteristic of western philosophy, particularly 
the kind of disembodied reasoning that Australian feminist philosopher Genevieve Lloyd 
(1993) refers to in her book: The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western 
Philosophy. Her claim is that the community of inquiry can alleviate masculine and other 
epistemic biases because it appeals to a deliberative rather than adversarial method of 
questioning and reasoning. However, she cautions that theory may not so easily translate 
into classroom practice, as biases are prevalent in societal attitudes, values, beliefs and 
practices, teachers are unlikely to so readily leave them at the classroom door. To address 
this issue requires ‘empirical studies of what is actually happening in the classrooms 
practicing Philosophy for Children’ (Field 1997, p. 22). To date, no published studies of 
this kind are available. 
 
Redshaw (1994), too, expressed concern over the role of reason in Philosophy for 
Children, arguing for ‘concretizing reasoning as a bodily experience, not just a mental 
one’ (p. 9). She points out that children enjoy movement and that ‘there is some reason 
to believe that movement is significant to learning’ (p. 9). Unlike the disembodied 
philosophy Field criticises, for Redshaw, collaborative philosophical inquiry ‘cultivates 
thought as concrete, as connected to everyday experience’ (p. 9). This kind of 
‘phenomenological understanding’, she contends, ‘is central to the self-consciousness 
required in the development of complex levels of thought, [and] is intimately related to 
the body’ (p. 9). By children drawing on their imagination and associated experiences, 
and reflecting on both, which she argues the traditional IAPC curriculum provides 
because it relates to real issues in the everyday lives of children embodied in narratives 
of the characters in the novels, ‘[r]easoning is alive and can be developed in children in 
connection with their awareness’ (p. 13). Like philosophy, there are different ways to 
reason, and as Redshaw states, ‘[r]easoning combined with a sense of the concrete 
experience of things is invaluable in an ethical understanding’ (p. 14).  
 
Glaser (1994), too, wrote on lived experience in education. She reminds us that children 
are engaged in gender construction from birth, and as children learn from their 
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interactions with others, she argues it is essential to create an educational environment in 
which equality of the sexes is modelled. Despite Australian legislation and government 
media campaigns for equality at the time, there continued ‘to be a gap between the static 
“theory” or equal opportunity and the dynamic “practice” of gender construction’ (p. 15). 
To fill this gap, Glaser asserts that if students, like the children in Lipman’s novels, were 
provided with living experiences of equality, this could enable ‘them to perceive 
themselves and each other in ways other than according to traditional gender roles’ (p. 
15). The community of inquiry, she argues, can provide such an experience as it ‘provides 
an environment in which a number of traditional gender dualisms break down—where 
reason and intuition are not necessarily seen in opposition; where emotional responses 
provide valid material for reflection and can be taken as seriously as logic’ (p. 16). 
Through direct engagement with others in collaborative dialogue, children encounter 
interdependence that has the potential ‘to bridge the dichotomy which exists when gender 
difference is seen in terms of differentiation and objectifications by transforming it into 
one of direct association and engagement’ (p. 17). 
 
Haynes (1994) draws attention to male dominance and the mastery of reason, particularly, 
the separation of language and logic as a problematic binary. She argues that the 
combination of the community of inquiry and appropriate stimulus for discussion – she 
particularly refers to Lipman’s novel Harry Stotlemeier’s Discovery – can provide a 
learning environment where the presentation of formal logic is neither oppressive nor 
coercive, because logic ‘is no longer at the top of a hierarchy of developmental stages of 
child development’ (p. 22) found in the theories of, for example, Jean Piaget and 
Lawrence Kohlberg. This is so because the community of inquiry ‘does not leave the 
lived-reality behind’ (p. 23) and, therefore, contextualises reasoning rather that treats it 
as an abstraction; ‘an ongoing dialectic between abstractions, imagination and 
perceptions’ (p. 23).  
 
Slade (1994) also concentrates on Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery to address the question 
of how gender might be treated in a classroom COI. Unlike Lipman’s other novels Kio 
and Gus and Pixie, in which the main characters’ names are ambiguous as is the 
conversational style, this is not so in Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery, where Harry is 
unquestionably male. 
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His role in the text confirms the gender stereotype of males as innovative, 
analytic and “rational.” His friend, Lisa, is involved in his discoveries but 
typically plays a supporting role or raises objections which are sceptical 
of the value of the analytic technique. (p. 31) 
 
Rather than deal with the complex problem of the onus being on the text to resolve gender 
stereotyping, Slade turns to philosophical investigation to put power in the hands of 
students to question the very text they are given as stimulus. She also turns to Lloyd as a 
source for facilitating discussion through questioning the accuracy of the depictions and 
whether they should apply. She concludes that the community of inquiry, if aware of 
gender stereotyping, ‘is a technique for avoiding the worst of gender-based 
miscommunication’ (p. 32). 
 
Laverty (1994), who completed her PhD with Lloyd, argues that Philosophy for Children 
can improve the world, by which she means ‘an individual’s relationship with themself 
[sic], with others and with their environment’ (p. 73). She argues that P4C not only makes 
us aware of this essential relatedness, which itself is an ethical accomplishment, but works 
within its limits (p. 73). Like Redshaw, her focus is also on embodiment, particularly 
humans as ethical agents rather than epistemic subjects. Her starting point, like that of 
Peirce, is the Cartesian paradigm of consciousness; however, she focusses on patriarchal 
consciousness, which, she says, denies ‘alternative perspectives on reality’ and 
marginalises them ‘to the realm of subjectivity and therefore irrationality’ (p. 74). This 
denial, she says, prevents the inquirer from ‘being truly engaged and thus effected [sic] 
by otherness’ (p. 74). This otherness is then internalised, producing a ‘knower’ that is 
both separated from themselves and what is known. In the process, the knower ‘denies 
his emotions and feelings, denies that his consciousness has a particular history, and 
denies his attachment to other subjectivities’ (p. 74). Acquiring knowledge becomes ‘a 
race to appropriate the largest amount of knowledge in the shortest amount of time’ (p. 
74). Philosophy for Children, she argues, has the potential to subvert this banking 
conception of education by putting ethics at the centre through the intimate link between 
philosophy and pedagogy. Children then learn that epistemic progress is made with others 
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who may play a role in changing their beliefs, feelings, values, attitudes and allow them 
‘to experience the constitution of their identity as occurring in relationship with others’ 
(p. 76). Education thus conceived opens the possibility of ethical relatedness. 
 
In another article, Glaser (2007) talks about how the ways in which women are socially 
conditioned affects their education. She argues that women are conditioned to be passive 
and ‘to hold as tentative their status as full and equal members of the learning 
communities of which they are part. This is an issue of acquired identity not only acquired 
styles of learning’ (pp. 219–220). The acquisition of such an identity means that the 
passivity carries beyond the bounds of the classroom and into the rest of women’s lives. 
This has ramifications for democracy: ‘If women do not see themselves as active-
generative participants in the classroom, there is a good chance that they will also not see 
themselves as participants in the engaged public deliberation that is critical to a healthy 
democracy’ (p. 220). 
 
In her book, Social Reconstruction Learning, Bleazby (2013) contends that mainstream 
schooling has its basis in an ideology of hierarchical dualisms, which makes it unable to 
facilitate the kinds of social and intellectual skills and capacities necessary for democratic 
citizenship. By drawing on Dewey’s pragmatism and feminism, she not only 
reinvigorates Lipman’s pedagogy, but proposes an approach to schooling she calls ‘social 
reconstruction learning’; students engage in philosophical inquiries with members of their 
community to reconstruct real social problems to facilitate independent thinking, 
imaginativeness, emotional intelligence, autonomy, and active citizenship. Noteworthy is 
that both Bleazby and Field were influenced by Plumwood, who as we will see, also had 
an interest in P4C. Bleazby connects Plumwood’s work to education, especially to 
Dewey’s idea of collapsing dualisms, which had an impact on Lipman’s educational 
philosophy.  
 
I will pick up on some of these issues in relation to Murris’ and Chetty’s concerns raised 
above in Chapter Seven. Next, I describe P4C’s involvement in Indigenous education in 
Australia. 
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Australian Aboriginal Philosophy: Ways of knowing, being and doing 
 
As I have argued throughout this thesis, Australia, like all societies, is historically 
constructed through complex social interactions between humans and other living 
organisms and the environments in which they are embedded. Politically, Australian 
parliamentary democracy was the result of British colonisation, and Australia remains the 
only commonwealth country not to have signed a treaty with indigenous peoples. Yet, as 
previously explained, Australian colonisation is usually seen as a political event, all too 
easily relegated to the past, rather than as the ongoing imposition of epistemic and 
ontological structures (Wolfe 2006). Social and political institutions that have governed 
and continue to govern human interactions are driven largely by invisible epistemic 
frameworks, including brute force epistemologies that have colonised and dominated the 
epistemic landscape and by extension the ontological landscape. As the UNESCO study 
of the present state of teaching philosophy in the world reveals ‘Philosophy is often 
viewed as a foreign – or frankly, Western – subject’ (UNESCO 2007: 52). This points to 
the need for the inclusion of indigenous philosophy and pedagogies in the development 
of philosophy in schools in Australia; a need yet to be fulfilled. As Mary Graham (1999) 
puts it:  
 
Indigenous philosophies as well as general Western ideas should be 
taught, especially the notion of the 'reflective motive', which would help 
young people to be more contemplative. The reflective motive is a group 
process of meditating upon our collective actions and experiential 
learning; it is not a matter of individuals reflecting in a random way but of 
the collectivity reflecting on why and how we as a group act and 
experience events. This process is encouraged, via acts of sharing and 
communal living, in as natural a way as possible ie not solely as an 
intellectual exercise. The result is that the process becomes habitual and, 
at the same time, non-egocentric. (p. 108) 
 
Australian advocates of P4C took an early interest in Indigenous education. In 1991, Clive 
Lindop was appointed the first Northern Territory philosopher-in-residence, funded by 
the Commonwealth Government’s Priority Schools and Country Areas Program, with 
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support and resources from the Curriculum and Assessment Division of the Northern 
Territory Department of Education. Approximately 2400 students and 100 teachers 
participated in philosophy classes (Northern Territory Department of Education 1992: 6–
7). One of the teachers, Robert Laird, conducted the first trial of the P4C program as part 
of the Northern Territory English curriculum with Aboriginal communities at Barunga, 
which included weekly visits from Lindop.  
 
According to Laird (1993), Aboriginal children in bilingual schools were well ‘aware of 
the cultural split between home and school’ as well as the ‘difference between the western 
and Aboriginal domain in their classroom’ (p. 41).  But he thought the reasons why the 
western domain is the way it is were not always clearly articulated, having the effect of 
‘mystifying’ western thought. Laird thought P4C ‘should help to make these differences 
more explicit, by helping the children understand the underpinnings of western language 
and culture’ (p. 41‒42). He argued that Wittgenstein’s ‘notion of language as a game’, 
explained well philosophy’s ability to set out the rules of western thought, rules that he 
thought one must internalise to play ‘the game of western culture and society’ (p. 42). 
Each culture, he explained, is assumed to be a game with its own set of rules, allowing 
Aboriginal children to ‘go home or play another game, both of which require different 
rules’ (p. 42). Laird concluded that the cross-cultural education program trial 
demonstrated Philosophy for Children’s capacity to demystify western thinking by 
making it ‘explicit that learning a language is to learn a way of thinking’ (p. 43). 
According to Lindop (1995), the IAPC purpose written philosophy-as-texts were 
uniquely qualified for teaching the ‘hidden intricacies’ of the English language. However, 
as the chapter on myths of reversal shows, much more than the ‘hidden intricacies’ of the 
English language goes into mystifying western thinking and, as I argued in the last 
chapter, the solution does not lie with educating the Outsider, but with re-educating the 
Insider. The process of demystifying must start with the teacher.  
 
Notable, too, is the absence of Australian teaching materials co-created with indigenous 
peoples. A global exception is the Philosophy for Children materials ‘developed at the 
conferences for Mexico’s indigenous population, which comprises sixty-four ethnic 
groups and thousands of schoolchildren’ (UNESCO 2007: 40). Moreover, in Australia 
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like elsewhere, the Philosophy for Children literature that specifically addresses racism 
remains rare (see Chetty & Suissa, 2017, p. 11). An Australian exception is Tace 
Vigliante. Vigliante’s (2007) study surveys the educational aims of pre-service teachers, 
along with their ‘notions of social justice in relation to anti-racism education’ (p. 103). 
She thoroughly critiques both equal-share-based and merit-based notions of social justice, 
arguing that teachers who hold either views ‘will potentially perpetuate further injustices 
in society, including the injustices suffered by Aboriginal people’ (p. 105). Working from 
the claim that racism is unjust, which she points out is a claim that ‘has been well 
supported through two and a half thousand years of philosophical discussion’ (p. 106), 
she argues that ‘unless teachers have a clear notion of social justice, and more particularly 
a clear needs-based notion of social justice, as an aim of education, they will be unable to 
deliver anti-racism education effectively’ (p. 105). Her findings show that ‘[o]nly 17 per 
cent of pre-service teachers in the sample […] satisfy the necessary condition for effective 
implementation of anti-racism education’ (p. 125). Vigliante’s PhD work at the 
University of South Australia utilised the community of inquiry pedagogy. Importantly, 
Vigliante (2014) notes that ‘it is the listening to others’ experiences and positions and the 
subsequent evaluating of one’s own position whilst engaged in an inquiry that, in addition 
to the philosophical content has the potential to change attitudes and develop 
understandings required for social justice education.’ (p. 129). 
 
There is an obvious need to focus attention on indigenous pedagogies, methodologies and 
ways of knowing, co-created classrooms and school initiatives; however, such 
engagement is marred by outmoded perceptions of Australian Aboriginal cultures 
operating without sophisticated belief and knowledge systems. Recent indigenous 
scholarship turns what was historically a monologue about indigenous bodies and ways 
of assimilation into a dialogic inquiry that all educators need to engage in. According to 
Denzin, Lincoln and Smith (2008), such inquiry 
 
must be ethical, performative, healing, transformative, decolonizing, and 
participatory. It must be committed to dialogue, community, self-
determination, and cultural autonomy. It must meet people’s perceived 
needs. It must resist efforts to confine inquiry to a single paradigm or 
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interpretive strategy. It must be unruly, disruptive, critical, and dedicated 
to the goals of justice and equity. (p. 3) 
 
Only in this way can we ever truly be said to inquire with, rather than about indigenous 
peoples.  
 
Is it also worth mentioning that there are some seemingly salient 
similarities between P4C and Australian Indigenous epistemologies and 
pedagogies, such as the focus on dialogue and stories in P4C and the 
centrality of oral communication, oral histories and storytelling in 
Australian Indigenous cultures and epistemologies. Thus, many 
pedagogics and educational programs that aim to incorporate indigenous 
culture make use of discussion circles that bear some similarity to the COI.  
For example, yarning circles (Bleazby, personal correspondence, 2018).83 
 
Much more needs to be done: genuine engagement with Aboriginal communities, co-
creation with Indigenous educators, empirical research using Aboriginal research 
methodologies (see Martin, 2008; Smith, 2012), attention to epistemic injustices in the 
current professional development and training models for philosophy teachers, and 
support for more Indigenous input into curriculum development and resource materials, 
especially stories. However, an actual list would require working together with 
Indigenous communities and professionals. I also wish to stress Indigenous education is 
more than a matter of racial equality or ‘thinking about race’ regarding the selection of 
material or application of the community of inquiry pedagogy. It is, as I have argued, also 
about epistemic violence against Aboriginal ways of knowing, being and doing and 
understanding which permeates the dominant logic, and, thus, philosophy itself. I will 
address this issue further in Chapter Seven.  
 
Sexuality, Adolescence and Discrimination 
 
Haynes (1989) called for a move away from the attribution of certain traits to certain 
sexes and proposes that instead of a male female dichotomy, ‘one could redefine these as 
                                                 
83 See: https://www.qcaa.qld.edu.au/k-12-policies/aboriginal-torres-strait-islander-
perspectives/resources/yarning-circles 
186 
 
possibilities for both sexes at either end of a sociological spectrum in the middle of which 
sits the androgynous person who can combine the virtues of each when appropriate’ (p. 
20). Haynes (1999) later elaborated on this position, arguing that placing the intersex 
person in the middle of the spectrum ‘as the normative human subject, to which all 
embodied subjects conform to some degree’, creates a new cultural framework which 
‘excludes no embodied subject from cultural normativity’ (p. 198). She calls upon schools 
to recognise that the biology of sexes is much more complex than we are led to believe, 
and points to education’s ‘ethical mandate to accommodate anyone who feels 
uncomfortable with being straitjacketed into gender stereotypes’ (p. 202). In Unseen 
Genders, Beyond the Binaries, Haynes takes a step further and explores the pathologising 
effects of binary assumptions of sex and gender, male and female (Haynes & McKenna 
2001). Vicki Crowley notes that in 2002 it was the only ‘educational text addressing the 
issues at this point’ and one that presented ‘a significant intervention in gender politics in 
schooling, education and pedagogy’ (Crowley 2002: 145).  
 
In 1993 Splitter published his story, Simon, a chapter per issue, in the journal Critical & 
Creative Thinking. He prized the potential of ‘stories which model the processes of 
inquiry, using language which is readily accessible to children’ (1993a, iv), to act as 
stimulus for probing ‘questions from ethics, aesthetics and epistemology: “How should 
we live?”, “Why should we care?”, “What kind of world do we want?”, “How do we 
become persons in the world?”, “What can I know?”, “What can we know?”’ (p. iv). 
Simon is a ‘philosophical story about being the same and being different’ (p. v). Written 
at a time when HIV/AIDS was even more poorly understood than it is today, it provided 
and continues to provide teachers with an ‘interesting way of approaching a controversial 
and difficult topic in the classroom’ (1993a, v). In a similar form and format to the IAPC 
materials, the story is accompanied by leading ideas, exercises and discussion plans. The 
leading ideas include ‘HIV/AIDS’, ‘Sex, sexuality and sexual preference’ and 
‘Discrimination’, amongst others (1993b, 74). 
 
Despite the amendment to the Sex Discrimination Act in 2013 to include discrimination 
based on a person’s sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status, ‘80 per cent of 
homophobic bullying involving LGBTI young people occurs at school and has a profound 
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impact on their well-being and education’.84 Such statistics should be of concern to 
educators, and P4C advocates alike. Like feminist and indigenous concerns, societal 
attitudes toward sexuality, too, can be plagued by binaries, such as male/female, 
masculine/feminine, that manifest in epistemic violence. Moreover, all these issues can 
be more thoroughly addressed by educational policy aimed at the hidden structural bias 
and prejudices and how these issues affect all children. Indeed, I argue that they need to 
be dealt with within a framework of eco-rationality. This leads me to my next topic, 
namely, environmental education. 
 
Environmental Education: More than ecological and economic sustainability 
 
From the 1970s to the 1990s, Australian environmental philosophy influenced global 
conversations and helped shape the way environmental philosophy is done today. Early 
Australian environmental philosophy questioned our social and political identities and 
relations to self and the environment.   
 
Environmental philosophy includes in its scope all the core discourses of 
philosophy: metaphysics, our assumptions about the basic stuff and 
structure of things; epistemology, how we come to know and understand 
nature and how different epistemologies reveal different aspects of the 
natural world; aesthetics, the patterning that may or may not be taken to 
confer meaning or value on nature; and ethics, the morality of our 
treatment of living things and systems. (Mathews, 2010, pp. 543–544) 
 
In 1991 Catherine Young Silva wrote: ‘Environmental issues have become not only 
legitimate political, economic, education, technological, scientific, social and practical 
concerns; they have become crucial questions with life-or-death implications for groups 
and individuals in all walks of life and in every part of the globe’ (Young Silva 1991: 38). 
Two years earlier, she wrote85 to UNESCO on behalf of the International Council for 
Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC) to gauge their interest in ‘an ecological 
                                                 
84 Australian Human Rights Commission website: www.humanrights.gov.au/education/face-facts/face-
facts-lesbian-gay-bisexual-trans-and-intersex-people 
85 Silva, Personal Communications, 1989 (IAPC Archives). 
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ethics program based on philosophical inquiry into ecological and environmental 
themes’. The following presuppositions were included in the proposal: 
 
1. It is the one basic right of all children to discover their own personal quality and 
dignity, that of their peers and fellow human beings and of the whole world in 
which they live. 
2. It is the educational right of all children to be taught about their environment, and 
the challenges facing it today and tomorrow.  
3. It is the right of all children to understand the questions now being asked about 
their survival, the survival of life on earth and the survival of human values.  
4. Schools must make the most important discoveries of modern science about our 
environment and the most vital insights of traditional mythology, philosophy and 
culture about our place in it available to today's children in terms they can read 
and talk about for themselves.  
5. Schools must encourage children to think and inquire for themselves about the 
problems and opportunities of their different and common environments- for it is 
their destinies and birth right at stake, and their community (or lack of it) that will 
shape the future.  
6. ICPIC is an existing organization with the necessary expertise in bringing 
philosophy to children on a truly international and multicultural leve1.  
 
Proposed also was the use of IAPC novel Kio and Gus and its accompanying manual. The 
proposal is still salient today, more so given the ever-expanding literature on climate 
change. The Australian proponents of the project included Splitter, Lindop, Sue Knight 
and Peter Woolcock. Documents suggest that the projects advisory board consisted of 
influential Australian environmental philosophers, including David Bennett, Aaron Gare, 
Janna Thompson and Peter Singer, as well as Sylvan and Plumwood. In a piece written 
for the project, Plumwood notes both Australia’s contribution to greenhouse gasses and 
 
global and regional environmental problems via market involvements, 
consumption of rainforest timbers from SE Asia's threatened rainforests, 
and the offshore activities of Australian companies which exploit timber 
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and mining resources without proper safeguards in Niugini, Irian Jaya and 
elsewhere in the Pacific.86 
 
The proposal involved people from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Iceland, Mexico, Taiwan, 
and the USA. Unfortunately, little is known of the fate of the proposal other than that it 
was not successful.  
 
Notable also, is the inclusion of a symposium on ‘philosophy, society and the 
environment’ in the first national conference for Philosophy for Children and the 
Teaching of Thinking in 1991. Chaired by Sandy Yule, speakers included Sally 
Richardson from the World-Wide Fund for Nature, Peter Davson-Galle, Margaret Coady, 
and Brenda Cherednichenko. A decade or so later, Sue Knight and Carol Collins, both at 
the University of South Australia, upon noting, as Collins did in her 2004 study, that 
‘philosophical issues … [underlie] many, if not all, curriculum areas’ (p. 107), argued for 
the importance of embedding philosophy within the current learning areas and, 
controversially, suggested that doing so might well achieve more than the traditional P4C 
approach based on stand-alone lessons. Collins writes:  
 
[We] could do no better than work towards designing a functional 
educational programme that succeeds in fostering the disposition to 
engage widely in logically cogent and ethically grounded thinking; a 
programme which upholds all that Lipman and his colleagues in the 
Philosophy for Children movement have strived to achieve, yet one which 
sits within and even transforms the curriculum areas as they stand. (p. 113) 
 
Collins set out to develop such a program; one focussed on the field of social and 
environmental education, the goal of which, she writes, is ‘to develop in students the 
disposition and ability to think well about important, complex social and environmental 
issues’ (p. 114), so that they may participate fully as citizens in a just democratic society. 
She argues that to make significant progress towards this end, it is necessary, within the 
field of social and environmental education, to engage students of all ages in the processes 
                                                 
86 From unpublished communications, 1989 (personal archives). 
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of rational ethical inquiry and justification; that ‘teachers and students need to identify 
and deal with the complex ethical questions and issues embedded within the content of 
the topics they study’ (p. 116). Yet, she argues, research reveals that the Society and 
Environment learning area (in Australia at least) is driven by a strong empirical research 
emphasis, and that even where teachers consider ethical questions worth asking, they are 
loath to attempt to raise them in the classroom. 
 
Collins’ six-month intervention study involved the writing of ethical inquiry-based units 
of work encompassing environmental topics such as beaches, keeping animals in zoos, 
Antarctica and rainforests. The topics were trialled, using community of inquiry 
pedagogy, with more than two hundred South Australian upper-primary students. 
Findings indicated that ‘participation in the programme produced significant gains in 
students’ capability and readiness to engage in logically cogent and ethically grounded 
thinking’ (p.10). In addition, a qualitative analysis demonstrated the functionality of the 
program, that is, its fit with the constraints of the prevailing educational structures. 
 
My project in this thesis is to reconstruct the dualism of human/environment, and that 
‘environmental education’ should be more than children being taught about their 
environment, sustainability, and the challenges they face today and in the future. It is to 
place eco-rational thinking at the centre of identity formation; to provide children with a 
way knowing, being a doing. I am not arguing for eliminating the individual, but to put 
the individual in its place, so to speak. I will have more to say about this in Chapter Seven.  
    
Conclusion 
 
Philosophy for Children is founded on the view that theories of classroom practice, as 
well as curriculum materials and classroom resources, need to be attentive to the concerns 
of children and adolescents, and, therefore, the larger social and political issues from 
which their concerns arise. Bleazby and Slade (2019) make the following observation: 
 
The interest in such [applied] philosophy seems to mirror the myriad of 
pressing issues facing humanity (e.g., global warming, extremism and 
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terrorism, the refugee crisis, global inequality, and threats posed by 
modern technologies). Advocates of P4C ought to take advantage of this, 
emphasising P4C’s ability to foster the skills and knowledge that people 
need in order to effectively interact with such a complex, diverse, and 
rapidly changing environment (e.g., communal inquiry skills; moral 
reasoning; and theories of democracy, rights, truth, the good, justice, etc.). 
(p. 227) 
 
As one of the primary purposes of formal education and, hence, schooling, is identity 
formation, and the process of national identity-building is reflected in education policies 
and national curriculum, as well as the hidden curriculum (Anyon, 2006), the issues raised 
here – stereotyping, language and bias; Indigenous ways of knowing, being, and doing; 
relatedness to others and environment; sexual identity; ethnicity; ethics and related 
matters – are pertinent to the aims and objectives of the philosophy in school movement 
not just in Australia, but internationally. If we pay heed to Bleazby and Slade’s words, 
then how might advocates of philosophy in schools ‘effectively interact with such a 
complex, diverse, and rapidly changing environment’? In the next chapter, I argue that 
the answer lies in the ability of pragmatist epistemology to uncover classroom prejudices 
and in a community of inquiry for a lucid teacher to facilitate discussion around matters 
which will impact children’s futures, such as those outlined by Bleazby and Slade, along 
with the concerns of the many authors covered in this chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
Moral Memory: Resistance, revolt, and the voice of 
the Outsider 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Lipman (2004) has said that Philosophy for Children owes a debt to Dewey, particularly 
assigning a practical function to education in order to foster thinking rather than the 
transmission of knowledge. However, he took Dewey to task regarding assigning a practical 
function to philosophy—Dewey understood philosophy to be the theory of education, whereas 
Lipman wanted it to have a prominent place in classroom practice as the methodology of 
education. Whilst Lipman has been commended for his application of philosophy to curriculum 
and pedagogy, as we have seen, some proponents have criticised this practice on grounds of 
different forms of what could be classified as domination.  
 
In this chapter, I argue for greater attention to the role of relatedness and self in education, as 
mechanisms for correctiveness, particularly in addressing epistemic issues of domination 
within the classroom, that is, the need to be aware of epistemic violence as an issue of injustice 
in education. From the standpoint of the embedded self, an attack on a human’s relationship 
with other humans, with their history or with the non-human world enveloping them, is an 
attack on the human, on the self, and not just on an individual self but on a communal self. 
Resistance to such attacks, to such forms of violence, becomes of utmost importance to 
the survival and flourishing of both notions of self, not only in the classroom, but as 
education contributes to identity formation my concern is also its effect on the greater 
community. To the ongoing violence against indigenous peoples, as I discussed in the 
previous chapter, Smith (2012) contends that to ‘acquiesce is to lose ourselves entirely and 
implicitly agree with all that has been said about us’ (p. 4). To agree to a ‘self’ defined by force, 
is to lose the ability to define one’s self. Educationally, I argue that this amounts to losing the 
ability to learn.  
 
For Camus (1977b), lucidity, carries a responsibility to maintain awareness of injustice, but, 
also, it carries the responsibility to rebel against it: ‘I rebel, therefore we exist’ (p. 28). To this 
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end, I will highlight the need to value the knowledge of the outsider, those society has 
overlooked or deemed unfit for inclusion – both ontologically and epistemologically – and 
show that their voice is essential for the development of a critically engaged and 
phenomenologically aware ‘self’, a self that is traitorous to the dominant culture. I will argue 
that our propensity to insist on educating the outsider is symptomatic of our eco-irrationality 
and should instead be flipped, with emphasis on educating the insider. I propose that the 
community of inquiry, re-enriched with pragmatist theory and augmented with Camus’ concept 
of absurdity adapted to education, is a viable pedagogy capable of facilitating the education of 
the insider. 
 
My task is to illustrate where absurdist and pragmatist thinking align, in so far as they can 
inform the educative process of the COI. This alignment comes from the recognition of the 
experience of disorientation, which for Peirce is genuine doubt and for Camus is the feeling of 
absurdity, leading to the need to act on that experience, but to act according to a method, which 
for Peirce is inquiry and Camus is lucidity. I argue that an understanding of Peirce’s and 
Camus’ epistemic concerns, when brought together, offers a richer conceptualisation of the 
relationship between belief, prejudice and genuine doubt necessary to propel a rigorous method 
of inquiry facilitated by fallibilism and lucidity. These two positions, from different 
philosophical traditions, converge with respect to the experience of inquiry and together can 
better inform the educative process of collaborative philosophical inquiry. To this end, in the 
next section, ‘Feeling over Introspection’, I start with Camus’ criticisms of Descartes and 
utilise Plumwood’s theories to draw out the important role feelings play in Camus’ philosophy. 
In the section that follows, ‘The Feeling of Doubt’, I examine Peirce’s rejection of Descartes’ 
theories of knowledge and his recourse to genuine felt doubt over what he called Descartes’ 
‘paper’ doubting. Paper doubting fails to shake our familiar frameworks of knowing and being. 
I highlight the role habits play in perpetuating harmful prejudices, as well as intellectual 
freedom. These frameworks then become ‘unexamined ends in themselves, leaving no room 
for open questioning of the values inherent in and presupposed by these structures and their 
goals’ (Hyde, 2016, p. 2), which is the problem explored in the section ‘Intellectual Freedom’. 
I then turn to the work of Rainville in the section ‘Traitorous Identities: Disrupting school’ to 
imagine how Plumwood’s notion of traitorous identities would apply to a classroom setting, 
arguing for the need for traitorous teachers to overcome the ongoing epistemic violence of 
colonisation and its effects on the creation of self. Whilst neither Camus nor Plumwood, as far 
as I am aware, use the term moral memory, it is a term that captures well their hybrid ethical 
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concerns and it is a concept I develop with the help of Mary Graham’s philosophy through the 
course of this chapter.  
 
Feeling over Introspection 
 
Peirce and Camus both rejected Descartes in various ways. For both, there is no Cartesian 
dualism between human essence and the world, that is, they reject the notion of the mind as an 
inner space capable of directly apprehending clear and distinct ideas through introspection. 
While Camus’ and Descartes’ respective responses to the problem of existence contrast with 
each other, they share a methodological similarity, a similarity that has been commented on by 
both Matthew Sharpe (2011) and Thomas A. Williams, Jr. (1964). Indeed, Camus (1991) 
makes note of the similarity himself when speaking of the absurd as ‘an experience to be lived 
through, a point of departure, the equivalent, in existence, of Descartes’ methodical doubt’ (p. 
8, italics added). His insistence on the absurd being experienced is important. Whereas 
Descartes sees doubting as proof of thinking, which he takes to be proof of existence, Camus, 
(1977a) instead, takes feeling to be foundational: ‘This heart within me I can feel, and I judge 
that it exists. This world I can touch, and I likewise judge that it exists. There ends all my 
knowledge, and the rest is construction’ (p. 24, italics added). To Camus, doubt is a feeling, a 
feeling that precedes thinking: ‘The worm is in the man’s heart. That is where it must be sought’ 
(p. 13). It is the feeling of absurdity. The absurd is Camus’ datum point; however, recognition 
of the absurd springs from the feeling and accompanying recognition of being alive, and the 
feeling of a world that is much greater than you, but of which you are, nonetheless, a part.  
 
Whilst Sharpe recognises Camus’ use of feelings, he searches elsewhere for a datum point and 
posits life. Sharpe (2011) surmises that ‘[f]or Camus, that is, the meaningfulness of human life 
is at a basic level uncircumventable or inalienable’ (p. 582, italics added). However, Camus’ 
insistence on life as irreducible comes later, for as I have argued in Chapter One, this is not 
Camus’ (1977a) beginning but his end point.  
 
The only truth that might seem instructive to him is not formal: it comes to life 
and unfolds in men. The absurd mind cannot so much expect ethical rules at the 
end of its reasoning as, rather, illustrations and the breath of human lives. (p. 
65, italics added) 
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The distinction is an important one. To arrive at a shared appreciation of life, including the 
conditions under which life thrives, both epistemic and physical, we must, Camus thinks, 
reason from the breath. However, on my reading, this is lucidity; an appreciation of the limits 
of reason toward the preservation and encouragement of life. We are still in need of a way to 
arrive here, a starting point for a different kind of reason, antithetical to the traditional forms 
that Plumwood (2002) deems ‘sado-dispassionate’ and ‘ecologically irrational’. She uses the 
term sado-dispassionate to critique the subject/object divide present in traditional reason, 
especially that of scientific reasoning. ‘Objectivity’ she says, ‘is usually seen as excluding the 
emotional, the bodily, the particular, the personal, and of course especially the “political”’ (p. 
42), and the ethical. To counter such logic, we need the starting point of an absurd reasoning; 
the feeling of absurdity as the beginning of the method of lucidity. Camus’ insistence on 
feelings lies contra to the objectification of self and Other, including Earth Other. 
 
For a philosopher who, as we have seen, does away with absolute Truth, it may come as no 
surprise that Camus (1977a) also dispenses with ‘ethical rules’ in favour of ‘illustrations’, as 
per the block quote above. Myths, he insists, are made for the ‘imagination to breathe life into 
them’ (p. 108). I argue that we can understand this in two ways. First, in the case of myths of 
reversals, the meaning of ‘to breathe life into them’ is literal; the epistemology creates a lived 
reality, one that often results in suffering, loss of life, and meaning, as we saw in Chapter Three. 
Ironically, these myths often come replete with ‘ethical rules’. Spivak (1990) describes these 
myths differently as ‘worlding’:   
 
As far as I understand it, the notion of textuality should be related to the notion 
of the worlding of a world on a supposedly uninscribed territory. When I say 
this, I am thinking basically about the imperialist project which had to assume 
that the earth that it territorialised was in fact previously uninscribed. So then a 
world, on a simple level of cartography, inscribes what was presumed to be 
uninscribed. Now this worlding actually is also a texting, textualising, a making 
into art, a making into an object to be understood. (p. 1) 
 
In other words, worlding is a process of making a section of the world objective, writing it into 
being and holding it up as authoritative; the anthropomorphisation and attendant objectification 
of the world. 
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Second, myths, such as that of Sisyphus, can be used to the opposite effect; to demonstrate the 
importance of life, that meaning does not transcend life but rather arises from it and can, 
therefore, be created by the living. These myths are ‘illustrations’ in that they illustrate rather 
than command ethical ways of being. Used in this way, myths can expand the moral 
imagination and help prevent philosophical suicide, including the leap into sado-dispassionate 
reasoning, another form of heavenism.  
 
Myths blur the line between fiction and non-fiction, text and territory, and between creation 
and destruction. Myths can be used to create meaning or to create destruction with creation not 
thought to be in opposition to destruction, but, rather, destruction as a part of creation. How 
then are myths to be judged? Camus (1964) tells us that the ‘artist can value the myths that are 
offered him only in relation to their repercussions on living people’ (p. 9). This I read as 
equivalent to Plumwood’s ethico-epistemic proposition which states that ‘knowledges that 
involve injustice to those who are known do not provide accurate or ethically acceptable forms 
of knowledge’ (p. 44). It is not enough to say, as we saw in Chapter Five, that morality is to be 
found in either consequence or intent as it lies in both. For Camus, the consequence of which 
we must be ethically aware is suffering as a shared feature of the world, but not merely the 
reductionist suffering of the pain response. His notion of suffering is collective, ‘from the 
moment rebellion begins, suffering is seen as a collective experience – as the experience of 
everyone’ (p. 28). Such suffering can take the epistemic as well as the physical form and the 
intent behind the consequence can be traced in the movement from the ‘textualising’ to the 
‘worlding’ as Spivak put it or along the more familiar (by now) lines of Plumwood’s sado-
dispassionate logic of domination. ‘The ultimate source was a Hellenistic conception of reason 
as utterly opposed and superior to emotion – just note Plato’s famous exhortation that reason 
must rule desire’ (Hyde, 2016, p. 5). To question sado-dispassionate reason, Plumwood tells 
us we must decentre the human in the world and take into account the non-human. To Colwell 
(1972), decentring the human requires a shift in ‘intellectual questions (by which I mean 
questions as to truth, knowledge and values) (p. 85)’. He argues that it is a shift ‘from “What 
is good, or what is to be derived from any situation for man” to the question “What is good, or 
what is to be derived from the situation for the benefit of the situation itself?”’ (p. 85). It is a 
shift from a human-centric to an ecological worldview.  
 
The difference between the two is that with the former, one component of the 
system Nature is separated out from it and given a selective and controlling 
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emphasis, while with the latter there is no such separation and all components 
of the system Nature are viewed on an equally inclusive basis. Thus, with the 
former, intellectual questions […] are decided on the basis of the degree to 
which they satisfy the putative needs and requirements of the selected 
component (man), whereas in the latter, intellectual questions are decided on 
the basis of the degree to which they satisfy the needs and requirements of the 
system Nature itself. (p. 85) 
 
Such a shift in thinking requires a ‘radical reform of existing social institutions’ (p. 86) which 
rest on the foundations of the liberal individual, including education, to a collective as a source 
of value, in this case ecology, a view I have argued Plumwood shares. She thought that if 
 
the injustices that are wrought and misconceptions that are held (especially that 
of mastery over nature, women, and colonised peoples) themselves follow from 
an indefensible and objectionable conception of rationality one that contrasts 
itself with emotion then, amongst other consequences, another that follows is 
that reason and emotion are not discontinuous opposites. Each is, to some 
extent at least, a part of the other. Moreover, reason cannot, as has been the case, 
simply be assumed to be superior to emotion. Emotions must play a central role 
in how we view the world alongside reason. (Hyde, 2016, p. 7, italics added) 
 
Likewise, Camus’ philosophy is radical in moving away from the dominance of thought over 
feeling and external existence (nature). Dismissing emotions as irrational is a form of 
philosophical suicide. I take Plumwood’s use of the term emotions to be contiguous with 
Camus’ use of the term feelings. In the next section, I turn to Peirce and his emphasis on the 
feeling of doubt as a vital part of inquiry.  
 
The Feeling of Doubt 
 
Peirce, too, stressed the importance of feelings to philosophy. Like Camus, he rejected 
certainty, which he believed to be exemplified in Descartes’ cogito. Put another way, ‘Peirce 
believed that philosophy had gone awry with its adoption of a Cartesian view of knowledge’ 
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(Pardales & Girod, 2006, p. 300).87 He contrasted two types of doubt: genuine doubt and paper 
doubt; the latter of which is questioning divorced from the feeling of doubt. ‘Unlike Descartes, 
Peirce did not commit to the view that we could divorce our body from our mind, or our 
experiences and emotions from our thoughts’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2016b, p. 168)88. For Peirce, 
the initial scepticism, typified in Descartes’ meditations, is an exemplar of paper doubt. He 
thought that the doubt Descartes practised, seated by the fire in his bathrobe free from passions, 
‘is mere self-deception and not real doubt at all because no-one can ever strip bare of all 
prejudices of thought’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2016b, p. 168). In Peirce’s (1868) words: 
 
A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what 
he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive 
reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to 
doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts. (pp. 140–141) 
 
By assuming a position of emptiness, that is, freedom from prejudices in the form of total 
scepticism, Descartes failed under Peirce’s definition to engage in genuine felt inquiry. To 
Peirce, genuine doubt requires us to genuinely experience doubt—a persistently irritating 
quality or state of disequilibrium that drives us to seek satisfaction in belief. It is ‘the 
experiential alarm signalling the need for a revision of one’s hypothesis’ (Hildebrand, 1996, p. 
3).  
 
However, Peirce (1868) was careful to point out that genuine doubt does not mean total 
(absolute) doubt. Genuine doubt could never be total, Peirce thought, as prejudices ‘are things 
which it does not occur to us can be questioned’ (p. 140). For doubt to be total we would have 
to be able to catalogue and question every thought, belief and prejudice we hold. However, the 
subconscious nature of many prejudices makes this task impossible; prejudices are a part of an 
ever changing ‘self’. Instead, Peirce argued we ‘must begin with all the prejudices which we 
actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy’ (p. 140). To grab hold of a prejudice 
long enough to consider whether it is useful (not all prejudices, he thought, were negative), to 
sort the helpful from the harmful (to self and Other), Peirce thought we needed the help of a 
                                                 
87 See also Seixas (1993). 
88 Throughout this thesis passages from my joint publication (see Burgh & Thornton, 2016b) appear both cited 
and uncited. All passages attributable to Burgh or Burgh and Thornton jointly have been cited. Other passages 
appeared here first and were slightly modified for publication. 
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community to engage in rigorous inquiry. He thought that only when an experience throws us 
into disequilibrium can we come to recognise our prejudices and begin to reconstruct them.  
 
Peircean inquiry is the move from disequilibrium to equilibrium through a communal struggle 
to acquire new belief-habits. After such a struggle, we are warranted in accepting the result of 
our deliberations as ‘the most reasonable by account of all available arguments and evidence’ 
(Gregory, 2006, p. 166) but only provisionally, always keeping in mind that even equilibrium 
is temporary. Equilibrium can de/evolve into disequilibrium once again in an ongoing cycle, 
much like Sisyphus’ struggle. Commitment to such a form of inquiry, to Peirce, reveals a desire 
to learn. In his ‘First Rule of Logic’ (1899), Peirce states that: 
 
Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn 
you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you 
already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be 
inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy: Do not block the way of 
inquiry. (p. 48) 
 
A desire to learn then is a dissatisfaction with what is already known, or to put it another way, 
the first rule of inquiry is to wonder.  
 
Peirce did not posit an absurd so to speak, however, his notion of truth was, in a similar way to 
Camus’, finite and multiple. For Peirce, the ascertainment of truth required the rigors of the 
scientific method, implemented by a community of inquirers as an active learning community. 
  
In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached 
it is considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached. After it is 
reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one 
left who doubts it. (p. 141) 
 
The notion of an interpersonal method, wherein people come together to rigorously test ideas 
and hypotheses to arrive at results, forms the basis of his notion of the community of inquirers, 
which Lipman and Sharp took as their example (see Lipman, 2008; Lipman & Sharp, 1978; 
Burgh & Thornton, 2016b). Peirce thought we can speak of knowledge, truth and reality only 
insofar as such concepts are grounded in a community of inquirers, and not in individual 
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consciousness resulting from introspection (Murphy, 1990), or as absolute, fixed and 
immutable Truth. Truths, to Peirce, must stay open to the admittance of new evidence and, 
thus, may be subject to further inquiry that is open to self-correction.  
 
Peirce’s account of communal inquiry contrasts with other methods of fixing belief, such as 
‘refusing to consider contrary evidence (the Method of Tenacity), accepting an institution’s 
dictates (the Method of Authority), or the most coherent and/or elegant-seeming belief-set (the 
A Priori Method)’ (Legg, 2014, p. 205). In many respects, these methods are tantamount to 
what Camus called philosophical suicide; they fail to engage people in the struggle to inquire. 
Peirce lists four common points of resistance to inquiry:  
 
1. absolute assertion, 
2. maintaining that something is absolutely unknowable, 
3. maintaining that something is absolutely basic, ultimate, independent of all else, and 
utterly inexplicable, and 
4. holding that perfect exactitude is possible, especially that which precludes unusual and 
anomalous phenomena. (pp. 49–50).  
 
Cooperation in inquiry, therefore, is not guaranteed; we cannot ‘assume a social impulse or 
tendency to strive for or seek explanations that coincide with fact’ (Burgh, Thornton & Fynes-
Clinton, 2018, p. 50). In practice, we can use any of these methods to satisfy our desires and to 
quell the irritation of doubt through retaining our own belief or uncritically adopting someone 
else’s belief, but in doing so we commit philosophical suicide. However, if we wish to arrive 
at conclusions that closely mirror the ‘reality’ of our embedded existence whatever it maybe, 
Peirce thought we have need for a method founded on fallibilism; the understanding ‘that no 
empirical statement is impervious to epistemological challenge’ (Powell, 2001, p. 11). 
Fallibilism, like genuine doubt, is not total doubt or scepticism, rather, the community needs 
to adopt the ‘scientific spirit’ which ‘requires a man to be at all times ready to dump his whole 
cartload of beliefs, the moment experience is against them’ (Peirce, 1960, p. 55). Importantly, 
Peirce’s notion of fallibilism is akin to Camus’ notion of lucidity, that is, a sustained awareness 
of the absurd which makes us question the content we give to our experiences rather than our 
experiences themselves. However, for an inquiry to become lucid we must add to Peirce’s list 
above (5) myths of reversal, and (6) philosophical suicide, as further blocks to inquiry.  
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Plumwood’s experience with a crocodile is illustrative of Peirce’s view that experiential 
episodes can give rise to disequilibrium resulting in genuine doubt, wherein our belief-habits 
no longer offer us the confidence needed to accept them as cogent explanations of reality and, 
therefore, are open to self-correction. Further, her experience of genuine doubt in the wake of 
the attack led her to examine the assumptions built into her belief-habits and brought about an 
initial awareness of her prejudices, subsequently leading to the questioning and re-
interpretation or reconstruction of her beliefs factoring in her new experiential information.  
 
Camus’ (1977a) feeling of absurdity can also be described as an experiential episode; ‘one day 
the “why” arises and everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement. “Begins”—
this is important. Weariness comes at the end of the acts of a mechanical life, but at the same 
time it inaugurates the impulse of consciousness’ (p. 18). The feeling of absurdity triggers the 
doubt, the ‘why’. The experience of the ‘end of the acts of a mechanical life’, as described by 
Camus, along with Plumwood’s encounter as prey to a crocodile, both arise from an existential 
understanding of a given moment; the moment of genuine doubt. When we experience genuine 
doubt we are unable, at the moment of uncertainty, to shape what William James called the 
‘great blooming, buzzing confusion’ (p. 462) of the world into a familiar epistemic framework. 
A longitudinal study by Liz Fynes-Clinton on the role of genuine doubt in the classroom shows 
that: 
 
Students who experience genuine doubt are more inclined to grapple with ideas 
to create meaning and to engage in inquiry with others to find ways to explore 
their ideas. One student’s doubt can lead to other students sharing similar 
doubts, which has the potential to lead to ‘collective doubt’ that could become 
a significant indicator of intellectual progress during CPI [collaborative 
philosophical inquiry]. (Burgh, Thornton & Fynes-Clinton, 2018, p. 53) 
 
In a classroom setting, a diversity of prejudices is a necessary starting point for genuine inquiry, 
for it is only when children bring divergent perspectives to the community of inquiry that 
cooperative intelligence can occur. As Gregory (2005) puts it, ‘[g]ood inquiry depends on a 
rich diversity of options—options for beliefs, values and actions—upon which the community 
may apply its procedures of intelligent selection’ (p. 269). Awareness of the importance of 
prejudices allows teachers and students alike to look for and expand upon moments of 
disequilibrium in the classroom, thereby multiplying awareness and experience of the divorce 
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between belief and reality. Once cognisance of our own prejudices is achieved, we are 
confronted by these prejudices as barriers to inquiry that hinder self-correction, and a choice 
presents itself; either we accept things the way they are and remain confined by our own 
narratives, or we consent to wrestle with our habits, admitting that they could be otherwise.  
 
Genuine doubt as the suspension of a familiar epistemic framework opens the way toward the 
reconstruction of the framework. Awareness of genuine doubt can encourage inquirers to 
reflect on the relationship between their feelings and their thoughts, how these relate to each 
other and how they impact their belief-habits. In the next section, I look at why this is important 
in the prevention of epistemic violence. Particularly, I explore how unquestioned belief-habits 
affect our ability to wonder and impede our intellectual freedom. I argue that teachers need to 
pay attention to their own experiences of doubt. By understanding and experiencing fallibilism, 
‘teachers become exemplars of wonder that children take to be models for their own conduct’ 
(Burgh & Thornton, 2016b, p. 172). The intellectual freedom of the teacher becomes a model 
for the intellectual freedom of the student and vice versa. This in turn increases the probabilities 
of the creation of other lucid inquirers and the prospect of a community free from dogmatic 
certainty and open to constructive and creative dialogue. The position of intellectual freedom 
also enables the teacher to recognising dominant narratives by listening not only to the child’s 
words but also by ‘looking for clues that grant access to the child’s phenomenological world, 
e.g., facial expressions, body language, group interactions’ (Thornton & Burgh, 2017, p. 
63). Both teachers and students need to be attentive to the phenomenology of the community; 
to their own felt experiences along with those of others, for example, anger, hesitancy, 
resistance, silence, silencing and so forth. That is, they must pay attention to potential moments 
of doubt. Facilitation of such moments can draw ‘an individual’s attention to his or her own 
prejudices’ and open ‘a pathway to genuine doubt’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2016b, p. 166). 
 
Lucidity, then, is more than the confession of Socratic ignorance, and more than just the denial 
of Cartesian scepticism in favour of fallibilism. Nor is it only intellectual doubt. Lucidity is a 
deep sense of awareness directed at engagement in exploration, in learning; a state of being 
between question and answer. This state not only offers a phenomenological description of 
absurdity, but it also indicates a necessary response as re-focusing of attention on every action 
as an opportunity for a new understanding of life; to construct meaning in a given moment 
whilst also paying attention to the presence of past narratives and their role in shaping the 
environment. 
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Intellectual Freedom 
 
For Camus (1977a), our habits are what give shape and meaning to our lives. As mentioned in 
Chapter One, and extended on here, Camus derives this conclusion from the plight of Sisyphus, 
the figure in Greek mythology whom the gods condemned to an eternity of rolling a rock up a 
mountain only to have it roll back down; an eternity of the same habit. Even faced with this 
laborious and seemingly futile punishment, this forced habit, Camus thought, ‘one must 
imagine Sisyphus happy’, as the ‘struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill a man’s 
heart’ (p. 111). Walking back down to his rock, ‘his thing’ (p. 110), Sisyphus is aware of the 
life contained in his immediate surroundings. His task, he knows, is waiting, always waiting 
for him at the bottom of the mountain, and yet with all eternity stretched before him he takes 
his time reaching it again. On the slow amble down, he cultivates what is left for him to 
cultivate, the relationship between his senses and his thoughts with the life around him—he 
becomes lucid. 
 
The wonder Sisyphus finds in ‘each mineral flake of that night-filled mountain’ (p. 111) was 
not what the gods had in mind, not part of the task they had preconceived for him; it is his act 
of self-creation, his art of learning. It is the learning that happens beyond the text-book, beyond 
the scope of the teacher’s intent. It is learning born of a wonder that is means to no end.  
 
The limitations of Sisyphus’s situation necessitate that his ability to inquire is limited to the 
meeting of his thoughts and his senses with the mountain and sky surrounding him. Yet, while 
the tract of land he can walk, and the scope of external habits he can create, are much more 
confined than most of us need endure, his experience is not so different to our own. Our lives 
are Sisyphusian in the form of repetition we encounter in the course of a normal day, week, 
month, year; the ‘Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday and Saturday according to the 
same rhythm—this path is easily followed most of the time’ (p. 18). However, unlike Sisyphus, 
many of us fail to cultivate the habit of developing awareness of our senses; we look but do not 
see, listen but do not hear. We see through the lens of past narratives and the words we hear 
are given meaning through the unconscious whispers of past stories.89 In many ways, by 
                                                 
89 See Murris (2015a, 2016a) for a thorough examination of what she calls listening as usual: ‘that is, listening as 
evaluating, interpreting – listening out for the same, thereby confirming what we already know’ (2016a, p. 144). 
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internalising, unquestioningly, the epistemic culture of the community in which we are 
situated, we play the role of our own gods; we limit the range of our own internal habits, and 
by extension the habitat in which we co-exist. The structures that we create then go on to limit 
the habits of future humans, perpetuating the limitations on our intellectual and physical 
experiences, and in this way, through our collective existence, past, present and future, ‘we’ 
endure the punishment of Sisyphus. Hyde’s (2016) notion of intellectual freedom aptly 
captures the Sisyphusian quality of our shared existence. 
 
Intellectual freedom is compromised by the domination of instrumental 
rationality that sees all as a means to the furtherance of our currently-accepted 
economic and political structures (the system). They are unexamined ends in 
themselves, leaving no room for open questioning of the values inherent in and 
presupposed by these structures and their goals. Our horizons draw in, our Life-
world narrows, and we become dominated by a world-view that does not offer 
or consider possible alternatives. (p. 2) 
 
Our thoughts become confined by an epistemically built environment. As Camus (1977a) 
attests, the goals to which we direct our habits are often subsumed by them; ‘a man wants to 
earn money to be happy, and his whole effort and the best of a life are devoted to the earning 
of that money. Happiness is forgotten; the means [habits] are taken for the end’ (p. 94). Habit 
alone guarantees nothing, for it is always meeting an uncertain world. Depending on the habit, 
it comes attended with both positive and negative consequences for us and for others in 
differing and varying measure. What I focus on becomes me and shapes the world around me, 
and for this very reason, habits deserve our attention. Our habits, more than not, come attendant 
with a cost to the Other, whether human or environment. For example, the clothes that I buy 
may be the product of child labour,90 the confectionary that I love to consume may be 
responsible for deforestation,91 the antibiotics I take may end up in waterways,92 the plastic 
bags I use to carry my groceries may end up in the stomach of a whale,93 and the list goes on. 
The consequences of our habits expand past our intentions, they spill out of the bounds of our 
                                                 
and its opposite ‘reciprocal and responsive listening’ (p. 29) or ‘listening without organs’ that is: ‘listening out 
for the effects of difference , what makes me as educator think and feel differently’ (p. 144).  
90 See: https://labs.theguardian.com/unicef-child-labour/ 
91 See: http://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2018-06-29/nestle-suspended-sustainable-palm-oil/9923238 and 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/39492207 
92 See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4034546/ 
93 See: https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/06/whale-dead-plastic-bags-thailand-animals/ 
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plans. Whereas Sisyphus acquired the habit of listening, Murris (2013) contends that teachers 
can acquire the habit of not listening; that is, they can assume the role of the gods, assigning 
set tasks and paying little attention to unintended educational consequences, thereby limiting 
not only their own but also their students’ intellectual freedom. Due to ‘their conceptions of 
childhood’, often adults ‘will not “hear” the child who speaks’ (p. 246).  
 
Schools engage in epistemic practices through curriculum and pedagogy which rely on the 
interpretation or acceptance and transmission of knowledge, and are, therefore, an integral part 
of epistemic cultures; cultures of ‘knowledge setting’ that contribute to and shape society. 
Epistemic practices shape our belief-habits through which we make sense of the world. 
Repetitive interaction with our environment builds our habits. Rightfully or wrongfully, when 
we enter a new environment we are likely to see it through the framework of the familiar. A 
similar process is active when we, as adults, look at children. We see children not as they are 
but as we think they should be. This extends to the content of their speech—often we fail to 
take seriously or value children’s knowledge. To counter such practices, teachers ‘need to be 
open to what they have not heard before, and resist the urge to translate what they hear into 
what is familiar’ (p. 251). They need to be careful not to dismiss the content of the child’s 
words based solely on the age of the speaker. Murris argues that doing so would be to commit 
epistemic injustice. I argue that a lucid inquiry with an emphasis on genuine doubt, as described 
above, can disrupt such frameworks of familiarity. In the next section, I outline Fricker’s work 
on epistemic injustice before explaining (briefly, as a recap of Chapter Three) why I prefer to 
follow Spivak’s use of the term epistemic violence. I then argue for the need for teachers to 
develop their own traitorous identities to disrupt the familiar framework of education.  
 
Traitorous Identities: Disrupting epistemic violence in the classroom 
 
Fricker (2007) identifies two kinds of epistemic injustices: testimonial injustice and 
hermeneutical injustice.  
 
Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated 
level of credibility to a speaker's word; hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior 
stage, when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair 
disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences. An 
example of the first might be that the police do not believe you because you are 
black; an example of the second might be that you suffer sexual harassment in 
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a culture that still lacks that critical concept. We might say that testimonial 
injustice is caused by prejudice in the economy of credibility; and that 
hermeneutical injustice is caused by structural prejudice in the economy of 
collective hermeneutical resources. (pp. 1–2) 
 
Whilst Fricker is largely credited with beginning what Rachel McKinnon (2016) calls a 
‘watershed moment’ (p. 443) in epistemology, certain minority groups have a long history of 
producing literature on the topic of epistemic injustice that has itself been subject to epistemic 
injustice.94 McKinnon reminds us that ‘whose work we engage with is a matter of epistemic 
justice’ (p. 439), a topic I will look at further in the next section in relation to the choice of 
stimulus materials for classroom inquiry.  
 
Fricker (2007) notes that for ‘something to be an injustice, it must be harmful but also wrongful, 
whether because discriminatory or because otherwise unfair’ (p. 151). However, I adapt 
Spivak’s use of the term epistemic violence. Just as Fricker herself attempts to escape the wider 
implications of the use of the term ‘the philosophical imaginary’ in favour of the less theorised 
term imagination, I favour the use of the term violence over injustice. This is not to say that 
justice is necessarily undesirable, rather it is to broaden the umbrella to include all epistemic 
harms, and to heed Camus’ warning that the term justice has been used to justify what he argues 
are harmful beliefs and practices, such as the death penalty. Injustice, too, focuses inquiry on 
the victims. I use violence to reframe the inquiry onto the perpetrators, as it is they, I argue, 
who need to be re-educated. Using the character Marge from the movie The Talented Mr. 
Ripley as a prime example of a woman silenced by testimonial injustice, Fricker (2007) writes: 
‘If we were to interpret Marge as thoroughly aware of the distorting nature of the stereotype 
used to silence her, it would still be no surprise that she should be silenced by it’ (p. 14). Fricker 
then admits that the victim’s awareness of the injustice cannot always prevent it; a focus on 
educating the victim, whilst important, should not be paramount. Educating the victim alone 
follows the same logic as assimilation, an attempt to ‘help’ the Other endure the logic of 
domination, rather than teaching the dominant not to dominate.  
                                                 
94 Fricker (in Dieleman, 2012) admits being influenced by feminist philosophy, including standpoint theory, 
however, she states that ‘my own emphasis has always been on the “philosophy” in feminist philosophy, if you 
see what I mean. That is, I conceive of the ideas I have wanted to promote as entirely continuous with fairly 
universal, barely theoretical ideas about what discrimination or unfairness consists in, for instance, and in this 
sense the ideas presuppose no broader theoretical feminist philosophical commitments—certainly none regarding 
the allegedly gendered nature of philosophy, for instance’ (p. 254).  
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Epistemic violence, then, is a form of violence found in speech acts, in systems of rationality, 
and broadly speaking, in our relationship with others, both human, including our relationship 
with ourselves, and non-human. In all cases, epistemic violence comes from the privileging of 
a single position that inferiorises or nullifies countless others, that totalises knowledge. Forced 
intellectual conformity to a dominant logic narrows both a person’s physical and intellectual 
horizons. I have argued that epistemic violence is a self-perpetuating societal structuring force 
that is active at all levels of human organisation, including the institution of education and 
schooling itself. Epistemic violence manifests in the ontology of built environments, such as 
traditional classrooms. It also manifests in prejudices ‒ beliefs or assumptions we think not to 
question ‒ which require us to engage with others so that we become aware of them. Given 
pragmatism’s ability to uncover prejudice, a community of inquiry steeped in pragmatist theory 
potentially offers educators a way to facilitate this form of epistemic violence in the classroom. 
I will argue that when enriched by a theoretical framework of lucid inquiry, the community of 
inquiry allows for multiple ways of knowing and being to flourish and does not impede on the 
intellectual freedom of those who lie outside the dominant narrative. My intention in arguing 
for such is two-fold: the first is to promote teacher awareness of epistemic violence to mitigate 
the damage done in the classroom; the second is to question the very structures of Western 
education. I will do this by recourse to indigenous approached to education, but not to subsume 
them. Eve Tuck (aka Unangaxˆ) and K. Wayne Yang, in their new book Indigenous and 
Decolonizing Studies in Education (Smith, Tuck & Yang, 2019), note that: ‘Indigenous and 
decolonizing perspectives on education have long persisted alongside colonial models of 
education, yet too often have been subsumed under broader domains of multiculturalism, 
critical race theory, and progressive education’ (p. x, italics added). Instead, I acknowledge 
‘Indigenous worldviews and decolonizing theory as distinct philosophical traditions’ (p. x). 
Further, Tuck and Yang highlight that: 
 
Decolonizing studies, when most centered in Indigenous philosophy, push back 
against assumptions about the linearity of history and the future, against 
teleological narratives of human development, and argue for renderings of time 
and place that exceed coloniality and conquest. (xiii) 
 
Pushing back against the colonisation of education, therefore, requires embedding it in the 
history of the land on which the classroom and greater community is situated, including: the 
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philosophies and practices of the traditional owners of the land; perceptions and conceptions 
of childhood that disrupt the dominant narrative of liberal individualism; education’s role in 
politics, including aspects of ongoing assimilation; indigenous approaches to science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM); right down to the glue that holds together 
the tables and the impacts of its manufacturing on the environment and social fabric in the 
place where it is made. That is, education needs to trace the moral memory of place. 
Constructing the past is, as Spivak (2012b) puts it, a work of epistemology: ‘We know only a 
passing, and, studying in the present, we construct a past thing: epistemology at work’ (p. 1). 
The experiential inquiry, or as Spivak deems it, ‘the study’, creates a memory of a non-
experiential past obtained through the process of inquiry. Memory is, therefore, a site for both 
epistemic violence and epistemic remuneration; a paying back through a paying attention to 
past silences. With attention comes the possibility to reconstruct habits that conflict with the 
contents of past silences; moral memory has the potential to shine a light on practices that 
would not exist were it not for the silences. For example, if Indigenous knowledges were valued 
from the beginning of colonisation, how would our schools look today? Put differently, 
respecting other ways of knowing includes respecting the limitations they place on Western 
ways of knowing.  
 
Understanding the world through multiple frameworks and ways of knowledge construction, 
without recourse to a hierarchy of knowing, presents the greatest opportunity to reconstruct 
both our epistemology and ontology in a relational way, a way that, as Colwell (1972) put it, 
satisfies not just the individual but ‘the needs and requirements of the system Nature itself’ (p. 
85). A robust understanding of place is vital in shifting our (Western) familiar liberal 
framework of understanding the world. Akin to Camus and Peirce, Graham (2014) also seeks 
to shift Descartes’ notion of knowledge.  
 
There is no Aboriginal equivalent to the Cartesian notion of ‘I think therefore I 
am’ but, if there were, it would be – I am located therefore I am. Place, being, 
belonging and connectedness all arise out of a locality in Land. The key 
understanding of identity/place is coherence. A sense of coherence 
(Antonovsky 1987) is a general feeling of confidence that one’ s environment 
is predictable. In Aboriginal terms, one’ s environment must be predictable 
and/or must be made predictable in order for coherence to be achieved. That is, 
coherence has to be worked at or constructed – confidence emerges in one’ s 
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own social, spiritual and cultural life and this comes out of relationships, rather 
than positions. (pp. 18‒19) 
 
I understand Graham’s use of coherence as a sense of studied equilibrium akin to lucidity. A 
‘feeling of confidence’ arising out of an understanding of the relationships of place, an 
understanding of past narratives embedded in present ontologies with the human embedded 
alongside them. The concept of place, Graham contrasts with the Western concept of ‘position’. 
Indeed, place, in the way Graham conceives it, is a challenge to sado-dispassionate, abstract 
and universal logic.  
 
In the Aboriginal notions of autonomy, a place isn’t a position. A place can’t be 
a position because it’s a matrix of relations, narratives, obligations – it has 
neither rigidity nor flexibility, it has soft, inclusive structure, spirit, agency and 
memory. And while position can also have the same kind of matrix as place, it 
has not come into the world to preserve relationality (like place) – it comes to 
contain, define and dominate relationality. (p. 19, italics added) 
 
Traditional educational ways of knowing and being in a classroom function according to 
position to the detriment of a complex understanding of place. As Graham (2014) puts it: ‘For 
most Westerners, Inquiry precedes Place. Knowledge acquisition both defines and supersedes 
place’ (p. 5). Reversing the order of inquiry disrupts our notions of keeping school. Recall in 
Chapter Five Colwell’s notion of ‘keeping school’, the educational tendency to focus on ever 
present social concerns, and the fear of questioning societal values he identified as driving the 
keeping school mentality. Keeping school means keeping it constantly attuned to the demands 
of the present, demands Colwell (1972) deems ‘the tyranny of familiarity which, under the 
banner of relevancy, eliminates a richness in perspective, nuance, and counter-challenge we 
cannot afford to miss’ (p. 88).  
 
In 1934, Dewey (2010), who, as we have seen was a towering influence on Lipman’s 
Philosophy for Children, gave two reasons for the need to disrupt school and question social 
values, rather than keep it. The first is the ever-increasing industrialisation of the world: 
‘Individual groups, tribes and races, once living completely untouched by the economic regime 
of modern capitalistic industry, now find almost every phase of their lives affected by its 
expansion’ (p. 244). The second is the then ‘unprecedented wave of nationalistic sentiment, of 
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racial and national prejudice, of readiness to resort to force of arms’ (p. 245). Both reasons are 
just as relevant today as they were in 1934. However, Dewey’s and, by association, Lipman’s, 
focus on democracy has been called into question by indigenous scholars such as Sandy 
Grande: 
 
Grande observes that non-Indigenous revolutionary pedagogies fail to consider 
a fundamental difference between revolutionary democracies and Indigenous 
sovereignty (see also Brayboy, 2005). This difference is made evident in critical 
pedagogy’s frequent promotion of practices that foster an empowered critical 
citizenry for greater participation and integration in the nation-state (Morrell, 
2008; Dewey, 1997), in contrast to Indigenous approaches that seek self-
determination from a colonizing state. (Tuck & Lang, 2018, p. xv) 
 
Whilst many proponents, both scholars and practitioners, of Philosophy for Children have 
attested to its potential to reform education, as we have seen, its ability to disrupt schooling or 
reconstruct education toward larger societal changes has been questioned on many fronts. 
Recall, particularly, Rainville’s (2001) words: ‘I have yet to read a paper in the growing body 
of Philosophy for Children literature which acknowledges the ways in which our so-called 
democratic institutions have arisen out of, and continue to perpetuate, the political, economic 
and ideological repression of Native North Americans’ (p. 66).  Rainville expresses that she is 
‘worried that our [Philosophy for Children] purportedly neutral approach to philosophical 
inquiry may unwittingly contribute to the marginalization of Indigenous peoples both in North 
America and around the world’ (p. 67). Her concern is echoed by Walter Kohan (2018), who, 
following Freire’s moral condemnation of neutrality, has this to say: ‘Education cannot be 
apolitical, politically neutral or aseptic’ (p. 7). Purporting that education must be neutral, is a 
myth of reversal, a way of silencing the Other without admitting a standpoint; hiding behind 
the mask of neutrality. Rainville (2001) further argues that education cannot be ahistorical 
either, that teachers must understand the historical forces that shape the lives of their students, 
especially those to whom history has been oppressive. To this end, she argues for ‘conscious 
partiality.95 
 
‘Conscious Partiality’ requires that teachers acknowledge their own (inevitable) 
biases, as well as the conceptual limitations of their chosen material, while 
                                                 
95 Rainville cited ‘Conscious Partiality’ as a term taken from Marguerite Rivage-Seul (1987). 
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paying particular attention to the political contexts in which education takes 
place. As a result, Philosophy for Children must be willing to incorporate 
historical detail and socio-cultural awareness into any programs which are 
meant to be truly liberatory. (p. 67) 
 
To return to climate change for a moment, climate change science is often reported by the 
media as a debate between those scientists who are ‘for’ and ‘against’ climate change, loosely 
configured so as to be able to change the meaning of the terms at will. For example, ‘for’ could 
mean acknowledgment of the very existence of climate change, and ‘against’ the denial of its 
occurrence. But ‘for’ could also mean accepting anthropogenic climate change and ‘against’ 
meaning that climate change is due to natural processes rather than human activities. ‘For’ and 
‘against’ could also indicate a range of positions as to how severe the impacts of climate change 
are or might be. None of these formulations, however, offer a nuanced look at the science and 
all present the research as if it were split equally between positions, which is not the case. As 
my discussion in Chapter Two illustrates, the evidence overwhelmingly points to climate 
change occurring, and scientists are becoming increasingly vocal as to the dangers of inaction 
caused by the continual presentation of the topic as an ‘impartial’ debate. The same skewed 
notion of impartially is active in the notion of keeping school. There is no impartially in white-
washing or denying history. Keeping school perpetuates the logic of domination by actively 
backgrounding the historical context in which the school is situated and actively reinforcing 
the logic of domination in rejecting other ways of knowing and being in the world.  
 
Returning to Australia, Aunty Judi Wickes (in Shay & Wickes, 2017), reflecting on her own 
education, had the following to say: 
 
How wonderful it would be to gain a fundamental acceptance and affirmation 
of all races within the Australian landscape; to be judged on one’s own merits 
rather than the colour of your skin. I wish that my school days had delivered a 
factual curriculum system regarding Australian history and that my educators 
were of many cultures and not just British. I wonder if a time will come when 
educators challenge the doctrine of past scholars concerning Australian history, 
and begin to teach an accurate account of the invasion/colonisation of this 
country, including the destruction of our Aboriginal people’s society? (p. 117) 
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Traditionally, the literature on P4C presupposes that philosophical inquiry with school students 
in a community of inquiry is best brought about using purpose written stimulus material to 
create an impartial, intellectually safe environment by connecting student experiences to the 
characters in the philosophical stories-as-text which are thought to provide a model for doing 
philosophy. However, Chetty’s (2014) drawing on critical race theory96 makes the following 
point, regarding ‘thinking about race’ problematises the assumption of safety: 
 
There may be an assumption on the part of P4C practitioners that fantastic tales 
are a better way of thinking about race and culture than real-life situations. It 
may be that they offer the comfort of distance or that they encourage a 
dispassionate approach to philosophising. However, it is questionable who is 
being comforted here. Are we to assume that children are incapable of serious 
thought about the real world? (p. 25) 
 
Chetty further notes that if our concern is to promote dialogic inquiry, we need to acknowledge 
that for the marginalised and oppressed there is no safe space. When paired with Rainville’s 
concerns, I conclude that inquiry derived from purpose-written stimulus material – such as the 
stories-as-text written by Lipman – fail to question the history of Western rationality or take 
notice of the other ways of knowing it silences. That is, it fails to address epistemic violence. 
As Rainville (2001) puts it: 
 
The lack of political recognition and epistemic authority which has been 
conferred upon Native Americans undermines, not only the accomplishments 
of First Nations peoples, but also the capacity for non-Native peoples to take 
Aboriginal issues seriously. Within the classroom we find all of the learned 
behaviors and negative stereotyping which affect Native American people, both 
adults and children, on a systematic basis. We also find a cultivated ignorance 
on the part of non-Native children (and teachers) with respect to both the 
injustices which have transpired against, as well as the current political 
objectives of, Native American communities. (p. 68) 
                                                 
96 I reference Chetty here as I think his point around artificially creating ‘safety’ in the classroom is a good one. I 
do not, however, wish to suggest, as Smith, Tuck & Yang, (2019) caution against, that Indigenous philosophy 
such as Rainville’s can be ‘subsumed under broader domains of multiculturalism, critical race theory, and 
progressive education’ (p. x). Each stand on their own, which is also not to lessen critical race theory.  
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Intellectual freedom requires the inclusion of multiple knowledge systems, not simply as topics 
or issues to critique or criticise, placed in opposition to Western knowledge, but as starting 
points for lucid inquiry. As Graham (2014) attests, ‘Western contemporary technosciences, 
rather than being taken as definitional of knowledge, rationality, or objectivity, should be 
treated as varieties of knowledge systems’ (p. 6). Failing to include varieties of knowledge 
systems, either through text, art, story, place, the knowledge of teachers, students, parents, and 
members of the wider community, fails to interrupt the dominant narrative, leaving it 
unquestioned—or, in Shor and Freire’s (1987) words, ‘leaving the dominant ideology in peace’ 
(p.174).  
 
Watson (2014), speaking of the larger goal of increasing Australia’s understanding of 
Aboriginal philosophy, has the following to say as to how to get there: 
 
The immediate goal would be to reassess practices aimed at inclusion and 
develop practical possibilities for the centring of Indigenous knowledges. Such 
a process would go beyond the translation of Aboriginality, which has in most 
instances been affected by Western expertise and interpreters, and would enable 
the inclusion of Indigenous knowledges from a First Nations peoples’ 
standpoint. (p. 518) 
  
The purpose-written texts, then, could be used in a lucid inquiry as an example of Western 
rationality, but only alongside other ways of knowing, and in recognition of their limitations 
and domination. The Australian feminist philosophers discussed in Chapter Six alluded to 
something similar in relation to masculine bias and discourse prevalent in the novels. 
 
Plumwood (2012) sought to address the problem of dominant rationality through the 
development of ‘traitorous identities’. As previously mentioned, traitorous identities are 
created by focusing lucid attention on ‘experiences that do not fit the dominant story’ (pp. 12–
13); experiences that point to the need to revise our ‘conception of the self and its relation to 
the non-human other, opposition to oppressive practices, and the abandonment and critique of 
cultural allegiances to the dominance of the human species and its bonding against non-
humans’ (p. 205) and those humans classed as non-human. Traitorous identities cultivate an 
ethical, ecological rationality through constant reflection on the ways in which they habitually 
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interact with the environment and others, looking for the experiences that lie outside of the 
dominant narrative. An aim of lucid inquiry, then, is the development of traitorous identities, 
in both teachers and students. In a lucid inquiry, the teacher as facilitator and co-inquirer 
maintains awareness of the fallibility of narratives and seeks to mitigate the epistemic violence 
perpetuated by dominant narratives, whilst broadening both their own and their students’ 
epistemic landscape. This is important, as Rainville (2001) explains: 
 
The absence of overt ridicule may be insufficient to overcome problems 
associated with low self-esteem or the sense of futility often experienced by 
those subjected to prolonged institutional oppression. And even the most 
politely received speaker becomes frustrated, perhaps to the point of silence, 
when her ideas are neither recognized nor understood by those around her. Both 
Native and non-Native students may be reluctant to speak out on issues of social 
justice if it appears that the community is not interested in hearing what they 
have to say. (p. 69) 
 
Such contextual silences act as a signal for a lucid teacher to expand the situated understanding 
of the classroom. A lucid teacher – one who understands the historical socio-political habitat 
of the classroom – on becoming aware of a student’s struggle due to the ‘prejudicial flaws in 
shared resources for social interpretation’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 147), does not ignore such 
prejudice but uses it as an opportunity to expand understanding, that is, as an opportunity to 
teach. Rainville (2001) further explains what can be read as hermeneutical marginalisation in 
the case of indigenous students in a traditional community of inquiry: 
 
Likewise, students may be reluctant to speak up when they feel hurt or 
threatened by remarks which others do not perceive to be threatening. Finally, 
a lack of public recognition for Aboriginal peoples and their concerns may make 
it difficult for students to formulate challenges toward, and to articulate their 
reasons for wanting to challenge, dominant societal and classroom perspectives. 
In many cases, children may be aware of their own, or others’, discomfort but 
lack familiarity with the concepts or the vocabulary necessary for responding to 
this awareness. Unless educators are willing to consider these factors when 
evaluating Philosophy for Children curriculum, we will remain oblivious to the 
possibility that classroom dialogue may be biased in ways which are not 
immediately obvious to everyone. (p. 69) 
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Further, all too often the denial of emotion as a traditional part of education via the suppression 
of ‘disruptive’ behaviour can make it even harder for a student when experiencing feelings of 
hurt, frustration or anger brought about by epistemic violence to express their distress. 
Teaching students to supress emotions is part of the living history of colonisation. Indeed, 
educational norms in Western societies are inextricably tied to punishment. Pedro A. Noguera 
(2010) notes that ‘[d]isciplinary practices in schools often bear a striking similarity to the 
strategies used to punish adults in society’ (p. 342). He adds that ‘[c]onsistent with the way we 
approach crime in society, the assumption is that safety and order can be achieved by removing 
“bad” individuals and keeping them away from others who are presumed to be “good” and law 
abiding’ (p. 343). Once again, this logic should sound familiar, as it is the same that was 
operational in early colonial societal structuring, including the slaughterhouses canvased in 
Chapter Four. Speaking of slaughterhouses, Plumwood (in Plumwood & Shannon, 2012) 
warns us that ‘[a]s disciplinary democracy normalises massive incarceration, and more of us 
become either prisoners or keepers, the fate of non-human and human prisoners increasingly 
converges’ (p. 57). Recall also that a primary justification for capital punishment in the early 
days of Australian colonisation was its use as a so-called ‘teaching tool’. Well over ‘100 
Aborigines were judicially executed in the 19th century … [hanging] was perceived by 
colonizers as the ultimate instrument in educating “untutored savages” in the rule of law’ 
(Finnane & McGuire, 2001, p. 281, italics added). Part of the role of a traitorous teacher, then, 
is to prevent the normalisation of epistemic violence masquerading as discipline.  
 
Conclusion 
 
I argued that the development of traitorous identities should be a goal of all Philosophy for 
Children scholars and practitioners alike. Teachers have a responsibility to their students to be 
mindful of their own prejudices, to develop their own traitorous identities, which then become 
models for inquiry. Otherwise, prejudice has a way of seeping into discourse, content choices, 
and methodology in general; of seeping into the habitat and limiting intellectual freedom. 
Hence, Dewey’s (2010) claim that an ‘environment in which some are limited will always in 
reaction create conditions that prevent the full development even of those who fancy they enjoy 
complete freedom for unhindered growth’ (p. 244). In short, the teacher needs to be aware of 
the limiting capacity of epistemic violence on creating a habitat in which varieties of 
knowledge systems can thrive.  
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Indigenous ways of knowing, being and acting in the world have, as Watson (2014) put it, 
traditionally been on the peripheral of universalising Western discourses, particularly 
philosophy. In Australia and many other countries, the knowledge and resources of Indigenous 
peoples were subsumed and consumed by colonisers without recognition and, in many cases, 
actively denied, evidence destroyed (such as in the case of agriculture) and myths perpetuated 
(such as Aboriginals as hunter-gatherers) (p. 516). The legitimacy of Aboriginal knowledge 
and philosophy has been repeatedly called into question in support of such myths. As Watson 
put it: 
 
The “domestication” and “assimilation” of Indigenous peoples are on the main 
agenda of the Australian state and within that process of assimilation the 
richness of Indigenous law, knowledge and philosophy is largely ignored, or 
treated as if those Indigenous ways of being are of minor interest. (p. 509) 
 
Education as a form of reproduction of the State has been a site of ongoing assimilation, but a 
growing body of indigenous scholarship challenges this (Rainville, 2001; Shay & Wickes, 
2017; Watson, 2014). Whilst Sharp (in Vansielegham & Kennedy, 2011), as one of the founders 
of Philosophy for Children, seemed aware of some of the limitations of the Philosophy for 
Children curriculum and pedagogy, and welcomed criticism, as evidenced in her words, 'we 
need radical alternatives to be shocked out of habitual ways of seeing, so that we can appreciate 
an idea or a practice that is more beautiful than anything we might have’ (p. 42), Indigenous 
philosophy, as we have seen, is still grossly underrepresented on the whole within Philosophy 
for Children and the wider philosophical community. My conclusion then echoes that of 
Rainville’s (2001): 
 
It is not difficult to recognize the importance of honoring the presence and the 
possibilities of Indigenous peoples, and their philosophies, when creating more 
egalitarian educational programs. I regret that my own eurocentric background 
prevents me from making authoritative claims about how, exactly, this should 
be done. I do believe, however, that committed educators can reflect a genuine 
interest in extending, or altering, the scope of our material so that it includes 
both traditional and contemporary Native American perspectives. Perhaps not 
such a formidable task when we consider the many similarities which exist 
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between Indigenous knowledge-seeking practices and Philosophy for 
Children’s dialogical approach. (p. 72) 
 
Lucid inquiry is a praxis that attempts to reinstate the centrality of genuine doubt in line with 
Peirce’s intent, and in doing so, adds a missing dimension to Lipman’s and Sharp’s 
reconstruction of the community of inquiry into a method of educational practice, that of 
emotional education along with an emphasis on the contextual creation of meaning, including 
the reconstruction and questioning of past meanings (that is, the meaning that went into the 
creation of the present reality) present in ontology. In this way, the historical narratives (that 
is, place, being, belonging, and connectedness) of the classroom intersect with cultural and 
moral history writ large, the narratives of beliefs and actions shaping not only the way we think 
and act within the classroom, but the classroom itself.  
 
Left unattended, epistemic violence will continue to function as prejudices that can manifest in 
unfair treatment of individuals and unjust structural practices embedded in law, religion, 
government policy, educational theory and practice, along with other social and political 
institutions. Lucid inquiry gives students the opportunity to reconstruct their experiences by 
exploring the normative judgments passed on them through their daily lives. Further, doing so 
allows them the intellectual freedom to create their own characters (rather than live through the 
experiences of the characters of purpose written philosophical stories-as-text), their own art of 
learning, in the way Sisyphus did while his rock was rolling. This provides opportunities for 
children to develop an epistemic understanding of being in the world and the reciprocal 
relationship between their belief-habits and the (re)construction of the habitat.  
 
The prevention of epistemic violence in the classroom may seem a small thing in the scheme 
of things, and perhaps it is. However, as classrooms are one of the first places in which the 
moral memory of people is collectively shaped – a moral memory that will in part direct the 
way people respond to and act in the world – classrooms are a site of possible reconstruction 
of both dominant logic and its effects. The ways in which epistemic violence as a feature of 
dominant logic reproduces itself in the classroom can in a sense be traced to a denial of the 
reproduction of nature and Other as part of nature. As we have seen, Plumwood (1992) stressed 
that the ‘major forms of oppression in our culture – oppression of class, of sex, race and nature 
– are interwoven’ (p. 48). She further links such oppression with the denial of the value of 
reproduction, noting that she uses reproduction ‘following Carolyn Merchant, to include the 
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reproduction of all nature, including human reproduction’ (p. 49). This denial of reproduction 
is accomplished through the conception of human identity or human consciousness as 
fundamentally opposed to nature and Other, and the ‘real heart of the problem of sustainability 
lies in this kind of consciousness’ (p. 49). To create a sustainable consciousness, that is, an 
ecologically rational identity, we need to deconstruct our (colonial) own and our (colonial) 
culture’s opposition to both nature and Other. I have argued that in the classroom, this requires 
looking for ways to promote the reproduction of both ontologies and epistemologies that have 
historically borne the brunt of epistemic violence. The development of traitorous identities 
gives us a starting point for a wider social and environmental reconstruction. 
 
 
  
 219 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Australia is a clear example of a colonial legal and cultural epistemology meeting with a far 
older epistemology and ontology, with the former by and large othering, denying, 
backgrounding, nullifying, or assimilating the latter, and the latter never ceding sovereignty, 
nor giving up the struggle for recognition. The interaction between ontology and epistemology 
is characterised throughout this thesis in terms of Camus’ absurd. Following Camus, I have 
argued that the gap between ontology and epistemology allows room for the creation or 
destruction of both ontologies and epistemologies; the human ability to imagine the world as 
other than it is and to shape it according to human imaginings is the process by which societies, 
institutions, cultures, laws, and so on, come into being. As I have shown over the course of the 
chapters, often these imaginings are then taken as foundational knowledge, translated into 
systems of oppression and used to justify atrocities, all the while denying their constructed 
origins.  
 
For efficient subordination, what’s wanted is that the structure not only not 
appear to be a cultural artifact kept in place by human decision or custom, but 
that it appear natural – that it appear to be a quite direct consequence of the facts 
about the beast which are beyond the scope of human manipulation or revision. 
It must seem natural that individuals of the one category are dominated by 
individuals of the other and that as groups, the one dominates the other. (Frye 
in Plumwood, 1993, p. 436) 
 
‘Nature’ used in the above sense is as Mary Graham (2014) puts it, simply Empire dominating 
‘behind another face’ (p. 22). To address such domination requires a reconstruction of both 
nature and human nature. To aid in such a reconstruction educationally, I have drawn on the 
combined philosophies of Plumwood and Camus to explicate an eco-rational form of education 
that I have argued shares epistemological commitments with pragmatism. These shared 
commitments allow me to adapt the community of inquiry pedagogy, a part of the Philosophy 
for Children curriculum, to create a pedagogy that has the ability to mitigate epistemic violence 
in the classroom, and act as a vehicle for wider social reconstruction.  
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I chose Philosophy for Children to highlight the potential for education to cultivate 
correctiveness, which can be found in the disrupting capabilities of philosophy. However, it 
has come under criticism for having its own epistemic bias, and, therefore, may not always be 
open to other ways of knowing, being and doing, and potentially subject to the charge of 
epistemic violence, hence, the need for the introduction of Camus’ and Plumwood’s 
philosophies.  
 
From Camus, I take the concepts of lucidity and philosophical suicide. Lucidity indicates a 
necessary response to domination; a refocusing of attention on every action as an opportunity 
for a new understanding of life, to construct meaning in a given moment. In this way, lucidity 
provides us with an understanding of the human world as constructed and, therefore, open to 
reconstruction. Such understanding shares crossovers with Dewey’s naturalistic notion of 
growth in a feedback loop of habits and habitats, as Bleazby (2013) explains: ‘Growth is 
continuous because with every experience, the individual and their environment are changed, 
which in turn causes the individual to interact with the world differently. Consequently, the 
individual then encounters more unfamiliar situations needing reconstruction, leading to 
further experience and growth’ (p. 43). Philosophical suicide gives us a way to determine when 
our beliefs and those of others are likely to create harmful habits; when our epistemology stands 
to stunt our growth or the growth of others. Likewise, Plumwood’s ethico-epistemic 
proposition allows us to judge when a body of knowledge, philosophy, or way of thinking is 
likely to cause harm, epistemically or otherwise. These concepts, taken together, allow us to 
recognise and limit the logic of domination, and they allow us to develop ecologically rational 
traitorous identities that stand in stark opposition to incorporative liberal notions of self.  
 
Built on liberal foundations, education as a tool for nation building in colonial countries is a 
site for the perpetuation of epistemic violence; a site of present-day assimilationist projects. As 
Plumwood (2002) argues, the logic of unity which underlies assimilation is another form of the 
logic of domination:  
 
The incorporative self uses unity in a hegemonic fashion to absorb the other or 
recreate them as a version of the self. To the extent that the colonising project 
is one of self-imposition and appropriation (literally ‘making self’), the 
incorporative self of the colonising mind is insensitive to the other’s 
independence and boundaries, denying the other’s right to define their own 
reality, name their own history, and establish their own identity. (p. 203) 
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The incorporative self is marked by an inability to recognise limits and, therefore, an inability 
to self-correct when such limits have been exceeded. To mitigate epistemic violence in the 
classroom, I have argued, teachers need to turn traitorous to dominant logic and model 
ecologically just thinking in the same way Lipman sought to model reasonableness and caring 
thinking. In a lucid inquiry, students are the characters in their own narratives directly relating 
to their own experiences, rather than stimulated by philosophical stories-as-text, in which 
philosophical concepts and philosophical procedures relate to student’s experiences through 
the experiences of fictional characters. This re-emphasises inquiry as an educational activity of 
inquiry, experimentation and collaboration stimulated by intelligent curiosity that arises from 
a ‘sense of genuine doubt that signals a rupture in consciousness’ (Gregory & Granger, 2012, 
p. 6). Put another way, it is a reintroduction of the Deweyan notion of thinking as inquiry, in 
which students are encouraged to bring their own experiences to the classroom through 
discussion and analyses of these experiences. If, like Peirce, we accept that philosophical 
inquiry cannot begin with complete doubt—that we can only ‘begin with all the prejudices 
which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy’ (p. 140)—then inquiry 
does not take place in a vacuum. In the classroom, students are steeped in a social structure of 
historical customs, habits and traditions of their communities. These historical narratives make 
up their prejudices and, thereby, constitute their being in the world, which are likely to stay 
with them as they become adults, and, therefore, ‘need to be questioned and explored to avoid 
a society inoculated against wonder’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2015, p. 12). Wonder can be 
understood in a similar way to the feeling of absurdity; it is an experiential break in our familiar 
perceptions of the world. As Marguerite La Caze (2002) puts it: ‘objects worthy of wonder 
stand out against the undifferentiated background of those everyday and familiar things that 
we can easily categorize. We can perceive that something is different or unfamiliar without 
making a judgment or assenting to anything particular about it’ (p. 3). It is wonder’s lack of 
judgement that La Caze finds particularly useful about the concept, and which she later argues 
provides a ‘starting point for thinking about the role of the passions in ethical and political 
questions’ (2013, p. 11).  La Caze (2002) outlines an ethical dimension of wonder as a limit to 
assimilation that is informative for education: 
 
The advantage of wonder is that it goes beyond what is or is not suitable for us. 
If the other “suited us’’ completely, in the sense of being enough like us not to 
surprise, we would have reduced the other to ourselves, and would understand 
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and respond to them only on our own terms. In regarding the other with wonder, 
their existence resists assimilation or reduction to sameness or self and we are 
able to accept differences in them. (p. 5) 
 
The break of the familiar, Camus (1977) argues, can lead us in one of two directions, towards 
the elucidation of the absurd, that is, lucidity, or towards a denial of the experience of wonder 
and a lessening of all passions, that is, back to ‘the acts of a mechanical life’ (p. 18).  The first 
leads us to question our belief-habits as we come to recognise that they ‘no longer offer us 
confidence to accept them as an explanation of reality’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2016b, 169). This 
realisation drives the desire to question the fit between habit and habitat, rather than accept 
them unquestioningly in the face of contradictory experience; to engage in denial. 
Understanding the force of habit and having the ability to stop our habitual actions long enough 
to question our judgements and re-evaluate our beliefs, is what it means to be lucid, it is the 
basis of self-correction in the community of lucid inquiry and it the basis of what it means to 
be traitorous.  
  
To be traitorous, is to act in a way that is ecologically rational, which Plumwood (2002) argues 
 
includes that higher-order form of critical, prudential, self-critical reason which 
scrutinises the match or fit between an agent’s choices, actions and effects and 
that agent’s overall desires, interests, and objectives as they require certain 
ecological conditions for their fulfilment. (p. 68) 
 
To be ecologically rational requires recognition of the fit, or lack thereof, between 
epistemology and ontology, with ontology understood relationally, and, therefore, 
ecologically. It is not enough to either examine our beliefs or the world around us, we need 
also look to the ways in which the two interact and set ecologically rational limits to action that 
foster correctiveness. Without such limits we lose the ability to understand the very conditions 
that enable our lives and the lives of others (Plumwood, 2008). I have argued that the 
establishment of such limits comes not in the form of rules but in the process of reasoning from 
the breath as proposed by Camus, first and foremost, and secondly and equally importantly, 
through Plumwood’s (2002) ‘ethico-epistemological proposition’, which states that 
‘knowledges that involve injustice to those who are known do not provide accurate or ethically 
acceptable forms of knowledge’ (p. 44). Such a proposition also provides an epistemic 
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guideline for regulating dominance and can, perhaps, through lucid inquiry, be used to 
dismantle dualisms and increase intellectual freedoms which are ‘compromised by the 
domination of instrumental rationality that sees all as a means to the furtherance of our 
currently-accepted economic and political structures’ (Hyde, 2016, p. 2). As such structures 
are created, and as Frye pointed out above, given ‘natural’ status as a way of encoding 
domination in a culturally acceptable form, such norms of cultural acceptance must also be re-
written. Watson’s (2014) points to a way in which this can be accomplished: 
 
To make up for the historic and ongoing erasures of Aboriginal knowledge and 
possibly to begin to remedy the desolation which they have wrought, one 
solution would be to recentre Aboriginal worldviews as the norm and to liberate 
Indigenous places from colonising and assimilationist processes. However, for 
this to occur we need to take aim at normativity itself; and certainly to take aim 
at the proposition that the state is the centre into which First Nations peoples 
are to be absorbed and assimilated. In centring Aboriginal knowledges, we need 
to go beyond neo-liberal interpretations of human rights and include, for 
example, the relationality of Indigenous knowledges to all things in the 
environment, to land and kin. (p. 513) 
 
Environmental ethics has since the 1970s been concerned with decentering ethics, with many 
varied adaptions, reconfigurations or new theories developed and developing. Just as 
environmental ethics has sought to decentre the human from ethical discourses, Watson calls 
for a decentering of Western knowledge from all discourses, to make room for other ways of 
knowing, being and doing. To turn traitorous to dominant logic requires a decentering of 
Western knowledge as the only acceptable and True knowledge. Traitorous identities know 
that between assimilation and appropriation lies co-creation based on a recognition of limits.97 
Understanding the absurd or becoming lucid imposes a limit on action, for by reasoning from 
the breath we come to recognise first and foremost the importance of the life of the Other. 
Being lucid means we no longer hold a position to the point of imposition, it means we 
understand the fallibility of our thoughts and the potential for destruction inherent in our 
                                                 
97 An existing example is the Yolngu teachers at Yirrkala Community School, led by Principal Mandawuy 
Yunupingu, who banned the teaching Mathematics for two years ‘because it was doing so much harm to the 
students’, and developed a curriculum to bring ‘together language and literacy, teaching (both in Yolgu and in 
English) with teaching of both traditional knowledge of the physical and social world, and Western ideas of Maths 
and Science’ (Thornton, M.B., 1996, p. 3). 
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actions. Lucidity stands in opposition to one True, Absolute or transcendental way of knowing 
–  as Graham (1999) argues, if ‘one true way is posited, sooner or later individuals or groups 
are inclined to ideologise it; rigid thinking then follows (or vice versa), and the formation of 
groups of 'true believers', chosen people, sects, religions, parties etc., cannot be far behind’ (p. 
113).  
 
Inherent in lucidity is an understanding of our place in the world as relational and our projects 
as co-creations with others; human animal, non-human animals and environment. Whilst there 
is a growing awareness of ethical and ecological failure and the link between them, we still 
have a long way to go to decentre both knowledge and ethics away from solely human 
concerns. As Plumwood (2002) put it: 
 
The quest for a nature and place-sensitive society, like the quest for a better 
quality working life and a genuinely communicative democracy, unveils a 
project that is radical in the sense that its fulfilment as the normal case would 
challenge the existing order very deeply and fundamentally at many levels. (p. 
235) 
 
What this shows is that in order to rethink our educational processes in an ecologically rational 
manner we must not only understand what it is that makes us human, we must rethink how the 
traditional understanding of the fully human as rational individual has shaped the way we see 
the world and the way we structure our institutions. It may be remarked that this is too great a 
project, however, it has also been remarked that humans are too small and insignificant to affect 
global change. If climate change can teach us anything, it can teach us that our actions matter, 
and our belief-habits shape the environment.  
 
If our belief-habits have led to our present-day environmental crisis, the path out would seem 
to entail a radical shift in those belief-habits. In education, this would mean a shift toward 
philosophically inclusive, place-based pedagogies, with place understood not as singular 
individual attachment to place, but as interconnected sites which support our lives and for the 
continuity of which we are accountable.  
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